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ABSTRACT
“Patterns of Diffusion” argues that the measles epidemic of 1886-1889 was a pivotal 
event in the indigenous history of British Columbia especially in its Central Interior. This 
conclusion is drawn primarily through the examination of Hudson’s Bay Company 
(HBC) and Department of Indian affairs (DIA) documents, but also from newspaper 
accounts, the oral histories of Imbert Orchard, and the anthropological notes of Marius 
Barbeau. Prior to this study, no academic work has fully examined the epidemic.
“Patterns of Diffusion” traces the spread of the epidemic, explores the involvement of the 
HBC, and examines the origins of the Skeena River Uprising, in which the epidemic was 
deeply involved. The incorporation of the 1886-1889 measles epidemic into the broader 
historical narrative contributes to our understanding of the expansion of white settlement 
and colonial authority in BC’s Central Interior region at the end of the nineteenth century.
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Introduction
Writing to William Sinclair, postmaster of Fraser Lake, in February 1888, 
Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) Chief Factor Roderick MacFarlane wrote, “It should be 
our misfortune indeed if the Measles Epidemic extends to the Babine—should it do so, 
the attacked Indians must be careful not to catch cold, by exposure or otherwise. ... so 
far, our Indians have escaped attack and I hope may long continue this.”1 Despite the 
efforts of the HBC, the good fortune MacFarlane desired was not forthcoming. Aided by 
harsh weather and the periodic scarcity of small animals, epidemic measles spread 
rapidly throughout British Columbia’s Central Interior and Skeena region during the 
winter and spring of 1887-1888. Changes in local economies, prompted by declining 
animal populations, a shifting wage-labour system, and conflicts over access to fisheries 
further weakened indigenous communities, undermining their ability to withstand the 
disease. Although mortality during the 1886-1888 measles epidemic did not reach the 
scale of earlier epidemics, it is historically significant because it occurred during a pivotal 
point in newcomer/indigenous relations in the Central Interior of British Columbia, and 
contributes to our understanding of the expansion of white settlement and colonial 
authority in BC’s Central Interior region at the end of the nineteenth century.
An examination of provincial and settler response to illness in indigenous 
communities in the Central Interior reveals a complex relationship among settler 
perceptions of land, indigenous people, and disease. Despite a growing white population, 
settlement was not yet firmly established in many regions of British Columbia’s Central
1 Hudson’s Bay Company Archives (HBCA) B.188/b/10 R. MacFarlane to William Sinclair (Fraser Lake) 
vol. 1, Fort St. James (Stuart Lake) Correspondence Outward.
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Interior, and the control of provincial and federal governments was still tenuous. The 
provincial government had developed some administrative presence in the Central 
Interior, as jurisdiction over First Nations Peoples passed in 1871 from the provincial 
government to the Canadian federal government, but the Department of Indian Affairs 
(DIA) had little effective presence in much of British Columbia before 1888. Moreover, 
the epidemic struck in the aftermath of the North-West Rebellion (1885), and was heavily 
intertwined with the Skeena River Uprising, one of few, and one of the last incidents of 
direct military conflict between government and indigenous peoples in British Columbia. 
Both incidents reflected and fueled anxieties about settler identity and security in western 
Canada, and strongly influenced the way that British Columbia’s Euro-Canadian 
population perceived the “Indian problem.” The 1886-1888 measles epidemic occurred 
during a period of transition in British Columbia, and although scholars have largely 
overlooked it, the devastating event was intertwined with important ideological and 
administrative developments. The measles epidemic was an essential element in the 
construction of the settler narrative of the Upper Skeena, and a key influence on the 
expansion of the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) into British Columbia’s Central 
Interior region.
Described by the DIA as a “particularly bad type of measles,” the 1887-1888 
measles epidemic was felt strongly in indigenous communities across western Canada. 
Many fatalities among children and young adults were reported almost everywhere the 
epidemic spread. Striking Blackfoot, Stoney, Cree and Metis communities, the epidemic 
spread rapidly through the southern half of the North-West Territories before entering 
British Columbia through both the south-east section of the province and the Puget Sound
2
region late in the fall of 1887. Evidence of epidemic measles in the Fraser Valley and 
Canyon area suggests that the disease spread northward inland, via Quesnel, as well as 
along the coast.2 The strongest evidence links the diffusion of disease along the British 
Columbia coast to indigenous hops workers returning from Washington State.3 The 
crowded and unsanitary accommodations typical of many of the hops camps encouraged 
the spread of the epidemic.4 Historian Paige Raibmon suggests that measles was 
widespread along the west coast of the United States, and W.H. Lomas of the DIA’s West 
Coast Agency noted that epidemic measles had been reported in the Indians of Puget 
Sound that same summer, where the disease “swept off . . .  great numbers of Children.”5 
Measles spread rapidly among the indigenous people of British Columbia. With an 
incubation period of between eight and twelve days, and the possibility of contagion four 
days prior to the outbreak of rash, measles is highly contagious. It is likely that many 
were not aware they were ill or contagious when they left the hops camps.6 Reports of 
severe measles in indigenous communities on the Sunshine Coast, the South Coast of 
Vancouver Island, and the entrance to the Skeena River confirm a general northward 
diffusion along the coast. Hubs of indigenous trade and travel, villages along this route 
functioned as natural gateways to other areas of the province.
The diffusion of the epidemic through the interior of British Columbia has been 
more difficult to trace, in part due to a fragmentary documentary record. The earliest 
report of the epidemic in HBC records of the Central Interior is from Fort George on 16
2 W.M. Meason, “Lillooet Tribes,” Annual Report o f  the Department o f  Indian Affairs (ARDIA), 1888, 113; 
H. Dewdney, “British Columbia ” ARDIA, 1888, lxxvi.
3 Paige Raibmon, Authentic Indians: Episodes o f  Encounter from  the Late-Nineteenth-Century Northwest 
Coast (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 84; W.H. Lomas, “Cowichan Agency,” ARDIA, 1888, 100.
4 Raibmon, Authentic Indians, 83; Mary-Ellen Kelm, Colonizing Bodies: Aboriginal Health and Healing in 
British Columbia, 1900-50 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998), 54.
5 Raibmon, Authentic Indians, 40, 84; W.H. Lomas, “West Coast Agency,” ARDIA, 1888, 118.
6 Raibmon, Authentic Indians, 74.
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January 1888, but the disease had arrived at Stuart Lake and Hazelton as early as the 
middle of February, suggesting the disease arrived from two different directions.7 While 
the epidemic did not affect the people of every locality equally, the DIA and HBC 
reported many deaths over a broad area. Mortality rates were particularly high in densely 
populated regions, notably the indigenous communities of the Babine, where the
Q
epidemic evidently arrived as late as May 1888.
The exact origins of the measles epidemic are unclear, but an outbreak of virulent 
measles in the British Isles and parts of Western Europe was reported between 1886 and 
1889.9 As epidemic measles was also present in Ontario and eastern Canada between 
1887 and 1889, it is possible that the epidemic entered Canada through routine patterns of 
immigration and travel. A diffusion pattern linked to immigration would also support the 
epidemic’s general westward movement, a route that loosely followed the recently 
completed Canadian Pacific Railroad (CPR). Although other scholars have examined the 
relationship between the growth of transportation and epidemic disease in the North-West 
Territories, any direct connection between the CPR and the 1888 measles epidemic 
cannot be proven given the present limitations of primary sources and the practical 
limitations of research. However, this does not mean that there was no connection 
between the expansion of settlement in the Canadian West and the diffusion of measles in 
indigenous populations. The epidemic entered British Columbia during a period of 
economic and administrative transition, and evidence strongly suggests that shifting wage
7 HBCA B.280/a/l Fort George 16 January 1888; HBCA B.188/b/10 R. MacFarlane to William Sinclair 
(Fraser Lake) Vol.l (29 February 1888), Fort St. James (Stuart Lake) Correspondence Outward.
8HBCA B.188/b/10, vol.2 Fort St. James (Stuart Lake) Outward Correspondence “Memorandum for 
QuesneF’pg. 81.
9 Anne Hardy, The Epidemic Streets: Infectious Disease and the Rise o f  Preventive Medicine, 1856-1900 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York, 1993), 35; “Epidemic o f Measles,” The Times, 8 December 
1888, 14; “Measles at Wandsworth,” The Times, 10 December, 1888,6; “Measles, or two Nights in a Paris 
Hospital,” The Times, 15 June 1889, 7.
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labour patterns and the growth of settler economies facilitated the spread of the 1887- 
1888 measles epidemic.
Both the provincial government and settler population recognized the threat that 
epidemic disease posed to the stability of both indigenous and white communities. This 
anxiety was expressed in different forms in different spheres, and reflected contrasting 
ideas about the future of British Columbia and the responsibilities of the provincial 
government as white settlement expanded into the Central Interior. In each case the 
uncertain position of British Columbia’s indigenous population was at the center of the 
dialogue, as well as the expansion of what historian Mary-Ellen Kelm termed “that North 
American middle ground between urban slums and far off colonies—the Indian 
reserve.”10 Part of broader dialogue about the future of settlement in remote areas, the 
expansion of the reserve system into the Babine and Skeena regions was both directly and 
indirectly linked to the period of scarcity and disease. In 1889, less than a year after the 
measles epidemic and the Skeena River Uprising, the Babine Agency was created with 
headquarters positioned in the small settler community of Hazelton. Comprising of 
Gitxsan, Babine and Wet’suwet’en territory, the agency was under the supervision of the 
newly appointed agent Richard E. Loring, a justice of the peace who had also been 
heavily involved in the Skeena River Uprising and the subsequent trials following 
government intervention.11 In 1891, the Babine Agency was allotted 4,384 acres which 
were then divided into nine separate reserves. The reserves in the Babine Agency were 
the first to be established in this geographic region, part of a large number rapidly created
10 Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, 372.
11 Jeremy David Williams, “A History of Gitxsan Relations with Colonial and Canadian Law, 1858-1909” 
(MA Thesis, University of Northern British Columbia), 62; Joanne Fiske, Cis Dideen Kat (When the 
Plumes Rise): The Way o f  the Lake Babine Nation (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000), 36.
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at the end of the nineteenth century in an attempt to address, among other concerns, the 
usurpation of indigenous land by white settlers.12 Interdepartmental and 
intergovernmental conflicts over title, access to resources, and the proximity of settler 
populations frequently marked these transactions.13
The lack of formal Indian administration in central British Columbia had a direct 
impact on how the HBC related to the indigenous people of the Central Interior. The 
failure of governments to administer Indian affairs effectively in remote regions had 
made many people in the HBC uneasy since the Crown Colony of British Columbia was 
created in 1858. Between 1821 and 1858, the British government had given the HBC an 
exclusive licence over the land that would become British Columbia. When the 
government revoked the licence, and created the colony of British Columbia, the HBC 
relinquished legal and constitutional responsibility for providing aid to indigenous 
populations.14 The situation became more complicated when British Columbia joined 
Canada in 1871. Unlike in the North-West Territories, the British Columbia Government 
retained control over Crown land, and by extension, the creation of reserves, when the 
province joined Canada in 1871. Thus it was unclear which federal or provincial 
department, if any, was responsible for indigenous peoples in British Columbia who had 
not yet signed treaties or been assigned Crown land for reserves. This put significant 
pressure on the HBC in many parts of the province. Although the company remained 
profitable in parts of British Columbia long after it had ceased to operate as an active
12 Cole Harris, Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002), 204,205.
13 Harris, Making Native Space, 184, 191.
14 Arthur J. Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1990), 44; Arthur J. Ray, “The Decline of Paternalism in the Hudson’s Bay Company Fur Trade, 1870- 
1945,” in Merchant, Credit and Labour Strategies in Historical Perspective, ed. Rosemary E. Ommer 
(Fredericton: Acadiensis Press 1990): 190, 191.
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trading company in many areas of eastern Canada, by the end of the nineteenth century, 
the HBC asserted that it no longer bore the responsibility of providing relief to suffering 
indigenous communities that it had when it operated as a quasi-govemment under a trade 
monopoly.
Evidence of this tension is visible in the Central Interior in the period under 
scrutiny here. HBC Chief Factor Roderick MacFarlane did not consider the impact of the 
measles epidemic a separate issue from the political vacuum and broader economic and 
environmental instability experienced by the indigenous peoples of the Stuart Lake 
region. Although MacFarlane considered Stuart Lake and its satellite posts to be among 
the most profitable remaining HBC trading posts in British Columbia, he argued that the 
intervention of the federal government during periods of distress was necessary for the 
well-being of indigenous populations, and strongly advocated for the government-funded 
distribution of food and other aid following the winter of 1887-1888.15 This allotment of 
emergency supplies would be distributed by the HBC, and supplemented by an annual 
system of rations and material aid for the elderly and infirm in indigenous communities in 
close proximity to the satellite posts of Stuart Lake. Such a system would ensure that the 
destitute were provided for while removing the financial burden from the HBC, and, 
according to MacFarlane, prove to be more cost effective for both the DIA and the 
provincial government.16 Although very different from the informal need-based aid 
system implemented elsewhere in the province, MacFarlane’s suggestions were not
15 HBCA B.188/b/10, vol. 4, Fort St. James (Stuart Lake) Outward Correspondence, 30 June 1888, 
MacFarlane to H.B. Davie (Victoria, BC).
16 HBCA B.188/b/10, vol. 4 Fort. St. James (Stuart Lake) Outward Correspondence MacFarlane to H.B. 
Davie (Victoria BC), pg 3.
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without precedent.17 The HBC was often used as a means to distribute aid and treaty 
payments to remote regions of the North-West Territories, in part, as Ray argues, because 
the HBC had pre-existing trade relationships with indigenous peoples and wished to 
capitalize upon the transfer of money and material goods, but also because some 
Canadian Government officials perceived the HBC as less likely to commit fraud than 
specially appointed government agents.18 However, MacFarlane’s repeated requests for 
aid were denied by both the federal and provincial governments, and neither government 
directly addressed the existence of epidemic disease or hardship outside of areas already 
under established control.
Newspapers, notably the Victoria Times Colonist, depicted the epidemic as an 
extension of an already existing threat, and used reports of virulent measles to deepen 
public concerns about the instability of indigenous communities. Although this dialogue 
primarily focused on Vancouver Island and the reserves near Victoria, these ideas were 
easily modified in the case of the Skeena River Uprising to encompass Hazelton and 
other rural communities where indigenous people were not yet living on reserves. 
Positioning the isolated white community at Hazelton as especially vulnerable to “Indian 
threat” not only legitimized already present anxieties about the safety of distant settler 
communities, but also reinforced the perception of Victoria as an important urban center 
where white identity was physically healthy and well established, if not always secure. 
Penelope Edmonds has argued that these types of transitions were an integral part of the 
imperial process for distant outposts such as Victoria, and that such ideological 
repositioning was an important step that had to be completed before any lasting colonial
17 Ray, “The Decline of Paternalism,” 189.
18 Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade, 5.
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order could be enforced. These reconceptualizations allowed for once “unruly” outlying 
town or cities to become “nodes in active trans-imperial networks in which bodies, ideas, 
and capital increasingly flowed in circuits of empire.”19 Although Edmonds was 
theorizing about mid-nineteenth-century Victoria, the identification of the city as “a 
continuing and vital structure of settler colonialism,” and the argument that such frontiers 
were “mercurial, transactional” makes this concept equally applicable to a post- 
confederation British Columbia increasingly interconnected by provincial webs of 
communication, transport, and ideology.20 Edmond’s theories are particularly relevant to 
Hazelton, where the HBC and the small settler community defined its relationship with 
Victoria (and Empire) through fears of disease and indigenous unrest.
However, not all scholarship has recognized the fluidity of settlement in British 
Columbia. Robin Fisher’s seminal Contact and Conflict asserted that there was a clear 
distinction between the British Columbia’s fur trade era and settler period, and that 
“white domination was complete by the end of the 1880’s [sic];” with the expiry date of 
indigenous agency set at 1858.21 At this point, a “human deluge” of gold-seekers shifted 
the balance of power in provincial affairs and effectively “signaled the end of the fur 
trade.”22 As the preface to the second edition acknowledges, Fisher’s thesis has been 
superseded by more nuanced arguments describing the agency of British Columbia’s 
indigenous peoples during the nineteenth century, as well as what has increasingly come
19 Penelope Edmonds, Urbanizing Frontiers: Indigenous Peoples and Settlers in 19th- Century Pacific Rim 
Cities (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 12.
20 Edmonds, Urbanizing Frontiers, 9, 6.
21 Robin Fisher, Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia 1774-1890 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), xi.
22 Fisher, Contact and Conflict, 71.
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to be viewed as the evolution, rather than replacement, of the fur trade economy.23 More 
recent attempts to fill this gap have identified the important ideological and 
administrative transformations that occurred within the early twentieth century. Scholars 
such as Mary-Ellen Kelm, Cole Harris, and John Lutz have done much to expand the 
knowledge of the administrative development of the relatively young province through 
studies of changing practices and perceptions of indigenous health and medicine, the 
creation of reserves and land claims, and the adaptive nature of indigenous wage labour.24 
Although they, and other scholars, have shown that the settlement (or “resettlement”25) of 
British Columbia might be better thought of as complex relationships rather than finite 
periods, there is still much room for growth in discussions of indigenous people and the 
late nineteenth century and northern or central British Columbia. This need is particularly 
apparent in the scholarship of the Central Interior, Cariboo, and Skeena regions. No 
academic studies have incorporated these somewhat geographically isolated regions into 
broader discussions of nineteenth century indigenous health or epidemiology. As a result, 
the historical narrative of British Columbia has tended to overlook more nuanced euro- 
Canadian/indigenous interactions, perhaps most notably the influence of epidemic disease 
on the growth of the state and administrative structures.
“Patterns of Diffusion” addresses this gap by focusing on the diffusion and impact 
of the 1886-1888 measles epidemic in British Columbia’s Central Interior, with an 
emphasis on the Skeena Forks and Stuart Lake region, both important economic hubs and
23 Fisher, Contact and Conflict, xvii, xiv. Fisher points to John Lutz (Makuk) and Rolf Knight (Indians at 
Work) for more recent work on the development of indigenous economies, as well as Susan Neylan’s The 
Heavens Are Changing for a more nuanced study of indigenous-newcomer missionary relationships.
24Mary-Ellen Kelm, Colonizing Bodies: Aboriginal Health and Healing in British Columbia, 1900-50 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002); John Lutz, Makuk: A New History o f  Aboriginal-White Relations 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008); Harris, Making Native Space.
25 Cole Harris, The Resettlement o f  British Columbia: Essays on Colonialism and Geographical Change 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996).
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centers of indigenous/newcomer interaction. These heavily interconnected regions have 
been chosen for examination in part because of the abundance of previously under­
examined evidence, and in part because of the unique and transitional role the Central 
Interior occupied during the late nineteenth century, a period when Victoria was urban 
enough to no longer be considered a “true” frontier capital but Indian policy and 
administration in British Columbia was still being established. By emphasizing the 
epidemic’s importance in this period and geographic region, this thesis fills an important 
gap in the epidemiological history of central British Columbia and adds to existing 
discussions of indigenous responses to an increased newcomer presence and the 
extension of state authority.
The historical literature examining epidemic disease in western Canada is uneven 
at best. Many studies examine acute infectious diseases in the fur trade era,26 and others 
examine chronic diseases in the twentieth century,27 but few works examine acute 
infectious diseases in the late the nineteenth century. This study draws upon all of that 
work to explore an epidemic of acute infectious disease during a time of transition from a
26 Cole Harris, “Voices of Disaster: Smallpox around the Strait o f Georgia in 1782,” Ethnohistory 41.4 
(1994): 591-626; Cole Harris, Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British 
Columbia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002); Jody Decker; “Epidemics in Saskatchewan during the Fur Trade 
Era” in Geography o f  Saskatchewan, ed. Bernard T. Thraves et al. (Regina: Canadian Plains Research 
Center, 2007): 86-90; Jody Decker, “We Should Never Again Be the Same People: The Diffusion and 
Cumulative Impact o f Acute Infectious Diseases Affecting the Natives” (Ph.D. Dissertation, York 
University, 1989); Jody Decker, “Country Distempers: Deciphering Disease and Illness in Rupert’s Land 
before 1870,” in Reading Beyond Words: Context fo r  Native History, ed. Jennifer S.H. Brown and 
Elizabeth Vibert (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 2007). Robert Boyd, The Coming o f  the Spirit 
o f  Pestilence: Introduced Infectious Disease and Population Decline among Northwest Coast Indians, 
1774-1874 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999); Robert Boyd, “The Pacific Northwest Measles Epidemic of 
1847-1848,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 95.1 (1994): 6-47; R.M. Galois, “Measles, 1847-1850: The First 
Modem Epidemic in British Columbia,” BC Studies 109 (1996): 31-43; Paul Hackett, “A Very Remarkable 
Sickness": Epidemics in the Petit Nord, 1670-1846 (Winnipeg: University o f Manitoba Press, 2002); Paul 
Hackett, “Averting Disaster: The Hudson’s Bay Company and Smallpox in Western Canada during the 
Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries,” Bulletin o f  the History o f  Medicine 78 (2004), 575-609.
27 See, for example: Mary-Ellen Kelm, Colonizing Bodies-, Mary-Ellen Kelm, “British Columbia First 
Nations and the Influenza Pandemic of 1918-19,” BC Studies 122 (1999): 23-48; Maureen Lux, Medicine 
that Walks: Disease, Medicine, and Canadian Plains Native People, 1880-1940 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001).
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fur trade economy to a “modem” economy in a geographic region that is largely 
overlooked. Despite an extensive diffusion pattern and an unusual virulence, the 1886- 
1888 measles epidemic remains poorly understood and largely excluded from the 
historiography.28 “Patterns of Diffusion” is the first study to focus on the 1886-1888 
measles epidemic.
Despite gaps in the literature, historians are aware that disease has had a 
significant impact on the history of British Columbia. The broader debate about pre­
contact indigenous populations in the Western Hemisphere remains contentious and 
ongoing,29 and much of the narrative of early colonial British Columbia is still being 
constructed.30 The recent recognition of indigenous oral traditions as valid and important 
sources of information has aided this process greatly. Although this process is far from 
complete, it has significantly expanded knowledge of the indigenous history of British 
Columbia and encouraged the broader inclusion of narratives of health and the 
indigenous body into the traditionally euro-Canadian dominated narratives of 
colonization and settlement. However, historians remain divided on the full impact of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century epidemics upon British Columbia’s indigenous 
population. Estimates of pre-contact and early post-contact populations differ
28 Several historians and geographers have used the epidemic to provide context for broader arguments 
concerning shifting economic or cultural patterns. See, for example, Paige Raibmon’s Authentic Indians,
84; John Lutz, Makuk, 96; Susan Neylan, The Heavens Are Changing: Nineteenth-Century Protestant 
Missions and Tsimshian Christianity (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 135, 190.
29 See Chapter Three, “Eden,” in Shepard Krech Ill’s The Ecological Indian: Myth and History (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1999). Although Krech determines the “most sensible” estimates o f  pre-contact 
population are between four to seven million (93), scholars have estimated as widely as 2-18 million (83).
0 For dialogue on the importance o f ethnohistory in disease studies, see Jay Miller, “Tsimshian Ethno- 
Ethnohistoiy: A “Real” Indigenous Chronology,” Ethnohistory 45.4 (1998): 658-671; Cole Harris, “Voices 
o f Disaster, ” 592; Mary-Ellen Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, xv.
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considerably, with more recent estimates of depopulation ranging from 50 to 90 percent 
of the indigenous population.31
Historians and First Nations scholars now largely accept the argument that 
epidemic disease played a crucial role in the colonization of British Columbia, but they 
disagree about what such high mortality rates signify in the context of indigenous agency 
and the later establishment of colonial government in British Columbia. Cole Harris has 
called for a better integration of epidemic-era evidence into mainstream literature. Harris 
challenged the continued reluctance of scholars to acknowledge “strong evidence” of 
cultural disruption resulting from epidemic disease, citing both the lingering influence of 
salvage ethnography and the ongoing refusal to acknowledge indigenous history as a 
dynamic force independent of British Columbia’s broader imperial narrative.32 Such 
massive disruption, Harris argued, should be foremost when considering 
indigenous/newcomer relations on Vancouver Island and the West Coast.33 This 
argument was in some ways furthered in Robert Boyd’s The Coming o f the Spirit o f 
Pestilence. Introducing the population debate to the context of the Coast Salish, Boyd 
argued that the influx of epidemic disease to the Northwest Coast resulted in a 
depopulation that was as much cultural as it was literal, claiming that “[ajfter a century of 
Euro-American contact... cultures were shattered: populations had plummeted, some 
groups had become extinct, and others were shadows of their former selves.”34 This claim 
is primarily based on the calculation that at least 74 percent of the Northwest Coast’s
31 Robert Boyd, The Coming o f  the Spirit o f  Pestilence, 3. Boyd estimates that out of a pre-contact 
population of “over 180,000, only about 35,000 to 40,000 [indigenous people] were left. Cole Harris, 
“Voices of Disaster,” 592. Cole Harris argues that the decline of population in British Columbia was most 
likely around 90 percent, a figure parallel to contemporary estimates for other areas of North America.
32 Harris, “Voices of Disaster,” 592.
33 Harris, “Voices of Disaster,” 617.
34 Boyd, The Coming o f  the Spirit o f  Pestilence, 3.
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indigenous population was lost to epidemic disease.35 Such large-scale depopulation, 
when combined with the loss of cultural knowledge, according to Boyd, shifted the 
balance of power between newcomers and indigenous people on the Northwest Coast for 
the next two hundred years. While “Patterns of Diffusion” does not emphasize the 
cultural ramifications of the 1886-1888 measles epidemic, and disputes Boyd’s assertions 
that the indigenous cultures were irreparably damaged by the early-nineteenth century 
epidemics,36 it does use elements of Boyd’s methodology, most notably the use of a 
variety of primary sources to reconstruct a fuller pattern of diffusion that moves beyond 
the immediate symptoms of illness. Although indigenous and literary accounts of the 
epidemic are few, they have been consulted in addition to the more Euro-Canadian 
sources to help reconstruct the geography and chronology of the epidemic.
At present, only a patchwork of scholarship examines the impact of disease in the 
context of the newcomer/indigenous relationships of the nineteenth century. Some mid- 
nineteenth-century epidemics have been examined, but these studies only encompass a 
fraction of epidemic illness experienced by the indigenous peoples of British Columbia, 
and many of these studies are by necessity thematically or geographically limited. This is 
particularly true of Boyd’s “The Pacific Northwest Measles Epidemic of 1847-1848” and 
R. M. Galois’s “Measles, 1847-1850: The First Modem Epidemic in British Columbia.”37 
Both Galois’ and Boyd’s arguments for the modernity of the Pacific Northwest measles 
epidemic of 1847-1850 are constmcted almost totally around the assertion that disease 
was experienced by indigenous communities differently when the means of diffusion
35 Ibid.
36 Boyd, The Coming o f  the Spirit o f  Pestilence, 268-278.
37 Robert Boyd, “The Pacific Northwest Measles Epidemic”; R.M. Galois, “Measles, 1847-1850.” It should 
be noted that Galois’s article, “Measles, 1847-1850” was written in response to Boyd’s earlier study.
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changed from indigenous patterns of travel to settler-introduced patterns of travel and 
trade.38 However, both the 1847-1850 measles and 1862-1863 smallpox epidemics 
occurred prior to the extension of colonial authority to much of the Colony of British 
Columbia, meaning that its “modernity” was limited to British Columbia’s southern 
sections. In both studies, little analytical consideration is given to shifts in cultural 
context or possible developments in interpretations of pathology. Although both works 
examine an important aspect of indigenous/newcomer relationships in British Columbia, 
the limited nature of these studies did little to further discourse surrounding the role of 
epidemic disease in the extension of state apparatuses in the new territory.
The impact of colonization upon indigenous health in British Columbia is more 
directly examined in Mary-Ellen Kelm’s important Colonizing Bodies. Exploring themes 
of dominance and resistance in the growth of the DIA, Kelm argued that First Nations 
bodies functioned as “sites of struggle between indigenous and imported healing 
systems” and were shaped through “the colonial policies and practices of the Canadian 
government.”39 Using DIA ethnography, archaeology, archival history, and oral histories 
as evidence, Kelm asserted that twentieth-century Indian policy actively constructed a 
physically inferior indigenous body through residential schooling and regulations 
intended to control elements of diet, dress, and religious practice.40 These policies formed 
the core of the Canadian government’s relationship with indigenous people and were 
contingent upon the belief that the indigenous body could be improved, reformed, and 
controlled through strict regimentation and supervision. The idea that this transformation 
was possible was closely linked to the growth of the body as a subject of study and the
38 Boyd, “The Pacific Northwest Measles Epidemic,” 31-43; R.M. Galois, “Measles, 1847-1850,” 31.
39 Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, 175, xix.
40 Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, 175, xv.
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rexpansion of medical knowledge, all of which supported the legitimacy of racial 
taxonomies and the superior physicality of the white body.41 These “scientific” principles 
justified the use of aggressive policies by the DIA despite the repeated failure of 
indigenous populations to thrive under government administration, and made, as Kelm 
argued, the practice of Euro-Canadian medicine among indigenous people acts of 
colonization.42 Although many of the administrative structures examined in Colonizing 
Bodies were not yet fully formed in the Central Interior of British Columbia at the end of 
the nineteenth century, many of Kelm’s core tenets are applicable to this study, and help 
us understand the role of epidemic disease and the indigenous body in British Columbia’s 
late-nineteenth-century political and social sphere. By arguing that the idea of a malleable 
and unwell indigenous body is a social construct with roots in enduring imperial rhetoric, 
Kelm shows how dialogue about health, illness, and physicality can be used as a lens to 
examine the power dynamics at the heart of the indigenous/newcomer relationships that 
have defined much of British Columbia’s recent history.
A more critical argument about the culpability of the DIA and the ill health of 
indigenous peoples is made by Maureen Lux in Medicine That Walks. Examining Indian 
policy and the expansion of the DIA that followed the signing of Treaties Four, Six, and 
Seven, Lux argued that poor conditions and disease among Indian reserves and 
residential schools were perpetuated in order to further the opening of the Canadian West 
to settlement and agriculture 43 Lux asserted that the desire to increase white immigration 
led to the Canadian Government’s intentional withholding of food, medicine, and proper 
farming equipment from indigenous communities, resulting in such poor living
41 Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, xviii.
42 Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, xix.
43 Lux, Medicine that Walks, 5.
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conditions that “the Native peoples of the plains could not escape the descent into 
illness.”44 However, Medicine that Walks does not acknowledge the epidemic measles 
that spread through much of the plains region between 1886 and 1888.
Historian James Daschuk briefly discusses the spread of the 1886-1889 measles 
epidemic in his recent study Clearing the Plains. Although the primary goal of Daschuk’s 
study was to “identify the roots of the current health disparity between the indigenous and 
mainstream populations in Western Canada,” his secondary goal was to “deal with the 
politics of famine,” particularly in regards to the tuberculosis crisis that spread 
throughout the western plains during the late nineteenth century 45 As the title suggests, 
Daschuk focused on the southern part of the North-West Territories and viewed the 
spread of epidemic diseases as a natural extension of pre-existing famines and ill health. 
Daschuk acknowledged the importance of biology in the spread of epidemic disease,46 
but primarily argued that the periods of increasingly poor health in indigenous 
communities were created by the “malevolence of the Macdonald regime” and the failure 
of the DIA to meet treaty terms or provide adequate food and medical supplies.47 
Unfortunately, Daschuk does not follow the epidemic into British Columbia, instead 
focusing on the rise of influenza and tuberculosis at the turn of the twentieth century.
While it is unclear what role, if any, negligence on the part of the DIA had in the 
spread of the measles epidemic throughout the North-West Territories, little evidence 
exists to suggest that officials in the DIA deliberately encouraged ill health during the 
1886-1888 measles epidemic in British Columbia. The 1888 annual report suggests that
44 Lux, Medicine that Walks, 4.
45 Daschuk, Clearing the Plains: Disease, Politics o f  Starvation, and the Loss o f  Aboriginal Life (Regina: 
University of Regina Press, 2013), ix, xix.
46 Daschuk, Clearing the Plains, xvi.
47 James Daschuk, Clearing the Plains, 103.
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many agents were very concerned about poor health and the spread of the measles 
epidemic in reserve populations.48 While it is difficult to know how thoroughly 
precautions were actually implemented in the 1886-1888 measles epidemic, a substantial 
amount of evidence suggests that the DIA advocated a timely response to epidemic 
disease. Although there is little firm evidence to suggest that quarantine was implemented 
by the DIA during the 1886-1888 measles epidemic, quarantine measures were 
sometimes relied upon to control smallpox in reserve populations. However, as 
quarantine procedures were just beginning to come into widespread use for epidemic 
measles in urban populations, the failure to implement them does not necessarily indicate 
anything other than disorganization 49 Moreover, these arguments do not translate very 
well into the context of central British Columbia, where the DIA’s presence was much 
more tenuous and the number of Indian agents much smaller than in the North-West 
Territories.
Arthur J. Ray’s The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age examines the 
mercantile-based trajectory that the company took between 1870 and 1945 as the 
company struggled to meet the challenges of western Canada’s expanding market, 
providing an important methodological bridge into the twentieth century and the modem 
fur trade. The HBC’s transition into the twentieth century was particularly complex in 
British Columbia’s Central Interior. Despite periods of serious financial difficulties, the 
company still had a far greater presence than the government did in most of the region. 
Although HBC personnel resisted the withdrawal of credit and emergency relief when the 
government was not able or willing to fill the gap, many senior officials and investors
48 For an example see Samuel R. Lucas, “Peace Hills Agency,” ARDIA, 1887, 96; WM Pocklington, “Blood 
Agency,” ARDIA, 1887,97.
49 Hardy, Epidemic Streets, 50, 51.
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believed that extending credit to indigenous people was contrary to modern business 
plans and would not provide any long-term benefit to the Company or the Indians.50 
Moreover, the company also believed that relief was a government responsibility. These 
tensions were not limited to British Columbia, and plagued the HBC well into the 
twentieth century.51 While the extensive credit system was not yet extinguished in the 
Central Interior at the time of the measles epidemic, it was in the process of being 
restricted at smaller and less productive posts, and MacFarlane was seeking ways to 
eliminate the cost and instability of the indigenous freighting system.52
A large part of “Patterns of Diffusion” has been informed by historical 
geographies. Although disease itself is a cultural and physiological experience, epidemics 
are inherently geographical phenomena. Works by Arthur J. Ray, Jody Decker, and Paul 
Hackett are used to provide context to the spread of disease in indigenous communities, 
and anchor the largely unexamined 1888 measles epidemic within a scholarly body that 
recognizes the historical significance of origin and patterns of disease diffusion.53 
Although both Ray and Decker examine important facets of geography and epidemiology 
in the growth of technology and newcomer/indigenous relationships, it was Paul 
Hackett’s A Very Remarkable Sickness (2002) that first examined the spread of epidemic 
disease as a result of non-biological factors. Relying primarily upon HBC documents, 
Hackett tracked the diffusion of several infectious crowd diseases, including measles,
50 Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade, 3, 5, 86, 87.
51 Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade, 201.
52 HBCA B.188/b/10 vol. 5, Fort St. James (Stuart Lake) Outward Correspondence, November 1888, 
MacFarlane to William Sinclair (Fraser Lake); Galois, “Gitxsan Law and Settler Disorder,” 80.
53 Arthur J. Ray, “Diffusion of Diseases in the Western Interior of Canada, 1830-1850,” Geographical 
Review 66.2 (1996): 139-157; Jody Decker, “Smallpox along the Frontier”; Jody Decker, “Country 
Distempers: Deciphering Disease and illness in Rupert's Land before 1870”; Paul Hackett, "A Very 
Remarkable Sickness: "Epidemics in the Petit Nord, J670-1846 (Winnipeg: University o f  Manitoba Press, 
2002).
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through the Petit Nord, the area between the Great Lakes and the Hudson’s Bay lowlands 
before 1846. By introducing concepts such as “critical community size” to the 
discussions of epidemic disease in the indigenous communities of the remote interior, 
Hackett emphasized the biological importance of the growing connections between 
outlying geographic areas and the large cities of the east coast. As transportation between 
the HBC posts and the urban centres of the east coast improved, the indigenous people of 
the Canadian interior were exposed to crowd diseases increasingly frequently. In 
asserting that the diseases that spread through the remote areas of the Petit Nord were 
both a continuum of the contact-era “Columbian Exchange,” and directly and indirectly 
linked to distant urban populations, Hackett emphasized the necessity of the further study 
of later-period epidemic disease. As such, Hackett’s work provides a strong model for the 
examination of the 1886-1888 measles epidemic.
Although factors such as economic stability, social disruption, and the shifting 
role of indigenous participation in settler communities are examined in an attempt to 
reconstruct the ideological climate of the late nineteenth century, “Patterns of Diffusion” 
does not attempt to explore the epidemic from an indigenous perspective or speak to any 
particular experience of disease. This is in part due to my outsider’s position in regard to 
indigenous traditions as well as the natural limitations of primary sources that are, in 
many cases, over one hundred years old, and the product of ideologies that privileged the 
white, male, and imperial voice. Disease among indigenous populations was not always 
seen or remarked upon as an abnormality,54 and many of the documents produced by 
colonial administrators make only oblique references to the measles epidemic. The 
annual reports from the DIA seldom mention areas outside their jurisdiction and the
54 Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, xvi.
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quality of documentation was highly variable and dependent on the vigilance of 
individual employees. Similarly, while HBC employees tended to be very concerned by 
the presence of disease among the indigenous populations, in many cases the epidemic 
took second place to larger economic concerns and the daily running of business. 
Although every HBC post kept detailed records, only a fraction of the material from the 
Central Interior of British Columbia survives today. Post journals are particularly 
fragmentary, with many of the most detailed records coming from the smaller, less 
economically important posts. However, despite significant limitations in chronology and 
scope, both of these sources remain some of the most informative sources on the lives of 
indigenous people in British Columbia during the late nineteenth century.
“Patterns of Diffusion” also acknowledges the limitations inherent in working 
with sources collected by third parties whose practices may not meet the standards set by 
contemporary historians, and aims to reflect this by attempting to use such material only 
in ways that are both cautious and discriminating. The particular challenges of using 
anthropological material from the early twentieth century have forced me to consider 
primary sources in terms of layers: the information the source provides about the period it 
documents, as well as the information the source provides about those who created the 
documentary record. This two-pronged approach has been particularly important when 
working with the Marius Barbeau collection, an extensive archival collection stored at the 
Canadian Museum of Civilization (CMC) in Ottawa.55 Barbeau, along with Tsimshian 
research assistant William Benyon, spent several years in the early 1920s transcribing 
oral tradition and collecting interviews from the Gitxsan, Tsimshian, and Nishga
55 CMC Marius Barbeau and William Benyon, Northwest Coast Files, Canadian Museum of Civilization, 
(B-F-l to B-F-731) (1910-1969).
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(Nisga’a) peoples. However, this was not Barbeau’s only exposure to the indigenous 
peoples of British Columbia. Shortly prior to visiting the Skeena, Barbeau conducted 
research in Victoria and the northern part of Vancouver Island, and this experience 
particularly influenced his opinions of indigenous peoples.56 Much of the information 
Barbeau and Benyon collected during this period formed the basis of Barbeau’s later 
publications describing the life, art, and culture of the Northwest Coast.
As the Barbeau collection only became available to researchers in the early 1990s, 
there has been little discussion of the challenges or implications of using either the field 
notes or completed manuscripts for research purposes.57 Although Barbeau’s studies were 
among the first to assume an in-depth approach to the study of the Gitxsan, Tsimshian, 
and Nisga’a peoples, many of Barbeau’s conclusions were deeply problematic.58 Several 
of these erroneous conclusions have had lasting impacts in both popular and academic 
scholarship.59 As a result, former CMC employee and research assistant Derek E. Smith 
has warned against simply using the collection as an unproblematic databank capable of 
supplying “globules of data,” and instead called for a “careful discursive analysis” that 
takes the form and meaning of the archive itself into consideration.60 This work follows
56 Edmonds, Urbanizing Frontiers, 3.
57 Archival research assistant Derek G. Smith is one of the few scholars to critically examine the value of 
the Barbeau collection. Derek G. Smith, “The Barbeau Archives at the Canadian Museum of Civilization: 
Some Current Research Problems,” Anthropologica 43.2 (2001): 191-200.
58Smith, “The Barbeau Archives,” 194. As well as erroneous conclusions about the origins and 
developments of the Tshimshanic language, Barbeau deeply misunderstood the Northwest Coast Crest 
System, attributing both the animal symbolism and the proliferation o f totem poles to the influence o f the 
mid-nineteenth-century fur trade.
59 Smith, “The Barbeau Archives,” 194.
60 Smith, “The Barbeau Archives,” 196.
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the lead of historians such as J.R. Miller and Susan Neylan who have also recognized the 
value of the Barbeau and Benyon collection and utilized it judiciously.61
The Imbert Orchard collection is similarly problematic. Although Orchard was 
forthright about his lack of formal training as a historian, the depth and scope of his 
personal records suggest that he viewed his work in British Columbia as a serious 
historical effort. However, Orchard sought candidates and conducted interviews often 
only when he knew the information provided would match the predetermined theme at 
the core of the Living Memory radio programs. Orchard did not think that the modem 
historical narrative of British Columbia captured the “pioneer” history of British 
Columbia, and having witnessed the rise of technology that followed the Second World 
War, was concerned that both time and modernity were obscuring the most authentic 
history of the province.62 In other words, Orchard was concerned with honouring the 
pioneers and the expansion of the Euro-Canadian settlement. While Orchard’s collection 
did attempt to serve as an alternative to the already established histories of the mid­
twentieth century, it did not attempt to challenge the dominant white settler narrative or 
orchestrate either political or social change.63 The interviews in Living Memory indicate 
that Orchard viewed the constmction of identity as separate from the narrative of 
progress and development that was at the center of many of these stories. In examining 
another side of this process—the rural working-class experience—Orchard attempted to 
further legitimize the earlier, colonial narratives of the Skeena region, seeking a particular
61 J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History o f Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1991) and Susan Neylan, The Heavens are Changing: Nineteenth-Century 
Protestant Missions and Tsimshian Christianity (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003).
“ Robert Budd, ‘“ The Story of the Country’: Imbert Orchard’s Quest for Frontier Folk in BC, 1870 -1914,” 
(MA Thesis, University of Victoria, 2005), 97, 15.
63 Budd, “The Story o f  the Country,” 13.
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“feel” that often came at the expense of historical accuracy.64 While most obvious in the 
finished radio products, the continued drive for a “good story” is also apparent in many of 
the rough notes and transcripts that form the bulk of the Orchard collection.65
The tone and nature of the Orchard interviews used in this thesis vary greatly. It is 
notable that many of the interviews were recorded by Robert Tomlinson’s wife, Roxy 
Tomlinson, as the product of informal conversations, rather than by Orchard. The lengthy 
interviews with Tomlinson maintain a formal and didactic tone, suggesting that 
Tomlinson was concerned with legitimizing both his father’s work and family’s presence 
in the Skeena Region. In contrast, the interviews with Roxy Tomlinson and Constance 
Cox are far more informal and anecdotal. The differing emphasis of the interview 
material significantly influenced the way that the measles epidemic and the surrounding 
Gitxsan communities are positioned in the rough recordings and transcripts and the 
finished radio programs, and reflects an important difference in methodology. While the 
present study primarily utilizes Orchard’s preliminary interviews and research notes, the 
biases inherent in the research methods used by Orchard are important and should not be 
overlooked.
“Patterns of Diffusion” consists of three chapters, organized thematically and 
geographically. The first chapter provides a background to epidemic measles and the 
rubeola virus as a disease. It also traces the diffusion of the epidemic from the North- 
West Territories into British Columbia, connecting federal, provincial, and public 
response to disease within indigenous communities to the expansion of DIA influence 
into British Columbia and western Canada. Articles from Victoria’s daily newspaper The
64 Budd, “The story of the Country,” 6,22.
65 BCA Imbert Orchard papers from CBC radio interviews 1961- 1972 "Living Memory" project (notes),” 
MS-0364.
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Colonist provide insight into anxieties surrounding the threat of disease in both 
indigenous and white communities, as well as the proximity of the newly established 
Indian reserves to an increasingly urban and white Victoria. This information is 
supplemented by extracts from the Annual Reports of the DIA which provide information 
on estimates of fatalities as well as a rough guideline of the spread of disease in many 
areas of both British Columbia and the North-West Territories. The chapter argues that 
the measles epidemic was likely spread by both indigenous and newcomer populations, 
roughly following the route of the newly constructed CPR as well as wage labour patterns 
that were shifting in response to an increasingly settler- and market-orientated economy.
The second chapter explores the impact of the epidemic in the Stuart Lake area 
between 1888 and 1889 as revealed by the documentation of the Hudson’s Bay 
Company. Although measles was present in British Columbia’s Central Interior only 
between January and May 1888, the epidemic occurred during a period of economic 
hardship and cyclic resource scarcity that lasted for upwards of two years. While this 
hardship was largely due to recurring and uncontrollable environmental factors, HBC 
Chief Factor Robert MacFarlane’s efforts to provide evidence of responsible resource use 
and to procure aid for the indigenous populations that visited the trading forts triggered a 
much larger conversation surrounding the uncertain position of the HBC in British 
Columbia. MacFarlane’s requests culminated in a correspondence examining the role that 
the provincial government and the DIA would assume in governing the province’s 
indigenous population as white settlement increased and the economic stability of the fur 
trade and other means of subsistence lifestyles declined. Using HBC post journals from 
western Canada, provincial and federal correspondence, DIA records, and MacFarlane’s
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personal correspondence, this chapter shows that the measles epidemic was an essential 
part of a larger dialogue surrounding the viability of the fur trade and the future of the 
DIA in central British Columbia and western Canada.
The third chapter shifts focus to the introduction of measles to the Northwest 
Coast during a period of political upheaval and indigenous resistance. It examines 
accounts of the epidemic experience of the Upper Skeena region. This chapter links the 
period of disease to legal and administrative changes that occurred during the spring and 
summer of 1888 and an event best known as “The Skeena River Uprising” or the 
“Kitwoncool Jim Affair.” This approximately eight-week-long period of conflict began 
with the murder of medicine man Neatsque by hereditary chief Kamalmuk, who 
apparently believed that Neatsque had cursed his son and primary heir with a fatal case of 
measles.66 Although the dispute was settled amicably under Gitxsan law, the murder was 
reported to Constable Washburn along with other colonial officials in Victoria, and the 
Skeena River Patrol was sent to the Gitxsan village of Gitwangak to apprehend 
Kamalmuk in late June.67 Supported by factions of the Gitxsan community, Kamalmuk 
managed to evade custody for several weeks, but was eventually found and fatally shot in
66 CMC Marius Barbeau and William Benyon, informant Lelt (Salomon Harris), “Gitwinkul Jim” in 
“Gitksan Narratives (Hazelton, 1920 etc),” Canadian Museum o f Civilization, Northwest Coast Files 
(Kitwanga) (B-F-89.2)(1924) pg 1, 2; informant George Derrick, ‘‘Gitwinkul Jim” in “Gitksan Narratives 
(Hazelton, 1920 etc),” Canadian Museum of Civilization, Northwest Coast Files (Kitwanga) (B-F- 
89.3)(1924) pg 1.
67 BCA, Minutes of the Executive Council o f British Columbia Relative to the Indian Troubles on the 
Skeena River and the Expenses of the Expedition Sent to that Locality, British Columbia Archives, GR 
1108, Box 1, File 1; Williams, 26, 52. Williams’ thesis emphasizes that this exchange took place in the 
context of an evolving legal relationship between the Gitxsan and Colonial administrators following the 
1872 agreement between Gitseguklan chiefs and Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works Joseph Trutch 
to adhere to colonial law. Williams argues that this agreement had “long term implications for Gitxsan 
attitudes towards blood vengeance,” and strongly influenced the chain of events in 1888.
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the back by a constable sent to arrest him.68 As relations between the Gitanyows and the 
white community further deteriorated, the settlers barricaded themselves in the HBC post 
at Hazelton.69 In response, the provincial government dispatched the gunboat H.M.S. 
Caroline and 'C ' battery of the Royal Canadian army, consisting of 80 soldiers, to the 
mouth of the Skeena.70 A unit of special constables under the leadership of 
Superintendent Roycraft of the provincial police, along with Gold Commissioner and 
Stipendiary Magistrate Captain FitzStubbs, were sent into Hazelton to assess the situation 
and meet with Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en chiefs from five villages. Finding little actual 
unrest and the majority of Gitxsan away at seasonal activity, the Caroline returned to 
Victoria within two weeks of arrival.71
The Skeena River Uprising has come to occupy a symbolic position in studies of 
Gitxsan resistance and the settlement of the Skeena region, in part due to the direct 
connection between violence and the development of colonial administrative structures. 
The immediate aftermath of the Skeena Uprising saw significant administrative changes, 
notably the creation of the Babine Agency and the first permanent placement of a 
Canadian legal presence on Gitxsan territory. Several academic publications have 
examined the military response to the Skeena River Uprising in detail, but few studies 
acknowledge the complicating presence of the epidemic when exploring either the legal
68 BCA, Constable James Homaus to Attorney-General Davie, 14 August 1888, GR 677; Robert Galois, 
“Research Report and Notes: The History of the Upper Skeena Region, 1850-1927,” Native Studies Review 
9.2(1993-1994): 136.
69 BCA, Constable B.W. Washburn to Attorney General, 27 June 1888, GR 677; BCA, R.E. Loring to HB 
Roycraft, 8 August 1888, GR 677; Williams, “A History of Gitxsan Relations,” 53.
70 Galois, “The History of the Upper Skeena Region” : 137; BCA, Minutes of the Executive Council of 
British Columbia Relative to the Indian Troubles on the Skeena River and the Expenses o f the Expedition 
Sent to that Locality, GR 1108, Box 1, File 1.
71 Galois, “The History of the Upper Skeena Region,” 137.
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or socio-cultural aspects of the Skeena Uprising.72 Chapter Three re-examines oral 
accounts collected by anthropologist Marius Barbeau and Canadian radio journalist 
Imbert Orchard in an attempt to fully explore the role that the epidemic played in both the 
cultural and economic disruption the Gitxsan people experienced during the spring and 
summer of 1888. Provincial, federal, and interdepartmental correspondences are used to 
expand upon these accounts and to explain the crucial role of the epidemic in the “Skeena 
Uprising” narrative and the settlement of the Upper Skeena Region.
Primary sources reveal that the 1886-1888 measles epidemic was an important 
event in the history of British Columbia, especially in the context of 
indigenous/newcomer relations. Although few sources give specific estimates, most 
suggest large numbers of mortalities in indigenous communities. The high death toll was 
compounded by inclement weather, the failure of salmon runs, and a scarcity of small 
fur-bearing animals. Moreover, the epidemic occurred during a period when the 
administration of British Columbia’s indigenous population was in transition, and the 
colonization of the province accelerating.73 The resulting tension was perhaps most 
obvious in the upper Skeena region. “Patterns of Diffusion” shows that the story of the 
measles epidemic was intricately connected with the Skeena River Uprising and the 
creation of the Babine Agency. The military response to the Skeena uprising was not only 
a reaction to the fear in Hazelton, where settlers felt physically threatened, but also 
reflective of colonial anxiety in Victoria, where the threat posed by the indigenous 
population was far less direct. The repeated refusal of both the provincial and federal
72 An exception to this is Robert Galois’ article “Gitxsan Law and Settler Disorder: The Skeena “Uprising” 
of 1888,” in New Histories fo r  Old: Changing Perspectives on Canada’s Native Pasts, ed. Ted Binnema 
and Susan Neylan (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007). However, Galois does not explore the larger impact of 
the epidemic.
73 Harris, Making Native Space, 71.
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government to provide aid to the indigenous peoples of the Stuart Lake Region revealed 
the overall reluctance of the government to establish an expensive apparatus outside of 
areas deemed suitable for settlement. This bureaucratic conflict reflected the uncertain 
and shifting position of the Hudson’s Bay Company at the end of the nineteenth century, 
but also the challenges faced by indigenous peoples during an epidemic period as lives 
based on subsistence activities and commercial trapping became increasingly difficult to 
achieve.
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Chapter 1
“The 1886-1888 Measles Epidemic in British Columbia and the North-west
Territories.”
Although some areas of western North America may have remained isolated from 
measles until as late as 1910, by 1886, British Columbia was far from “virgin soil.”1 
While there is little scholarly consensus on the impact that viral epidemics had upon pre­
contact British Columbia, the use of oral tradition and early written records have allowed 
for a fairly robust picture of the impact of measles and other viral diseases in the early 
post-contact period. The complete geographic and demographic scope of these epidemics 
is unknown, but several scholars have argued that outbreaks of viral disease influenced 
the establishment and continued success of Vancouver Island and British Columbia as 
successful Crown colonies.2 At least two measles epidemics occurred in British Columbia 
prior to the 1886-1888 outbreak, the most recent and well documented entering the 
province through coastal trading routes in early 1846.3 These early epidemics have been 
the subject of several studies, almost all of them highlighting the socially disruptive 
nature of epidemic disease.4
1 Robert J. Wolfe, “Alaska’s Great Sickness: An Epidemic o f Measles and Influenza in a Virgin Soil 
Population,” Proceedings o f  the American Philosophical Association 126.2 (1982): 91.
2 Robert Galois and Cole Harris. “A Population Geography of British Columbia in 1881,” in The 
Resettlement o f  British Columbia: Essays on Colonialism and Geographical Change, ed. Cole Harris, 137- 
160. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997); Robert Galois, “Research Report and Notes: The History of the Upper 
Skeena Region, 1850 to 1927,” Native Studies Review 9.2 (1993-1994): 113 - 183; Cole Harris, “Voices of 
Disaster around the Strait o f Georgia in 1782,” Ethnohistory 4 1.4 (1994): 591 - 626. For a more theoretical 
approach, see Mary-Ellen Kelm, “Diagnosing the Discursive Indian: Medicine, Gender, and the ‘Dying 
Race,’” Ethnohistory 25.3 (2005): 665-684.
3 Robert Galois, “Measles: 1847- 1850, The First Modem Epidemic in British Columbia,” BC Studies 109 
(1996): 38.
4 See, for example, Robert Boyd, The Coming o f  the Spirit ofPestilence: Introduced Infectious Diseases 
and Population Decline among Northwest Coast Indians, 1774-1874 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999); Cole 
Harris, “Voices of Disaster,” 591; Robert Galois, “Measles: 1847- 1850, The First Modem Epidemic in 
British Columbia,” BC Studies 109 (1996): 38. Galois describes the “sickness and despondency” that 
surrounded the HBC posts, impeding trade and limiting band movement.
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In contrast, comparatively little attention has been paid to the dynamics of 
epidemic disease within western Canada during the later nineteenth century, despite the 
fact that this period saw the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), a 
massive boom in the settler populations of British Columbia and the North-West 
Territories, and the formalization and expansion of the reserve system throughout the 
interior of British Columbia. Such rapid development, although geographically specific, 
was significant on both a provincial and national scale. For example, as geographer Jody 
Decker argued, the route of the CPR influenced patterns of disease diffusion, and Euro- 
Canadian perceptions of race and geography.5 Similarly, as campaigns for the increased 
development of the Canadian west continued to draw immigrants into British Columbia 
and the North-West Territories, new ideas about contagion and disease prevention 
accompanied the actual diseases that spread from urban centres.6 This influx had a wide- 
ranging impact on British Columbia’s intellectual sphere, influencing everything from 
sanitation planning and public health campaigns in the growing towns and cities of 
Nelson, Vernon, Prince Rupert, and Vancouver,7 to ideas about the “proper” racial 
division of fruit picking in the still sparsely settled Okanagan Valley.8 Occurring 
simultaneously with significant social transformation, the measles epidemic had the 
power to upset the precariously balanced system of wage labour, trade, and seasonal
5 Jody Decker, “Smallpox Along the Frontier of the Plains Borderlands at the Turn of the Twentieth 
Century,” New Histories fo r  Old: Changing Perspectives on Canada's Native Pasts, ed. Ted Binnema and 
Susan Neylan, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).
6 Mariana Valverde, The Age o f  Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada 1885-1925, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 16.
7 Margaret W. Andrews, “The Emergence of Bureaucracy: The Vancouver Health Department, 1886- 
1914,” Journal o f  Urban History 12.2 (1986): 149,150; Megan J. Davies, “Night Soil, Cesspools, and 
Smelly Hogs on the Streets: Sanitation, Race, and Governance in Early British Columbia,” Social History 
38.75 (2005): 2, 3.
8 Jason Patrick Bennett, “Apple of the Empire: Landscape and Imperial Identity in Tum-of the Century 
British Columbia," Journal o f  the Canadian Historical Association 9.1 (1998): 72, 73.
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subsistence cycles that continued to define the lives of many First Nations Peoples in 
western Canada during the late nineteenth century.
The earlier measles epidemics made it likely that by the winter of 1886-1888, 
many indigenous communities knew of measles and its symptoms, and that a portion of 
the adult population had acquired immunity from previous exposure, two factors that had 
the potential to significantly impact the mortality rates and diffusion patterns of 
subsequent epidemics.9 As the studies of Boyd, Hackett, and Decker show, context- 
specific social and economic situations influenced how indigenous and settler 
communities conceptualized and interacted with disease, and these perceptions 
themselves influenced the further diffusion of epidemics. Using methodology borrowed 
from these historical and geographic works, this chapter will trace the spread of the 
epidemic through the North-West Territories, through Vancouver Island, and north 
towards British Columbia’s more sparsely populated Central Interior. A brief 
examination of measles (rubeola) as a virus during the late nineteenth century and how 
the disease was perceived by medical professionals provides the historical context 
necessary to ground this exploration in the broader Canadian historiography of disease 
and indigenous peoples. Whenever possible, primary source material is included to help 
illustrate the serious and unusual nature of the 1886-1888 measles epidemic. By tracing 
the epidemic throughout the North-West Territories to British Columbia, this chapter
9 Boyd, The Coming o f  the Spirit o f  Pestilence, 18; It is likely that communities with higher levels of 
acquired immunity were much more likely to flee in an attempt to escape disease, both because o f overall 
better health and increased familiarity with early symptoms. However, because viral diseases are often 
contagious long before symptoms are visible, the “flight response” is not only ineffective at preventing the 
continuation of the disease cycle, but often counterproductive. In many cases flight only widened the area 
of contagion, leaving the party even more isolated when illness struck. As Ray shows in Arthur J. Ray, 
“Diffusion of Diseases in the Western Interior of Canada, 1830-1850,” Geographical Review  66(2): 139- 
57, regular patterns o f trade, travel, and seasonal migration also played an important role in disease 
diffusion.
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reveals some of the larger social and political ramifications of a disease that diffused 
rapidly in an already swiftly changing demographic.10
Historical studies of epidemic and crowd diseases have been the subject of some 
recent scholarly interest. Geographer Robert Boyd takes an epidemiological approach to 
the epidemics studied in The Coming o f the Spirit o f Pestilence. Unlike the “germ- 
focused” medical approach used by many micro-histories, Boyd attempts to anchor his 
study “in [a] space and time” that extends beyond highly specific pathogen or host 
characteristics, as epidemiology: “... views disease from an ‘ecological’ perspective 
which emphasizes (1) the interaction between pathogen and human populations and (2) 
the relationships of both to the larger environment and cultural systems.”11 The result of 
this approach is a study that maps the diffusion of disease, and creates a timeline 
anchored upon relevant social and cultural developments. Unfortunately, Boyd did not 
move beyond the early nineteenth century and what he rather short-sightedly labelled the 
formative period of colonial-indigenous interaction.12 While “Patterns of Diffusion” does 
not emphasize the cultural ramifications of the 1886-1888 measles epidemic, it does use 
elements of Boyd’s methodology, most notably the use of a variety of primary sources to 
reconstruct a fuller pattern of diffusion that moves beyond the immediate symptoms of 
illness. Although indigenous and literary accounts of the epidemic are few, they have 
been consulted in addition to the more Euro-Canadian orientated sources to help 
reconstruct the geography and chronology of the epidemic.
Despite the growth in disease literature, it was Paul Hackett’s A Very Remarkable 
Sickness: Epidemics in the Petit Nord (2001) that first suggested that the spread of
10 Galois and Harris, “A Population Geography of British Columbia in 1881,” 160.
11 Boyd, The Coming o f  the Spirit o f  Pestilence, 7.
12 Boyd, The Coming o f  the Spirit o f  Pestilence, 3.
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epidemic disease in sparsely settled regions of North America depended on much more 
than a hospitable biological host and vulnerable populations.13 Relying primarily upon 
Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) documents, Hackett tracked the diffusion of several 
infectious crowd diseases, including measles, through the “Petit Nord,” the area between 
the Great Lakes and the Hudson’s Bay lowlands. Although Hackett used trade routes and 
migration patterns to track the primary routes of disease diffusion, the complex nature of 
diffusion patterns are most clearly revealed when variables such as seasonal subsistence 
cycles, transportation networks, community size, and rural-urban dynamics are 
considered in relation to disease diffusion.14 Notably, Hackett assigned human 
populations as much agency as the geographic landscape in the transmission of disease, 
and claimed that “the likelihood that a disease would be passed between neighboring 
Aboriginal peoples ... was by no means universal” but instead “varied with a number of 
different factors beyond the season and the environment they inhabited.”15
Fears surrounding race, contagion, and border security played a prominent role in 
the 1886-1888 epidemic. While evidence suggests that quarantine was only sporadically 
enforced, the indigenous peoples of British Columbia experienced steadily increasing 
levels of restriction during periods of seasonal migration, not wholly dissimilar to the 
1902 quarantine measures outlined by geographer Jody Decker. Decker used the study of 
a very specific area (the 1,287 kilometer section of the 49th parallel located between the 
Lake of the Woods and the Rocky Mountains) to emphasise the political nature of 
epidemic disease, but was more concerned with perceptions of contagion than actual
13 Paul Hackett, A Very Remarkable Sickness: Epidemics in the Petit Nord, 1670-1846 (Winnipeg: 
University of Manitoba Press, 2002).
14 Hackett, A Very Remarkable Sickness, 13, 19.
15 Hackett, A Very Remarkable Sickness, 19.
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patterns of diffusion. To this end, Decker argued that it was the Canadian Government’s 
efforts at quarantine that most dramatically shaped the epidemic experience of the Plains 
First Nations and Metis, many of whom disregarded the political demarcation of the 
Canadian-U.S. border, and freely lived, hunted, and socialized on both sides until well 
into the twentieth century.16 The quarantine measures and government-regulated 
inspections of the prairie region further “altered the once porous border between the two 
countries,” marking the border as “a permeable shield” and “the zones adjacent to i t ... a 
widened borderlands ‘scare zone’ of multiple meanings, where cultural practices, border 
politics, and border enforcement intersected.”17
It is not surprising that settlers linked a particular geographic area to the spread of 
disease. Theories of germs and disease shifted dramatically throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century, but the general concepts of contagion and illness were well 
understood in the medical community.18 The existence of micro-organisms or “germs” 
had been known since the days of Antoni van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723), and theories 
that germs caused diseases had also existed for many years.19 In the 1860s, Louis Pasteur 
(1822-1895) provided sufficient experimental evidence to convince most of the scientific 
community that germs caused disease.20 However, it was still unclear what these germs 
were, and which diseases were caused by germs. Robert Koch (1843-1910) developed a 
method for identifying diseases caused by germs, and established that anthrax, cholera,
16 Decker, “Smallpox along the Frontier,” 97.
17 Decker, “Smallpox along the Frontier,” 92.
18 Alessandra Parodi, David Neasham, and Paolo Vineis, “Environment, Population, and Biology: A Short 
History of Modem Epidemiology” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 49.3 (2006): 360.
19 Howard Gest, “The Discovery of Microorganism by Robert Hooke and Antoni van Leeuwenhoek, 
Fellows of the Royal Society,” Notes and Records o f  the Royal Society o f  London 58.2 (2004): 188.
20 J.R. Porter, “Louis Pasteur Sesquicentennial,” American Association fo r  the Advancement o f  Science 178 
(1972): 1252.
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tuberculosis and smallpox were all caused by similar germs.21 However, although Francis 
Holme (1719-1813) had argued that measles was caused by an infectious agent,22 the 
measles virus was not isolated and identified until 1954 by John F. Enders (1897-1985) 
and Thomas C. Peebles (1921-1910), and no vaccine was available until 1963.23 Thus 
measles had quite a different history than smallpox and other contagious diseases, and 
was not yet well understood or vaccinated for at the time of the 1886-1888 epidemic. As 
British medical historian Anne Hardy argued, “die arrival of the laboratoiy as a frontier 
for medical research ... proved disappointing in therapeutic terms,” and measles 
continued to be considered a routine, although potentially life-threatening disease of 
childhood well into the twentieth century.24 In urban areas, where measles was endemic, 
most cases of measles occurred in children below the age of five and most deaths below 
the age of two.25 Adult cases were rare except in isolated areas where exposure to the 
virus was limited, but by the mid-nineteenth century, most of North America’s largest 
cities had the necessary populations to sustain at least partially endemic status.26 In 
contrast, measles had been endemic in many of the larger European cities since as early 
as the sixteenth century, although variations in population and environment allowed for 
occasional outbreaks of severe measles.27 Both of these distant disease reservoirs had the 
potential to affect the indigenous populations of Western Canada.
21 Parodi, Neasham, and Vineis, “Environment, Population, and Biology,” 363.
22 Barbara Gastel, “Measles: A Potentially Finite History,” Journal o f  the History o f Medicine (Jan 1973): 
40.
23 Gastel, “Measles: A Potentially Finite History,” 41.
24 Hardy, Health and Medicine, 26.
25 Anne Hardy, The Epidemic Streets: Infectious Diseases and the Rise o f  Preventative Medicine 1856- 
1900 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 30,31.
26 Hackett, Epidemics in the Petit Nord, 238.
27 The incidence of measles in the United Kingdom appears to have increased dramatically towards the end 
of the 19th century, with the London Times reporting measles epidemics in 1883, 1885, and 1887. Hardy 
also describes a “severe” measles epidemic in Sunderland in 1888, which she attributes to economic
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Measles remained a significant cause of childhood mortality in both urban and 
rural centers well into the twentieth century, but both contemporary and modem research 
suggests that high death rates often had more to do with respiratory co-morbidity than 
any notable severity of disease.28 Despite the fact that measles mortality during the 
nineteenth century actually rose as advances in vaccinations reduced London’s overall 
experiences of crowd disease, Hardy claimed that the most severe form of measles, 
“black measles,” was almost entirely eradicated from Britain by the turn of the twentieth 
century.29 Caused by the same vims as regular measles, black measles is named for the 
blood-filled blisters that form under the skin of the face and limbs. It is much more likely 
to be fatal than measles that present with characteristic flat, red papules. The secondary 
symptoms of black measles are equally serious, including hemorrhages from the nose, 
and a much increased likelihood of coma, delirium, and convulsions.30 While not the 
primary manifestation of the 1886-1888 measles epidemic, black measles, described as 
“severe” or “of a bad type,” was mentioned several times in both the Department of 
Indian Affairs (DIA) annual reports and Victoria’s Times Colonist.31
Although a subject of debate, a substantial amount of evidence suggests that poor 
nutritional status prior to infection has the potential not only to significantly increase the
hardship (Hardy, The Epidemic Streets, 35.) Reports o f severe measles in the North of the United Kingdom 
are echoed by the British Colonist “Condensed Dispatches,” British Colonist 5 July, 1887, 1.
28 Anne Hardy, “Rickets and the Rest: Child-care, Diet and the Infectious Children's Diseases, 1850-1914,” 
Social History o f  Medicine 5.3 (1992): 8; Hardy, The Epidemic Streets, 45; Charles West, Lectures on the 
Diseases o f  Infancy and Childhood, 4th and 7th ed (Philadelphia: Blanchard and Lea, 1860, 1880): 297.
29 Hardy, “Rickets and the Rest:” 8. While Hardy linked high respiratory mortality to London’s increasing 
industrialization and poor environmental conditions, she did not conclusively determine if  the decrease in 
measles severity was due to the general improvement o f nutritional status and living conditions o f late 
Victorian London or changes in biological and epidemiological patterns. As care for measles remained 
largely palliative through the end o f the nineteenth century, it is clear that the decline in mortality was not 
due to developments in medical practice.
30 Charles Fisher, Diseases o f  Children (New Delhi: B. Jain Publishers, 1999), 206.
31 “From Bearing’s Sea,” British Colonist, 13 September 1888,4; “Local Briefs,” British Colonist, 7 
December 1887,4; W. Anderson, “Edmonton, N.W.T,” ARDIA, 1887,104; Thos White, “District of 
Alberta,” ARDIA, 1887, liii.
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possibility of measles-related mortality, but also greatly increase the severity of disease 
presentation. James Daschuk suggests that indigenous people were highly aware of the 
connection between famine and measles, and used this to advocate for better aid during 
the epidemic period.32 Epidemiologist David Morley, having extensively studied measles 
fatalities among children in developing countries, argued that not only is poor nutrition 
linked to the increased likelihood of mortality from measles,33 but that poor nutritional 
status directly correlates with the severity of rash presentation, including dark-purple or 
“black” papules.34 Morley’s findings are particularly relevant in the case of the 1886 - 
1888 measles epidemic, as environmental concerns, including unusually harsh weather, 
poor crops, and failed salmon runs were reported across multiple regions of British 
Columbia for at least a year prior to the winter of 1888.35 More recently, Morley’s 
theories have been challenged by Peter Aaby, who argued that disease concentration and 
length of exposure to the virus are the most important factors in determining the severity 
and length of the primordial period and illness.36 However, as Hardy suggests, Aaby’s 
theories are of questionable value in a historical context, as crowded living situations and 
nutritional deficiencies are both influential factors that are not easily separated within 
primary source evidence.37
32 James Daschuk, Clearing the Plains: Disease, Politics o f  Starvation, and the Loss o f  Aboriginal Life 
(Regina: University of Regina Press, 2013), 165.
33 David Morley and Margaret Woodland, See How They Grow: Monitoring Child Health in Developing 
Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 89, 90.
34 David Morley, Paediatric Priorities in the Developing World (London: Butterworth’s and Co ltd, 1973), 
207.
35 K. Dewdney, “British Columbia,” ARDIA, 1888, lxxii, lxxxvi, lxxix; See also chapters two and three.
36 Peter Aaby, “Malnutrition and Overcrowding/Intensive Exposure in Severe Measles Infection: Review of 
Community Studies,” Reviews of Infectious Diseases 10.2 (1988): 478; Peter Aaby et al., “Decline In 
Measles Mortality: Nutrition, Age At Infection, Or Exposure?,” British Medical Journal 296 (1988): 1225.
37 Hardy, The Epidemic Streets, 42,43.
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The limited statistics available from the DIA annual reports reveal some basic 
characteristics of the 1886-1888 epidemic. Between the years 1887-1888, as the epidemic 
spread through coastal British Columbia and Vancouver Island, the majority of the deaths 
attributed to the measles in the DIA annual reports were of children. While such patterns 
do not preclude the unusual severity of disease as reported by the DIA, or nutritional 
deficiencies as suggested by Morley, it is also possible, but unlikely, that they reflect 
more the diffusion patterns of prior measles epidemics than any unusual degree of illness. 
Measles exposure in the Hudson’s Bay Company Territories during the first half of the 
nineteenth century was uneven, in part due to a very low population density and efforts
■10
on the part of HBC traders to organize quarantines during periods of epidemic disease.
By contrast, measles spread unchecked through many densely populated coastal areas of 
British Columbia. As a result, the 1886-1888 measles epidemic appears to have affected a 
far greater portion of the adult population in the North-West Territories than in most of 
British Columbia, at least in part due to lower levels of previous exposure.39 Additionally, 
the rates of famine in the North-West Territories following the North-West Uprising were 
substantially higher than those in British Columbia, increasing the susceptibility of a 
larger portion of the population to illness.40
The biological makeup of measles lends itself both to long-distance travel and 
mass contagion. Unlike the smallpox virus, which can live for weeks outside of the 
human body under the right conditions, the microbes that cause measles die quickly
38 Paul Hackett, “Averting Disaster: The Hudson’s Bay Company and Smallpox in Western Canada during 
the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries,” Bulletin o f  the History o f  Medicine 78 (2004), 607.
39 It is important to note that these speculations are dependent upon the limited geographic scope of the 
DIA records.
40 Daschuk, Clearing the Plains, 100.
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outside a human carrier, or host.41 The cycle of the virus depends upon high levels of 
human interaction to facilitate transmission. Furthermore, while some other crowd 
diseases such as the bubonic plague or certain types of influenza can be passed through 
wild or domesticated animals, there is no non-human reservoir for the measles virus, and 
most cases of measles are transmitted through close contact with an infected individual. 
As the disease is spread via nasal or throat secretions, indirect transmission, or contagion 
through secondary items, such as contaminated food or previously used clothing or 
bedding, is possible but rare 42 Following viral infection, the host will recover, die, or 
carry the disease asymptomatically until the body’s biological balance is upset and the 
virus is triggered into action, a process that usually occurs within two weeks.43 
Alternately, a virus may die if the host becomes immune. Immunity may be conferred 
actively through vaccination or by simply surviving infection.44
Unless the disease is very severe, the time between exposure and presentation of 
the characteristic rash is between ten and fourteen days. Prior to the appearance of the 
rash, the symptoms of measles mimic that of a cold, including fever, chills, cough, and a 
general sense of malaise. The macula associated with measles are flat and range from 
bright red to reddish brown, often combining to form large blotches; however, as 
previously noted, severe cases can present with a dark purple rash that is indicative of 
internal hemorrhage 45 Accompanying complications can range from the mild to severe, 
and include swelling of the water-retaining tissue around the eyes, lymphatic infection,
41 Hackett, A Very Remarkable Sickness, 79.
42 Hackett, A Very Remarkable Sickness, 79.
43 Jody Decker, “We Should Never be Again the Same People: The Diffusion and Cumulative Impact of 
Acute Infections Diseases Affecting the Natives,” (Ph.D. Diss., York University, 1989), 13.
44 Decker, “We Should Never be Again the Same People,” 13
45 Hackett, A Very Remarkable Sickness, 79.
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meningitis, and respiratory disorders such as bronchitis and pneumonia. Although these 
symptoms are more likely to be present in severe cases, a high degree of variation can 
exist even within extreme cases. Factors as wide ranging as genetic susceptibility,46 
environmental influences,47 and individual physical health are shown to influence the 
way a particular individual or community experiences disease. In contrast to earlier 
theories about predisposition, Francis L. Black has argued that New World populations 
were more susceptible to epidemic disease not because of genetic weakness, or lack of 
prior exposure, but because of an overall lack of genetic heterogeneity.48 Additionally, 
multiple strains of the measles virus have been identified, introducing further variables.49
Although an individual’s health may not determine the outcome of an epidemic, it 
will influence it. The level of immunity in a population influences not only what 
percentage of a community will contract a disease, but also how far an epidemic is likely 
to spread. In smaller centers, or, “type III communities,” viral infections such as measles 
and smallpox only sporadically appear. Defined by British mathematician Maurice 
Bartlett as communities with a population of fewer than 10,000 people, type III 
communities suffer only periodically from epidemic outbreaks, as the vulnerable 
population may not always be large enough to allow viral disease to reach epidemic
46 J.V. Neel, Health and Disease in Unacculturated Amerindian Populations, in Health and Disease in 
Tribal Societies, CIBA Foundation Symposium 49 (1977): 155; Francis Black, “An Explanation of High 
Death Rates Among New World Peoples When in Contact With Old World Diseases,” Perspectives in 
Biology and Medicine 37.2 (1994): 301.
47 Wolfe, 92; George J. Armelagos, Allen Goodman, and Kenneth H. Jacobs, “The Ecological Perspective 
in Disease,” in Health and the Human Condition, ed. M.H. Logan and E. E. Hunts (North Scituate, Mass: 
Duxbury Press, 1978) pp. 71-84.
48 Black, “An Explanation of High Death Rates Among New World Peoples,” : 301.
49 BK Rima, JA Earle, RP Yeo et al., "Temporal and Geographical Distribution of Measles Virus 
Genotypes," Journal o f  General Virology 76.5 (1995): 1173-80.
41
status.50 In these communities, not only is the gap between epidemics likely to be longer, 
but the average age of morbidities higher. As almost all of the cities on the 1886-1888 
epidemic’s route westward were type III communities, it is highly likely that the disease 
was spread and sustained by some kind of ongoing disruption to previous patterns.
The shifting patterns of travel and immigration in the rapidly developing 
Canadian west played an essential role in the diffusion of the 1886-1888 measles 
epidemic. While there is no conclusive evidence that the railway was an actual vector of 
the virus that caused the measles epidemic, the reach of the CPR through the North-West 
Territories and into British Columbia appears to have effectively shortened the biological 
distance between the urban populations of the east and the cities of western Canada, 
many of which fell far below the population threshold level (also known as “critical 
community size”) needed to support a human-host dependent crowd disease. Hackett 
describes this change as a period of “epidemic transition” in which crowd diseases occur 
with increasing frequency. When the transition is complete, the eventual result is a 
“mutual toleration” of disease with limited mortalities, but until a type of balance is 
achieved, outbreaks of disease are likely to be both increasingly frequent and severe.51 In 
larger centres, the continued renewal of population through birth and immigration kept 
host levels numerous enough to facilitate the longer-range diffusion essential to a 
sustained course of disease, but more remote areas were dependent upon immigration, 
settlement, and changes in technology.52 Such variables made it possible for urban areas 
to have an impact on seemingly distant populations, and rapid growth and mass
50 Hackett, A Very Remarkable Sickness, 11; M.S. Bartlett, “Measles Periodicity and Community Size,” 
Journal o f  the Royal Statistical Society 120 (1957): 48-70.
51 Hackett, A Very Remarkable Sickness, 13.
52 Hackett, A Very Remarkable Sickness, 13.
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immigration meant that the epidemiological relationship between urban and rural during 
the latter half of the nineteenth century was unpredictable.
By November 1885 the CPR had reached the end of its expansion to the Pacific 
Coast, and the “last spike” was hammered on 7 November in Craigellachie, between the 
then-railway towns of Sicamous and Revelstoke. Decker, describing the smallpox that 
crossed the Canada-U.S border in the summer of 1895, claimed that “disease spread 
easily along the network of branch lines north and south of the main CPR lines,” a 
diffusion that was facilitated by the fact that “[t]he rail had passed on or near many 
reserves in districts allocated for the plains Cree bands (Treaty 4) and the Blackfoot 
bands (Treaty 7) further to the west.”53 Unlike the primarily trade-orientated patterns 
Galois identified in previous measles epidemics,54 the 1886-1888 measles epidemic 
followed a similar pattern to the expansion of the railway, with the disease reaching the 
Pacific Ocean less than six months after completion of construction.
Beyond identifying a basic progression westward, it is impossible to determine 
the exact route and causes of the epidemic’s diffusion in the years prior to 1887.
However, primary sources do provide some clues to the magnitude and direction of 
diffusion. Although this study focuses on western Canada, DIA reports reveal that the 
epidemic was also present in eastern and central Canada, reaching south-west Ontario as 
early as the winter of 1887,55 spreading to the north,56 and travelling as far as Quebec by 
the spring and summer of 1888.57 While the 1889 report suggests that only isolated
53 Decker, “Smallpox along the Frontier,” 97.
54 Galois, “The First Modem Measles Epidemic,” 32.
55 Thomas Gordon, “Munsees o f the Thames,” Annual Report o f  the Department o f  Indian Affairs (ARDIA), 
1887, 7; Thos. White, “Ontario,” ARDIA, 1887, xvii.
56 John Beattie, “Northern Superintendency, Ontario,” ARDIA, 1889,4.
57 “Condensed Dispatches,” British Colonist, 3 July, 1887,1.
43
reserves and settlements in Quebec were affected by the measles, the British Colonist 
reported an outbreak of measles “raging” in Montreal, and Toronto’s Globe supported this 
claim.58 The noted presence of the epidemic in both rural and highly urban areas suggests 
that this particular strain of measles was indeed unusual, as many of North America’s 
larger eastern cities had the population levels necessary to support endemic measles. 
However, the overwhelming movement west suggests that this epidemic was linked to the 
increased traffic of immigration encouraged by the CPR.
The 1888-89 DIA annual reports suggest that the epidemic was present as far as 
east as Cape Breton by the fall of 1888.59 The diffusion path through this area is less 
clear, but the reports suggest a significant, if less fatal, impact on the much smaller 
indigenous populations of the Maritime Provinces.60 However, although it is likely that 
many of the experiences of indigenous communities in rural areas went undocumented, 
the large amount of evidence from both the DIA annual reports and HBC suggests that 
the impact of the epidemic was likely less than that in the west, as the epidemic was 
particularly harsh in British Columbia and the portion of the North-West Territories that 
would eventually become south-western Alberta.
The epidemic increased in severity as it spread west. The annual report of the DIA 
claimed that measles broke out in August 1886 among the Peace Hill Indians, located 
approximately 80 kilometers south of Fort Edmonton. By the later part of October 1886, 
the disease had spread south-west and was present at the nearby Sharphead Stony Indians 
at Wolf Creek. In both places, yearly subsistence patterns were disrupted by the epidemic.
James Martin, “Indian Reserve, Ste. Anne De Restigouche,” ARDIA, 1889, 34,35.
59 D.M. Isaac, “Glendale River Inhabitants, Inverness County, N.S,” ARDIA, 1889,44.
60 Angus Cameron, “Christmas Island, Cape Breton,” ARDIA, 1889,44. Although no deaths were reported 
by Cameron, he claims that measles were “very prevalent among the Indians” in the fall o f 1888.
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The Peace Hill peoples were unable to work throughout September, impeding 
preparations for winter.61 The epidemic also immobilized the Stony, who were delayed 
from embarking on their fall hunt until the end of November. Writing on 27 July 1887, 
Indian Agent Samuel Lucas reported that “when they [the Stony] left ... they had not 
fully recovered from their sickness.” Lucas asserted that although the epidemic itself was 
devastating, the premature departure was the main cause of mortality, with “50 or more” 
Indians dying, despite the fact that “everything that could be done for them was done.”62 
Similarly, the Cumberland Reserve in Manitoba reported mortalities across all age 
groups, as the band was wintering off-reserve and could not easily access medical care.63
As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, references to agents providing medical 
care to affected populations appear throughout the DIA annual reports. However, it 
cannot be assumed that the care First Nations communities received during periods of 
disease was uniform, adequate, or even appropriate to the situation at hand.64 Although 
Treaty Six, signed with the Woodland Cree in 1876, included a medicine chest clause that 
stipulated that: “[i]n the event hereafter the Indians comprised within this treaty be 
overtaken by pestilence, or by any general famine, the Queen ... will grant to the Indians 
assistance necessary and sufficient to relieve [them] from the calamity that shall have 
befallen them,”65 the DIA repeatedly denied obligations to provide medical care beyond 
the provision of basic medicines until the early 1880s, when, as Lux argued, the increased
61 Although it is not always clear which peoples the DIA are referring to, the 1888 annual report lists these 
as Sampson, Ermineskin and Bobtail [Montana], in the peace or Bear Hills; the bands or reserves of Muddy 
Bull on Pigeon Lake; Che- poo-te-quahn on W olf Creek; and Sharphead [Stoney] on Battle River and Wolf 
Creek.
62 Samuel R. Lucas, “Peace Hills Agency,” ARDIA, 1887, 96.
63 Joseph Reader, “Pas Agency, Treaty No. 5,” ARDIA, 1888, 76.
64 Lux, Medicine That Walks, 140; Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, 111.
65 As cited in Jill St. Germain, Indian Treaty-Making Policy in the United States and Canada, 1867- 1877 
(Lincoln: University o f  Nebraska Press, 2001), 220.
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incidence of epidemic disease on reserves in the North-West Territories threatened nearby 
immigrant communities and the ability of the residential schools to function as a tool for 
social and cultural change.66
The epidemic also affected communities outside of reserves. Less than a year 
before measles spread to the Peace Hills, a large group of Metis took scrip and left the 
care of the Indian agency. Although very little of the annual report discussed the Metis, 
the 1887 DIA annual report, in two brief but revealing pieces of correspondence, 
acknowledged the newness of the situation facing the “half-breeds” in the Saddle Lake 
area who accepted the federal government’s offer of land scrip. In July 1887, agent John 
A. Mitchell wrote that “of all those discharged, not one has to my knowledge, suffered 
therefore, although many were subjected to a most severe test, during the epidemic of 
measles of last summer .. .”67 Unlike the nearby Blackfoot and Cree, whom agents 
described as “suffering,” those who had taken scrip and disbanded were described only as 
being subject to a “crucial test.”68 The Metis and mixed-blood population, as self-defined 
entities, often occupied precarious and marginalized positions within the late and post­
fur-trade social order of both First Nations and Euro-Canadian communities. The 
occurrence of disease had the potential to heighten anxieties about identity and race both 
within and outside First Nations and Metis communities, and it is likely that the settler 
community viewed the easy transmission of disease between the two groups as a source 
of further instability in an area that was still reeling from the impacts of the North-West 
Rebellion.
Beyond the brief mentions in the DIA records, there appears to be little concrete
66 Lux, Medicine That Walks, 138.
67 John A. Mitchell, “Indian Agency - Treaty No. 6, Saddle Lake,” ARDIA, 1887, 93.
68 R. Dewdney, “District o f Alberta,” ARDIA, 1887, liii.
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evidence of how the Metis fared during the measles epidemic. Although it is possible that 
overall resistance to the disease was marginally higher in the Metis and mixed-blood 
communities,69 the agent’s choice of either passive (suffering) or active (being “tested”) 
language reflects a classification of the “half breed” body as more physically capable of 
resisting disease than the Indian body, despite the experience of what was likely an 
identical illness and for many, a similar lifestyle.70 While the DIA’s depiction of illness as 
an inherently racial experience was not unusual, the inclusion of Metis into a comparative 
equation suggests an intentional construction of a racial hierarchy, built, as Paige 
Raibmon suggests, upon the observation and “performance” of health and, conversely, 
illness, that relied upon “the tragic trope of the vanishing Indian” to gain legitimacy.71 A 
similar pattern is noted by Lux, who argued that during the late nineteenth century, Indian 
agents in the North-West Territories intentionally withheld food and farming supplies in 
an attempt to impress the need for subjugation to treaties and federal policies at the same 
time as crop failure, starvation, and epidemic disease were attributed to the perceived 
moral and intellectual failings of the Plains Indians.72
By October 1886, the disease had also spread to the nearby Saddle Lake Reserve, 
180 kilometers north-east of Edmonton, where it continued to spread throughout 
December, killing at least nine children and an unspecified number of adults before 
spreading to the southern part of the territory.73 The reports from the Edmonton agency 
do not provide a specific date of arrival, only stating that a “bad type” of measles was
69 Black, “An Explanation of High Death Rates Among New World Peoples,” 300.
70 Patrick C. Douaud, “Genesis,” The Western Metis: Profile o f  a People, ed. Patrick C. Douaud (Regina: 
University of Regina, 2007), 5, 11.
71 Raibmon, Authentic Indians, 75.
72 Lux, Medicine That Walks, 33, 155.
73 T.P. Wadsworth, “Saddle Lake Agency,” ARDIA, 1887,142.
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present throughout the winter and spring of 1887, and that many died from complications 
after the epidemic had passed.74 However, on 29 November 1887, the British Colonist 
published a short article stating that “the Indian population around Edmonton is being 
exterminated by measles,” which suggests that the epidemic spread to the Edmonton area 
as late as the middle of the month.75 Fort Edmonton, acting as a major point of transfer 
for both colonists and indigenous populations, likely functioned as a hub for further 
contagion and provided the transient population needed to carry the disease to 
surrounding bands and agencies.76
By January 1887, the epidemic had spread to a Stony camp near Gull Lake, where 
over fifty members of the band perished.77 In the following spring, the Blackfoot on the 
North Reserve were attacked “very severely” by measles.78 Several cases of measles 
occurred on the Blood reserve in isolated areas, but the annual reports suggested that 
diffusion to the broader community was prevented. The report does not indicate exactly 
how contagion was halted, but stated that “every precaution was taken.. . with complete
79success.”
Unlike the DIA, the Hudson’s Bay Company could draw upon a long history of 
experience with contagious disease in remote regions. Preventative measures, including 
quarantine, vaccination, and variolation in the case of smallpox had been practised by 
company officers as early as the late eighteenth century.80 Although not always
74 W. Anderson, “Indian Agent’s Office, Edmonton, N.W.T.,” ARDIA, 1887,104.
75 “North-West Territories,” British Colonist, 29 November 1987, 3.
76 Although there are several reserves within close proximity to the city of Edmonton, Edmonton Agency 
was the closest. The Annual Reports also list White Lake, Sturgeon River, Lac la Nonne, Stony Lake,
Stony Plain, and Pass-pass-chase's Reserve.
77 Samuel R. Lucas, “Peace Hills Agency,” ARDIA, 1887, 96.
78 Magnus Begg, “Blackfoot Agency "ARDIA, 1887, 100.
79 W.M. Pocklington, “Blood Agency,” ARDIA, 1887, 97.
80 Paul Hackett, “Averting Disaster,” 579.
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successful, these practices helped reduce deaths caused by contagious disease. However, 
by the late nineteenth century, the Canadian government largely relied upon the relatively 
inexpensive quarantine measures to manage illness in both First Nations and immigrant 
populations, although quarantine was not yet considered a feasible solution for treating 
measles in densely populated urban areas.81 It is likely that the Indian agent’s actions on 
the Blood reserve resembled the quarantine measures taken in the previous epidemics, 
capitalizing upon the increased level of control that the DIA exercised in the prairie 
regions following the North-West Uprising.82 Although the mobility of First Nations 
populations in this area was already restricted, the increased restriction that came with 
quarantine measures had the potential to considerably limit the further spread of disease.
Other reserves in what would eventually be southern Alberta were heavily 
affected by measles in the early months of 1887. The Sarcee Agencies at Fish Creek and 
Morleyville “suffered severely,” with an estimated mortality rate as high as 3 percent of 
the population.83 Although most accounts of infection come from the early part of 1888, 
the epidemic continued to spread throughout the North-West Territories for the next year 
and a half. The Chipewyan populations of Onion and Cold Lake, both located close to the 
border of present day Saskatchewan and Alberta, reported fatalities from a “severe 
attack” of the measles as late as the winter of 1889.84
The path of diffusion becomes much harder to trace upon entering the more 
highly populated regions of southern British Columbia. It is unclear exactly where the 
disease entered the province. It is possible that that the measles entered through the
81 Hardy, Epidemic Streets, 50,51.
82 Lux, Medicine That Walks, 48.
83 WM. Camagey De Balinhard, “Indian Agent’s Office, Sarcee Agency," ARDIA, 1887, 103.
84 Geo. G. Mann, “Onion Lake Agency, Pitt District,” ARDIA, 1889, 70.
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southeast portion of British Columbia, but the 1888 DIA annual report identifies the 
source of disease as a group of First Nations workers who had recently returned from 
picking hops in Washington State.85 Speculation about disease among hops pickers raised 
concern about the security of the border, as well as the seasonal employment of First 
Nations individuals, the latter of which was falling under increasing criticism as being 
both unprofitable and detrimental to the settled, agricultural-based lifestyle that federal 
agents considered ideal.86 Such distrust was compounded by the sheer volume of the 
annual migration. In 1885 Indian agent W.H. Lomas estimated that close to a staggering 
6,000 people, or as Raibmon suggests, one quarter of British Columbia’s Indian 
population, took part in the journey south for employment.87 Although 24,000 is a very 
conservative estimate of the 1885 indigenous population,88 Raibmon’s calculations reflect 
the important position that hops work and migration held in the late-nineteenth-century 
wage economy.
The yearly migration to the Washington State hops fields functioned as an 
important source of income, but also served as a key social and cultural outlet during a 
period of increasingly strict government regulation.89 American Indian agents had no 
legal power over Indigenous people who came from Canadian territories, and legislation 
prohibiting traditional cultural practices such as the potlatch could not be easily enforced
85 W.H. Lomas, “Cowichan A g e n c y ARDIA, 1888, 100.
86 Harry Guilloid, “West Coast Agency,” ARDIA, 1884, 99: “[A]lthough the seed is often obtained with 
great difficulty in the spring, and a good deal of labor expended in putting it in the ground, at harvest time it 
is often neglected (the owners being away at the canneries or hop-fields) and much grain is lost every year 
in this way, few being able to resist an offer of high wages, no matter at what future loss to their families.”
87 Raibmon, Authentic Indians, 79.
88 Galois and Harris, “A Population Geography of British Columbia in 1881,” 138. Galois and Harris 
estimate that in 1881, there was an indigenous population o f  just over 53,000 people, and a very low 
population density of about one person per eighteen square kilometers.
9 Raibmon, Authentic Indians, 61, 62.
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across the 49th parallel.90 Thousands of white spectators also travelled yearly to trade and 
watch indigenous workers in the Washington State hops fields. However, despite 
participation in what was obviously a thriving economy, many contemporary observers, 
including British Columbian Indian agents, inteipreted the migrations as further evidence 
of the inability to adapt to the Euro-Canadian lifestyle.91 The direct association of illness 
with this migration cemented such perceptions in the minds of provincial and federal 
authorities, and vulnerabilities that were once viewed as insular weaknesses became seen 
as active viral threats. In truth, hops grounds in both British Columbia and Washington 
State were enough of a breeding ground for disease to cause continued controversy.92 
Accommodations were crowded and in many cases poorly maintained, and Raibmon 
suggests that in seasons when work was plentiful, hops workers exercised agency in 
either demanding better accommodations or moving on to better grounds.93
Correspondence between the DIA and migrant Cowichan workers reveals that 
indigenous hops workers regularly concealed illness for fear that quarantine would 
prevent entry into Washington State.94 The system of self-disclosure and quarantine was 
not effective at preventing the spread of disease, and in 1888, the measles epidemic was 
prevalent enough to have a measurable impact on the hops harvest. Restrictions upon re­
entering British Columbia were much more lax, the only requirements being a letter from 
either a local Indian agent or a hops grower affirming the good health of the traveling
90 Ibid.
91 Raibmon, Authentic Indians, 75.
92 Kelm 54; Raibmon, Authentic Indians, 83.
93 Paige Raibmon, “The Practice of Everyday Colonialism: Indigenous Women at Work in the Hop Fields 
and Tourist Industry of Puget Sound,” Labor: Studies in Working-Class History o f  the Americas 2.3 (2006): 
34.
94 Library and Archives Canada (LAC) RG 10 (Department o f Indian Affairs), Vol. 1355, W.H Lomas to
A.W. Vowell, 17 July 1882; LAC RG 10 (DIA) Vol. 1356 W.H Lomas to Levi Meyers, U.S. Consul, 
Victoria, 9 August 1892.
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parties.95 These letters were easily falsified, and often did not include assessments of 
children, who were among the most vulnerable to the highly contagious disease. In the 
winter of 1888, infected hops pickers returned home as far north as Prince Rupert. Some 
of those who survived the journey almost certainly carried measles back with them to the 
mouth of the Skeena River.96
Having entered British Columbia in the late fall of 1887, the measles was 
epidemic among First Nations populations by December, and continued to spread 
throughout the first six months of 1888. The DIA reports do not provide detailed 
information about the spread of the epidemic throughout the Lower Mainland and Fraser 
River Agency, only stating that the disease was present in several areas by early 1888, 
and had “fatal impacts” on some of the bands closer to the coast.97 The reports from 
agents in coastal regions provide slightly more information. The Burrard Inlet, Schechelt, 
and “Sliamman” (Sliammon) Coast Salish populations were reported to be hit particularly 
hard, experiencing both measles and a respiratory disease that lingered into the spring and 
resulted in high child mortality rates.98 The disease continued to spread slowly north 
along the Northwest Coast,99 and by mid-December, the epidemic had reached the 
densely populated Cowichan agency, where Indian Agent W.H. Lomas claimed to have 
attended over 100 cases in one day.100 Most of the reserves on Vancouver Island and the 
surrounding areas contracted measles over the next month. The impact of the disease was
95 Raibmon, Authentic Indians, 84.
96 Raibmon, Authentic Indians, 84; Susan Neylan, The Heavens are Changing: Nineteenth-Century 
Protestant Missions and Tsimshian Christianity (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2003), 136. Although Neylan does not discuss many details of the epidemic in the Skeena region, Neylan 
claims that the measles reached the Skeena region as early as late 1887.
97 K. Dewdney, “British Columbia,” ARDIA, 1888, lxxvi.
98 P. McTieman, “New West Minister, B.C.,” ARDIA, 1888, 105.
99 K. Dewdney, “British Columbia,” ARDIA, 1888, xci.
100 W.H. Lomas, “Cowichan Agency,” ARDIA, 1888, 100.
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particularly harsh in the Puget Sound area, just over the American border, where it “swept 
off great numbers o f ... children.”101 It is likely that the disease then spread down the 
coast of Washington, or was already present in this region, having entered from south­
eastern British Columbia.
The residents of Victoria were well aware of the threat that measles posed. The 
British Colonist frequently published reports of incoming ships quarantined in port for 
cases of measles, making special note of any indigenous passengers or employees. 
Notably, few ships without indigenous passengers were quarantined for carrying 
passengers suffering from measles.102 In some cases, more severe diseases (such as 
cholera) were said to be measles, most likely as a means of avoiding quarantine, which 
was both costly and bad for business.103 Several ships were quarantined for suspicions of 
measles and cholera, and others for rumours of smallpox.104 However, these measures 
were not enough to prevent the importation of disease, and the paper reported that an 
epidemic of a “mild type” of measles was present in the city as of 8 November 1887, 
suggesting that despite the recent influx of immigration, Victoria and the surrounding 
areas had not yet reached the population level needed to support endemic measles.105
The fact that the epidemic was mild among the settler population did not lessen 
the city of Victoria’s concerns about contagion, and the newspaper continued to report 
new cases of measles among both the indigenous and white populations. On 27
101 H. Moffat, “West Coast Agency,” ARDIA, 1888, 118.
102 See “The Elder Case,” British Colonist, 4 May 1887; “The Last o f the Fleet,” British Colonist, 9 
October 1888,4.
103 See “Cholera on the Alexia,” British Colonist, 2 November 1887, 1.
104 See “Cholera on the Media,” British Colonist, 2 November 1887, 1; “The Elder Case,” British Colonist, 
4 May 1887.
105 “Local Briefs,” British Colonist, 8 November 1887,4. According to census records, Victoria’s 
population in 1891 was 16,841, significantly increased from 1881 ’s record o f 5,925. The Euro-Canadian 
death toll from the epidemic appears to have been relatively low and the paper only occasionally reported 
fatalities and quarantined houses within city limits.
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November 1887, the British Colonist reported that the mayor of Nanaimo had official 
information that “a malignant form of measles” had broken out among indigenous 
children in a Nanaimo camp and that “[a]n effort is being made to persuade the Indians to 
remain in their own quarters until the epidemic has subsided.”106 The next mention of the 
epidemic was on 7 December 1887 when “black measles,” was reported to have been 
epidemic at Esquimalt, with seven Indian deaths occurring in two days.107 This report 
was retracted in the following day’s edition, which claimed that there were no cases of 
black measles at Esquimalt, and that only three bodies were buried. These deaths were 
said to have occurred elsewhere from exposure following cases of measles but were not 
directly related to the illness.108 The article then noted that there were three persons, most 
likely settlers, sick with measles in a mild form at Esquimalt. Although it is not possible 
to know which version of events most accurately reflected reality, the British Colonist 
was clearly attempting to allay concern surrounding both the virulent nature and rapid 
diffusion of the epidemic.
The relative isolation of Victoria and the lack of geographical barriers between 
First Nations, immigrant, and Euro-Canadian populations worked to heighten pre­
existing fears of contagion and racial contamination. Victoria’s origins as a company city 
had long divided loyalties between those who viewed the city as the administrative hub of 
a still-profitable fur trade and newer British immigrants who considered the expanding 
metropolis as the westernmost stronghold of British civilization.109 Local First Nations 
populations were at the centre of this debate, and on 15 December 1888, the British
106 “Measles in Nanaimo,” British Colonist, 27 November 1887,4.
107 “Local Briefs,” British Colonist, 7 December 1887,4.
108 Ibid.
109 Chad Reimer, Writing British Columbia History, 1784-1958 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 21, 22.
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Colonist republished a short article from The Nanaimo Free Press that shifted attention 
from the spread of disease directly onto the indigenous body: “measles have appeared in 
Epidemic form at Toby and Malaspina inlets on the mainland coast. In one family alone 
five deaths have occurred. This is hardly to be wondered at when it is remembered that 
Indians, in the case of any eruption of the skin, rush into the salt water to bathe.”110 By 
arguing that the high death toll was the result of medical and cultural ignorance, rather 
than the widespread or unusually severe nature of the epidemic, the article limited the 
threat of measles to First Nations bodies that were already seen as weakened and in a 
state of moral and physical decline. Despite this reassurance, the disease—and fear of 
contagion within the nearby First Nations communities—spread, and measles was 
prevalent enough in Victoria to substantially lower attendance rates at schools throughout 
January of 1888.'11
It is likely that the disease spread north via the Fraser Canyon and the Northwest 
Coast at the same time as it moved through Vancouver Island. In late 1887 or early 1888, 
there were ten deaths among the Chilcotin, and seventeen in a band the DIA identified as 
the “Anahun,” in which the measles was described as being “very prevalent among them, 
and its attack virulent.”112 The epidemic then reached both of the bands at Alexandria, as 
well as Soda Creek, and all communities experienced fatalities.113 Although the mortality 
rate at Fort Quesnel was comparatively low, the 1888 report claimed that “almost all the 
tribe suffered.”114 The epidemic continued to spread north throughout the HBC’s network
110 “Outbreak of Measles,” British Colonist, 15 December 1888,4.
111 “School Board Meeting,” British Colonist, 15 February 1888, I.
112 B. Dewdney, “Annual Report,” ARDIA, 1888, lxxxvii.
113 Wm. Laing Meason, “Williams Lake Agency, B.C.,” ARDIA, 1888, 113; B. Dewdney, “Annual Report,” 
ARDIA, 1888, lxxxviii.
114 Wm. Laing Meason, “Williams Lake Agency, B.C.," ARDIA, 1888,113.
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of trading posts, spreading to Fort George, Stuart Lake, Babine Lake and the smaller post 
of Hazelton, as is discussed in chapters two and three. The dates of arrival are uncertain, 
but the epidemic was present as early as January 1888 at Fort George and lingered as late 
as May in regions outside of Fort Babine. Although evidence suggests that the epidemic 
spread further than the DIA or HBC’s documentation, little evidence remains from more 
geographically isolated areas. As such, the DIA annual reports should be considered only 
as starting points for further research. It is also important to remember that the reports 
may not be complete or accurate, and that the influence of the DIA had not yet reached 
much of the central or northern portion of the province.
Heavily intertwined with seasonal patterns of wage labour and the arrival of new 
transportation networks, the rapid spread of measles emphasized the isolation of Victoria 
and the insufficient networks of communication linking the predominately white 
provincial capital to the more remote regions of the province.115 Although rapidly 
declining in number, the First Nations population still significantly outnumbered the 
Euro-Canadian and immigrant populations.116 The fear of measles, although for most of 
the settler population a relatively common childhood disease, was inseparable from fear 
surrounding an inadequate system of public health and the proximity of indigenous 
peoples.
The British Columbia government’s memory was short when it came to the well­
being of the indigenous population in the aftermath of the epidemic. Few lasting changes
115 Cole Harris, “The Struggle with Distance,” in The Resettlement o f  British Columbia: Essays on 
Colonialism and Geographical Change (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), 179.
116 Galois and Harris, “A Population Geography of British Columbia in 1881,” 138. Galois and Harris 
estimate that in 1881, there was an indigenous population of just over 53,000 people, and a very low 
population density of about one person per eighteen square kilometers. Of the remainder, 4,200 were 
identified as “Chinese” and over 19,000 identified as either European or “white.”
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occurred on a provincial level.117 The rapid spread of measles throughout the province 
was quickly minimized by the DIA and forgotten by the newspaper. On 8 February,
1889, the British Colonist claimed that “[t]he report of the Indian Department was 
presented to parliament... [a]n epidemic of measles of a mild form  [emphasis mine] is 
reported to have been prevalent among the British Columbia Tribes with fatal effect.”118 
Less than a year before, the same newspaper had reported with alarm that measles was 
spreading throughout Victoria and Vancouver Island’s Indian population and 
“exterminating” the Indian population near Edmonton.119 The DIA’s mention of the 
epidemic was presented as new information, and no reference was made to the events of 
the previous year.
Although the full extent of the 1886 - 1888 measles epidemic may never be 
known, it had a heavy impact on indigenous communities both within and without the 
reserve system of western Canada. British Columbia in particular experienced a 
significant amount of disruption during the epidemic, including high levels of mortality 
and illness. The inclusion of the 1886-88 measles epidemic into the historical narrative of 
British Columbia will greatly broaden historians’ understanding of indigenous-newcomer 
relations of the late nineteenth century, and fill a gap in the epidemiological history of the 
Canadian west.
117 LAC RG 10 (DIA) Vol. 1355, H. Lomas to A.W. Vowell, 17 July 1892. While there is some evidence 
that broader vaccination campaigns for other diseases were undertaken in the wake of the epidemic, 
provincial authorities showed little enthusiasm and it appears that plan was soon abandoned.
18 “Capital Notes,” British Colonist, 8 February 1889, 1.
119 “North-West Territories,” British Colonist, 29 November 1987, 3.
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Chapter 2
“It Cannot Surely be Right:”1 The Hudson’s Bay Company’s Response to the 1886 -
1888 Measles Epidemic.
The measles epidemic diffused rapidly throughout the Central Interior of British
Columbia. As outlined in the previous chapters, the epidemic entered northern British
Columbia through the Skeena watershed, spreading via trade and travel routes throughout
the HBC (Hudson’s Bay Company) networks. The epidemic then spread to Fort Quenelle
and the Upper Skeena region in late 1887 or early 1888, suggesting separate interior and
coastal diffusion routes. It then spread to the more distant post of Fort George in January,
reaching Stuart Lake by February at the latest.2 The epidemic lingered as late as May
1888 in isolated regions, but the poor conditions that had facilitated the rapid spread of
disease continued into the winter and spring of 1889.3 Every post in the region appears to
have been affected by the disease.4
Evidence from several locations reveals that the epidemic became deeply
intertwined with HBC trade and business in the Central Interior between 1888 and 1889.
The HBC records from Fort George provide the most detailed account of the epidemic
and the period of scarcity that followed. The presence of measles was first recorded on 16
January 1888, corresponding with a period of severe cold and hunger.5 Over the next
month, Factor Charles Griffin Ogden repeatedly described the measles as “raging,” and
noted that, because of the severity of illness, most of the “Indians [were] still doing
nothing ... [t]hey are all starving with nothing to eat.”6 At one point, Ogden noted that
1 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), MacFarlane Fonds, MG29, A l l ,  vol. 1, pp. 808-809.
2 Hudson’s Bay Company Archives (HBCA) B.280/a/l 16 January 1888; HBCA B.188/b/10 vol. 3 f. 80.
3 HBCA B. 188/b/10 vol. 3 f. 77-80; HBCA B.188/b/10 (24 May 1888) R. MacFarlane to Thomas R. Smith 
Esquire (Victoria BC) 24 May 1888, pg 25.
4 HBCA B 188/b/10vol. 3 f.81.
5 HBCA B.280/a/1 16 January 1888.
6 HBCA B.280/a/l 18 January 1888.
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the whole camp was completely prostrate.7 These conditions continued for approximately 
a month before any signs of improvement were noted, but the measles lingered for close 
to two months, in part due to a relapse that occurred after a hunting trip in early March.8 
Similar to the evidence provided in Chapter One, children were hit particularly hard. At 
least eight children and two adults died of measles or measles-related causes in the 
vicinity of Fort George, and Ogden suggested that fatalities were even heavier in more 
isolated regions.9
Despite evidence of severe illness, it is unclear if these deaths were the result of 
measles or disease-related starvation. Due to the severity of disease, hunting and 
subsistence patterns were disrupted for most of the winter. As travel-adventurer and 
trapper J. Tumer-Tumer observed of the indigenous peoples at Fort George in January of 
1888, “an outbreak of measles ... had so thinned their ranks that among the survivors 
there were about eight fit to hunt,” and that it “was so late that they did not propose to 
take their usual trip higher up.”10 Tumer-Tumer also noted that mail and supply 
deliveries were delayed, and normal patterns of employment, such as guiding, were 
greatly disrupted.11
The HBC was ill positioned to respond to the measles epidemic. By the late 
1880s, the company had lost much of the economic power of the first half of the 
nineteenth century. In 1858, the British Government had revoked the HBC’s licence over 
the territory to form the crown colony of British Columbia. One result of this action was
7 HBCA B.280/s/l 28 January 1888.
8 HBCA B.280/s/l March 16 1888.
9 HBCA B.280/s/l 30 January 1888,20 February 1888.
10 Tumer-Tumer, Three Years' Hunting and Trapping in America and the Great North-west (London: 
Maclure, 1888), 159.
11 Tumer-Tumer, Three Years' Hunting and Trapping, 150.
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that the company lost its exclusive fur trading privileges and was forced to compete in an 
open market. Although the impact of this change was gradual, it allowed for an influx of 
free traders and merchants into territories that were once strictly controlled. Despite the 
loss of monopoly, the Canadian government still expected the HBC to maintain the costs 
of providing relief to Aboriginal people in many regions. This was a heavy burden, and 
one the HBC was not legally required to sustain. However, the government recognized 
that if it paid the HBC to assume this task, the company would gain a commercial 
advantage over its competitors through extra profit, a fact that HBC officials refused to 
acknowledge. As a result, many of the company’s decisions in the second half of the 
nineteenth century were influenced by its strained relationship with the federal 
government.12 Moreover, improperly managed imports, high tariffs and heavy retail 
competition absorbed a huge portion of potential profit.13 Chronic financial 
mismanagement and a failure to keep pace with the modernization of free traders and 
other retail competition hampered both trade and the development of a strong regional 
administrative system. This disorganization was particularly apparent in British 
Columbia, where a sharp division was rapidly developing between retail-orientated 
branches in the southern half of the province, and the more remote fur-trading posts of 
the Central Interior and northern districts, which were often stocked with older goods and 
were not always economically self-supporting.14
12 Arthur J. Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1990), 18,42.
13 Jennifer Anne Schmidt, “Shopping in the Late Nineteenth Century: The Hudson’s Bay Company and its 
Transition from Fur Trade to Retailing,” (M.A. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 2011), 67, 80; Arthur 
J. Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade, 26.
14 This is particularly apparent in HBCA B.226/b/46 Fort Victoria correspondence books, 1884-1891. For 
more information on the development o f the Hudson’s Bay Company as a retail force, see: Schmidt, 
“Shopping in the Late Nineteenth Century” and Donica Belisle, Retail Nation: Department Stores and the 
Making o f  Modem Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011).
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Many of the challenges to the fur trade in the Central Interior were outside of the 
direct influence of the HBC. An economy that Ray characterized as “volatile” placed 
increased pressure on those northern posts, including Stuart Lake, that were at the edge of 
the settler market, as they remained dependent on indigenous trade and trapping to 
produce profit.15 After the HBC lost its exclusive trading rights, its profits were far more 
subject to vicissitudes of distant economies and trends, many of which also translated into 
direct competition in the form of increased fur tariffs and operating costs.16 Moreover, 
free traders provided a wider variety of goods at cheaper prices. As historian Frank 
Tough observed “[e]ven with cost cutting measures, the external demands for furs 
ultimately determined the viability of the local economy.”17 An international economic 
depression reduced the price of luxury fur from 1879 until 1895, when expanding 
markets and a declining stock increased the market value of less expensive and more 
readily available alternatives.18 The expansion of mining in the Omineca region and the 
construction of canneries on the Northwest coast and lower Fraser reduced the returns of 
salmon traditionally relied upon by the Gitxsan, Carrier, Babine, Wet’suwet’en, and other 
indigenous peoples of the Central Interior and Northwest Coast.19 Moreover, as Keith 
Carlson and Douglas Harris argued, the development of industrial fishing operations and 
canneries on the lower Fraser and Skeena Rivers strengthened the claim of settlers to the
15 Arthur J. Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade, 13.
16 Patricia McCormack, Fort Chipewyan and the Shaping o f  Canadian History, 1 788- J920s: "We Like to 
Be Free in this Country" (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 71, 72.
17 Frank Tough, As Their Natural Resources Fail: Native Peoples and the Economic History o f  Northern 
Manitoba, 1870-1930 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), 64.
18 Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade, 25, 50.
19 Douglas Harris, Landing Native Fisheries: Indian Reserves and Fishing Rights in British Columbia, 
1849-1925 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 50; Brian Dale Stauffer, “Resource Development Patterns of 
British Columbia, 1870-1970” (MA Thesis: University of Northern British Columbia, 2001), 48; Robert 
Galois, “The History of the Upper Skeena Region, 1850 to 1927,” Native Studies Review 9.2 (1993-1994): 
121, 122; James A. MacDonald and Jennifer Joseph, “Key Events in the Gitxsan Encounter With the 
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2000): 202, 203.
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indigenous lands and influenced the way that the provincial government viewed the 
resource rights of indigenous peoples.20 This is perhaps most apparent in the 
correspondence between the HBC and the provincial government between the winter of 
1888 and the spring of 1889, the majority written by HBC Chief Factor Roderick 
MacFarlane of Stuart Lake and the New Caledonia fur trading district.
The HBC was not responsible for and hard pressed to provide aid to the 
indigenous peoples of western Canada in 1888. Unusually harsh weather, epidemic 
disease, and a sharp decline in the populations of small fur-bearing animals limited 
trading profits in the Central Interior between 1887 and 1889. The sum of these 
conditions resulted in terrible famine conditions in parts of the North-West Territories 
and British Columbia.21 Under increased pressure from Victoria to collect old debts, 
reduce outfit costs, and be financially conservative when trading, MacFarlane appealed to 
both provincial and federal governments to provide either long-term or temporary aid to 
the indigenous peoples of the Central Interior. MacFarlane’s correspondence emphasized 
two main points: the unsustainable nature of the prevailing fur economy and the ongoing 
subsistence struggles faced by the indigenous people of the Central Interior.22 Using the 
regional trading district of New Caledonia as a focal point, this chapter argues that the 
combination of cyclic scarcity and the 1887-1888 measles epidemic allowed for the 
growth of federal and provincial involvement in the Central Interior of British Columbia. 
Although no aid was provided to Stuart Lake or any of the indigenous peoples mentioned
20 Keith Thor Carlson, “Innovation, Tradition, Colonialism and Aboriginal Fishing Conflicts,” in New 
Histories fo r  Old: Changing Perspectives on Canada's Native Pasts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 151; 
Douglas Harris, Fish, Law, and Colonialism: The Legal Capture o f  Salmon in British Columbia (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2001).
21 McCormack, Fort Chipewyan and the Shaping o f  Canadian History, 83.
22 HBCA B.226/b/46 Vol 4. F.185; LAC RG10 (DIA) Vol. 3803, File 53556, R. MacFarlane to E.B.
Davie, 12 November 1888.
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in MacFarlane’s correspondence, the DIA became increasingly involved in the region as 
the economic stability of the HBC declined and indigenous peoples were forced to look 
elsewhere for aid during periods of disease and hardship.
Wildlife and salmon cycles were almost certainly a factor in the diffusion of the 
measles epidemic, and were a key factor in the disruption of seasonal rounds in British 
Columbia’s Central Interior. Post journals from Fort Babine and Stuart Lake show that 
the lack of game and insufficient access to supplies led to changes in hunting patterns; 
however, it is not clear how these changes interacted with the diffusion of disease beyond 
the vulnerability resulting from malnutrition. One possible explanation for this 
correlation in British Columbia’s Central Interior is that periods of scarcity and hunger 
encouraged increased congregation around posts where aid was often available. However, 
as Tough notes, this may have been more harmful than helpful: the majority of posts did 
not have access to the stocks of food needed to support large populations for extended 
periods, and even smaller posts often traded at a considerable distance for game.23
Very familiar with the environment of western Canada and highly knowledgeable 
of weather and game patterns, MacFarlane knew that the cyclic scarcity was temporary, 
but was also keenly aware that conditions were unlikely to improve in the prevailing 
economic climate, which limited the profitability of the fur trade and prevented the HBC 
from carrying the full burden of support for individuals who were ill, orphaned, or 
otherwise unable to provide for themselves.24 While not inherently related, the
23 Tough, As Their Natural Resources Fail, 19.
24 McCormack, Fort Chipewyan and the Shaping o f  Canadian History, 84. For more details on 
MacFarlane’s work as a naturalist, see Greg Thomas, "The Smithsonian and the Hudson's Bay Company," 
Prairie Forum (Autumn 1985): 283-305; E. O. Hohn, "Roderick MacFarlane o f Anderson River and Fort," 
The Beaver (Winter 1963): 22-29; "Statement o f Roderick MacFarlane," The Beaver (Sept. 1939): 12-15; 
E.A. Preble, "Roderick Ross MacFarlane, 1883-1920" The Auk 39 (1922): 203-209.
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intersection of environmental and economic factors and the inability of the company to 
address them are indicative of the changing nature of indigenous-settler relationships in 
the late nineteenth century.25 HBC letter books, correspondence from the provincial and 
federal governments, and documentation from the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) 
reflect the uncertain role of Canadian authorities in indigenous affairs prior to the 
extension of the reserve system into British Columbia’s Central Interior. The private and 
business correspondence of MacFarlane suggests the extent to which the HBC was 
involved in defining the relationship between the provincial government and the 
indigenous population of the Central Interior, and points to MacFarlane’s experiences 
with the DIA as an HBC employee. MacFarlane, transferred to Stuart Lake in 1887, was 
heavily influenced by his prior experiences at Fort Chipewyan, where cyclic scarcity, a 
changing economy, and the DLA’s reluctance to supply non-treaty Indians with aid had 
repeatedly contributed to periods of hunger and disease.26 Finding similar conditions in 
British Columbia, MacFarlane argued strongly and repeatedly for the indigenous 
communities in the Central Interior to receive aid while continuing to be engaged in the 
fur trade.
MacFarlane’s persistence exacerbated the tension between him and the HBC 
personnel in Victoria and Winnipeg, and further strained company relationships with 
provincial and federal governments.27 Although MacFarlane’s suggestions received little
25 Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade, 49. Ray argued that the failure of the state to support the social costs of 
the fur trade, notably seasonal aid, was directly related to the decline of HBC authority among indigenous 
communities in the late nineteenth century, as the company had met indigenous survival needs much better 
than the uneven state paternalism o f the post-confederation era.
26 McCormack, Fort Chipewyan and the Shaping o f  Canadian History, 84.
27 Roderick MacFarlane Fonds, LAC MG29-B15. MacFarlane had a reputation within the company for 
being outspoken about HBC policies and procedures, and had been quietly removed from his previous 
position as Chief Factor of Fort Chipewyan for criticizing company policy to a superior. It is unclear 
exactly what policy MacFarlane was criticizing when he offended his superior, but personal
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direct response from either federal or provincial authorities, his correspondence also 
reveals the contested and uncertain position of the HBC in British Columbia’s Central 
Interior during the late nineteenth century. The changing economic position of the HBC 
was a central influence in the shifting indigenous-newcomer relationships of the late 
nineteenth century. The HBC, although no longer technically responsible for the 
indigenous population, was the only settler presence in many regions of the province in 
1887-1888, and struggled to respond to the epidemic due to a number of internal and 
external financial and political constraints.
Geographically remote and operating within a distinct economic climate, the 
HBC’s Central Interior posts suffered from poor organization and inattention from 
superiors in Victoria. The larger posts in the southern half o f the province, although still 
supplying indigenous communities and buying furs, were now primarily concerned with 
competing for retail dominance in the lucrative and rapidly expanding settler market. 
Similar shifts were occurring in posts across the southern part of western Canada as 
immigration and agriculture increased.28 Immigration far outpaced the retail development 
of most districts, and the transition to a settler-based economy was not smooth for the 
HBC on either a regional or corporate level. While the HBC had successfully adapted to 
the changing demands of the indigenous economy, it was “slow in adapting to the 
growing European market” and reluctant to abandon business plans built around the 
traditional fur trade stock and operations of the earlier years.29 These plans had very little
correspondence indicates that he was unsatisfied with the growing lack of influence Factors and other high- 
ranking regional employees had on company policy, company organization, and recent changes in policy 
regarding the retirement rights o f company employees. The short length of his tenure at Stuart Lake (1887- 
1889) suggests that MacFarlane did not find company organization or policy improved in British Columbia.
28 Schmidt, “Shopping in the Late Nineteenth Century,” 64.
29 Schmidt, “Shopping in the Late Nineteenth Century,” ii.
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provision for mercantile expansion and were ill-suited to the increasingly diverse and 
consumer-orientated market of the Canadian west.30
Despite increasingly stringent restrictions on credit and company expenses, by 
1886 the only HBC outlet consistently producing a profit in British Columbia was the 
Victoria retail store. Many regions, including the entire New Caledonia district, were 
losing money to debt and poorly managed merchandizing even when individual yearly 
outfits did not produce a deficit.31 Such ongoing instability left the company very little 
economic power to respond to periods of scarcity and disease in the period between 1887 
and 1889. This problem has been discussed by Arthur J. Ray.32 Using the economic 
theories of H. Clare Pentland, who asserted that “the patterns of personal labour 
relationships broke down as competitive labour markets developed, ” Ray argued that the 
HBC slowly moved to managing the social overhead costs of the fiir trade via the debt 
system.33 This transition involved the introduction of the cash economy, wage labour, and 
modernized trade routes. All three of these systems were in the process of being extended 
to the Central Interior in the period between 1886-1888, and influenced how the company 
responded to the epidemic.
It was not until the early twentieth century that the HBC began to respond to the 
demands of an increasingly urbanized western market. Such a delayed response to the 
changing economic environment not only limited the profits of individual posts, but also
30 Schmidt, “Shopping in the Late Nineteenth Century,” 16.
31 HBCA B.226/b/46 Vol. 4, F.107
32 Arthur J. Ray, “The Decline of Paternalism in the Hudson’s Bay Company Fur Trade, 1870-945,” in 
Merchant, Credit, and Labour Strategies in Historical Perspective, ed. Rosemary E. Ommer. (Fredericton: 
Acadiensis Press, 1990), 189.
33 Ray, “The Decline o f Paternalism,” 189.
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interfered with the overall modernization of the company.34 The merchandizing 
techniques of the HBC in the late nineteenth century were outdated, inefficient, and 
expensive, leaving Stuart Lake and other more isolated posts ill-prepared to compete with 
free traders and smaller merchants who had access to affordable and modem luxury 
goods obtained from wholesale suppliers in the United States.35 Smaller posts often 
received shipments of rejected or inferior goods in an attempt to clear outdated stock and 
reduce costs, a practice that continued well into the 1930s.36 HBC district reports 
commented on the damage that this merchandising policy did to sales and year-end 
balances, as the remaining inventory of unsold goods limited the ability to import new 
goods and thus hampered future sales.37 Chronic organizational problems with shipping 
meant that orders were often received weeks or months behind schedule, limiting the 
ability of more remote regions to respond to epidemics, famine, and the types of 
shortages experienced in the winter and spring of 1888.38
In an effort to increase retail sales and reduce administrative costs, the HBC re­
organized on both a regional and national level. One of the most notable changes was a 
multi-level company restructuring in 1881 and 1884 that resulted in the shift to Winnipeg 
from London as the center of Canadian business, greatly reducing the frequency of 
expensive cross-country trips and overseas travel. Other changes, including the 
restructuring and modernization of the freight system, had a much larger impact on the
34 Donica Beiisle, Retail Nation, 7 ,24, as cited in Schmidt, “Shopping in the Late Nineteenth Century,” 64. 
Belisle explains how important reliable catalogue ordering was to the advancement of the retail structure. 
The HBC would catch up in the 1890s with larger depots in urban centres, but many northern posts would 
lack the stability o f regular catalogue access.
35 Schmidt, “Shopping in the Late Nineteenth Century,” 161.
36 Schmidt, “Shopping in the Late Nineteenth Century,” 53; Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade, 194.
37 HBCA B.226/b/46 Vol. 4 pg. 185.
38 Schmidt, “Shopping in the Late Nineteenth Century,” ii, 64; James Daschuk, Clearing the Plains: 
Disease, Politics o f  Starvation, and the Loss o f  Aboriginal Life (Regina: University o f  Regina Press, 2013), 
131.
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daily operations of the HBC in British Columbia’s Central Interior. Both Morris Zaslow 
and A. A. den Otter explored the HBC’s introduction of steam and industrialization on the 
fur trade in Western Canada, den Otter notably attributing the company’s decision to 
transition to steam to disruptions in transportation and indigenous employment during the 
Red River Uprising.39 However, despite an increasing awareness of the HBC’s role in the 
relationship between indigenous peoples and the Canadian government, little other work 
has been done on the technical or economic modernization of the HBC east of the Rocky 
Mountains in the late nineteenth century. This chapter fills part of this gap by showing 
that the economic and administrative development of the HBC in British Columbia’s 
Central Interior occurred within the broader context of the industrialization of the fur 
trade of British Columbia, and resulted in the increasing destabilization of indigenous 
communities during and in the years immediately following the measles epidemic of 
1887-1889.
Over twenty years after publication, Ray’s The Canadian Fur Trade in the 
Industrial Era remains the only general study of the fur trade in western Canada during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Refuting the assertion that the 
“continuities of native traditions between 1870 and 1945 can be explained in terms of a 
stable fur industry,” the majority of The Canadian Fur Trade focuses on the evolution of 
the HBC as a company, and how the shifting dynamics of upper management influenced 
the direction of regional operations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.40 
Ray shows that the fur trade was complex, dynamic, and subject to an increasingly
39 Moms Zaslow, The Opening o f  the Canadian North, 1870-1914 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1971); A.A. den Otter, “The Hudson Bay Company’s Prairie Transportation Problem, 1870-85” in The 
Developing West: Essays on Canadian History in Honor o f  Lewis H. Thomas, ed. J. E. Foster (Edmonton: 
University of Alberta Press, 1983), 27.
40 Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade, xvii.
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diverse and challenging market. The significant organizational and economic changes the 
company underwent in the period between 1870 (when the HBC surrendered the 
chartered territorial rights to Rupert’s Land) and the close of the Second World War had 
a large impact on indigenous wage labour and subsistence trapping, resulting in “fierce 
competition th a t... led to the depletion of fur and game resources and the ‘pauperization’ 
of native peoples.”41 The results of this process cemented the position of the HBC as an 
intermediary between indigenous people and the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) in 
western Canada, and were ultimately used to justify the increasing intervention of 
provincial and federal governments in indigenous communities as well as the creation of 
reserves.
The industrialization of the trade economies of northern communities has also 
been studied as a key factor in the expansion of Canadian authority and the establishment 
and growth of settler communities. Kerry Abel’s Changing Places: History, Community, 
and Identity in Northeastern Ontario examined the growth of community in an isolated 
region that also experienced environmental instability and rapid economic change at the 
end of the nineteenth century 42 A former economic centre and once one of the HBC’s 
most important posts, Moose Factory underwent dramatic transformation in the period 
between 1880 and 1950, a development triggered in part by the influx of modem industry 
and the completion of the CPR. Although Abel cautions against considering Moose 
Factory as reflective of all northern communities or assuming that patterns that develop 
within communities can be successfully “extrapolated to the national stage,” Changing 
Places provides valuable perspective on shifting settler-indigenous dynamics in the wake
41 Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade, xv.
42 Kerry Abel, Changing Places: History, Community, and Identity in Northeastern Ontario (Montreal: 
Queen’s University Press, 2006).
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of treaties, a growing resource economy, and settlement and immigration.43 Abel’s study 
holds significance for many parts of northern Canada, where the expansion of settlement 
and Canadian authority did not occur until the late nineteenth or early twentieth century 
when fur stocks were considerably depleted. While the majority of Changing Places 
focuses on the development of settler communities of the post-treaty period, Abel argues 
that the effects of environmental hardship and disease, left unaddressed by the DIA and 
the Ontario government, undermined treaty negotiations and influenced the way that 
reserve boundaries and conditions of residency were negotiated with indigenous 
communities.44 Moreover, Abel argues that many of the cultural changes evident in late- 
nineteenth-century Moose Factory were directly related to the declining economic 
importance of the HBC in the wake of immigration and the growth of settler 
populations 45 Changing Places highlights the need for a more nuanced, region-specific 
examination of the relationship between indigenous communities and the HBC in the late 
nineteenth century as the impacts of rail and industrialization reached local economies.
Historical geographer Frank Tough examines a similarly economically and 
environmentally unstable period in As Their Natural Resources Fail: Native Peoples and 
The Economic History o f Northern Manitoba, 1870 -1930.46 Compiling material from 
both indigenous and HBC sources, Tough shows how internal company restructuring and 
industrialization gradually removed indigenous wage labour from the northern Manitoba 
fur trade. This transition was particularly apparent in the isolated communities 
surrounding York Factory, a major post in northern Manitoba and until the late nineteenth
43 Kerry Abel, Changing Places, xxii.
44 Abel, Changing Places, 46, 47.
45 Abel, Changing Places, 42.
46 Frank Tough, As Their Natural Resources Fail, 70, 71.
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century, headquarters of the HBC’s operations in the western interior. Unlike the 
indigenous communities of Stuart Lake and Hazleton, which had the advantage of access 
to coastal trade networks that later allowed for economic ties to independent traders from 
Victoria, the indigenous peoples of York Factory and northern Manitoba remained 
largely dependent on HBC trade.47 Such dependency allowed the HBC to influence the 
shifting indigenous economy of northern Manitoba to its advantage, and once indigenous 
labour was no longer an economic necessary for the fort, “the native role in the seasonal 
economy was modified to meet the Company’s changing priorities.”48 As York Factory 
was no longer an economic and commercial hub, indigenous dependence upon credit and 
company aid was no longer beneficial or financially sustainable for the company. The 
lack of tradable furs in this region secured this transition as the “kindness” of the 
company was, as Tough asserts, by necessity attached to the prospect of future income 
and a profitable trade. 49 In an attempt to reduce the starvation, mass unemployment, and 
poor conditions that were developing in light of the HBC’s administrative changes, the 
officers at York Factory enacted measures to eliminate the residential population of “Fort 
Indians” between 1880 and the early 1890s.50 This involved the continued dispersal of 
gathered crowds, except during certain periods of the year, as well as encouraging 
hunting, fishing, and trapping over a broader area.51
While the Stuart Lake post was much smaller and far less economically important 
than York Factory, the lack of similarly established alternate provision in and around the 
Central Interior suggests that the HBC did not believe that either the scarcity of animals
47 Galois, “The History of the Upper Skeena Region”: 119; Tough, As their Natural Resources Fail, 5.
48 Tough, As Their Natural Resources Fail, 69.
49 Tough, As Their Natural Resources Fail, 7.
50 Tough, As Their Natural Resources Fail, 64, 73.
51 Tough, As Their Natural Resources Fail, 71, 72, 73.
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or the deficit of the fur trade in the New Caledonia region would be ongoing.
MacFarlane, who petitioned for the provision of aid from both the provincial government 
and the DIA, requested the seasonal provision of goods to “destitute” individuals during 
periods of economic and environmental hardship. As MacFarlane also requested that 
twine and other supplies necessary for hunting and trapping be provided to indigenous 
communities, he clearly considered both the environment and market viable enough to 
continue to support the indigenous population in a subsistence lifestyle, an argument that 
was further supported in company correspondence of 1889 where he suggested that under 
“careful development an extension of the fur trade” was possible.52 The success of this 
extension depended upon “a system of adequate supplies promptly dispatched; cheap 
transport; [and] reduced expenses,” as well as measures to limit overhunting and 
strategies to combat aggressive free traders, including lower fur tariffs and a more 
consistent presence in the Skeena region.53
MacFarlane’s recommendations proved too ambitious for the HBC, who were 
struggling to match the competition’s basic retail structure. One of the biggest flaws was 
inadequacy in shipping. The HBC was slow to adapt to the mercantile advantages of the 
CPR, but integrated steamer ships into several important regional transportation routes in 
the 1870s. By the 1880s, steam freight had been introduced to transport routes on Lake 
Winnipeg, the Saskatchewan, Peace, Athabasca and the Mackenzie rivers in an attempt to 
reduce dependence on indigenous labour and “fickle voyagers.” 54 The use of steamships 
improved access to wholesale goods and helped reduced the company’s importation of
52 LAC RG10 (DIA), Vol. 3803, File 53556, R. MacFarlane to EB Davie, 12 November 1888; HBCA 
B.226/b/46 vol. 5 pg 29.
53 HBCA B.226/b/46 vol. 5 pg 29.
54 den Otter, “The Hudson Bay Company’s Prairie Transportation Problem,” 28.
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more expensive English merchandise.55 Although the introduction of steam by the HBC 
is considered a mixed success at best, MacFarlane referred to the company’s use of steam 
ships as a positive development and almost certainly based his plans for the redesign of 
the Skeena-Stuart Lake interior freight system on these efforts.56
The HBC’s introduction of steam freighting to British Columbia’s Central Interior 
resulted in unexpected challenges to the economy that complicated the 1887-1888 trading 
season. Prior to the late 1880s, the majority of freighting was still contracted to 
indigenous employees who were hired regionally and on a seasonal basis, charging the 
HBC up to $60 per tonne for freighting on the Skeena.57 Intended as a means of 
modernization, the HBC’s ongoing efforts to streamline regional transportation systems 
meant that indigenous peoples of the Central Interior were increasingly removed from 
fort economies and this source of income. This intentional transition significantly 
weakened the position of indigenous and mixed-blood seasonal workers in the Central 
Interior. In the fall of 1887, immediately prior to the outbreak of the measles epidemic, 
the season’s freight was shipped by steamer in a coastal route via Port Simpson, Hazelton 
and Babine, instead of the formerly used overland route via the Cariboo wagon trail, 
Ashcroft, and Fort Quesnel.58 This change was intended to reduce transportation time and 
allow for a wider variety of consumer goods to be imported to the Central Interior than a 
pack train would allow. The coastal route, although more efficient in terms of actual 
labour and expense, necessitated an early start and the employment of different portage
55 Schmidt, “Shopping in the Late Nineteenth Century,” 67.
56 den Otter, ‘The Hudson Bay Company’s Prairie Transportation Problem,” 31; McCormack, Fort 
Chipewyan and the Shaping o f  Canadian History, 72.
57 W. Wicks, Memories o f  the Skeena (Saanichton, British Columbia: Hancock House, 1976), 44.
58 HBCA B. 226/b/48 vol. 2, Wrigley to Assistant Commissioner, 15 March 1888.
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workers.59 Tough notes a similar transition occurring in Manitoba in 1876, when the 
labour-intensive York boats used to transport goods between York Factory and Norway 
House were replaced by the efficient and economical steam powered boats that brought 
freight directly from Winnipeg. Following this change, some of the labour force relocated 
in order to load carts or supply wood for the steam engines, but a significant portion of 
the wage-labour economy was displaced.60
The HBC’s attempt to transition to a non-local freighting system was met with 
resistance from at least one indigenous community of the Central Interior. The complete 
shipment of freight left Winnipeg in March, but by mid-summer, less than a fifth of the 
expected goods had reached Stuart Lake, leaving the company, as well as the indigenous 
trappers, waiting for supplies and outfits, unprepared for the coming season.61 All of the 
trade goods and the majority of the food had been stolen, or as some speculated, 
abandoned in the bush along the portage by the inexperienced workers.62
Despite the large impact the missing goods had upon the already difficult trading 
season, little HBC documentation directly links the theft of goods with the 
implementation of the new freighting system or changes in hiring practice. It is thus 
unclear who, exactly, was responsible for the theft of the freight: the newly hired portage 
employees, the former pack-train employees, or an uninvolved third party. Several 
possible motivations for theft exist. The period between 1887 and 1889 was exceptionally 
challenging, and harsh weather, declining salmon runs and a scarcity of fur and game
59 HBCA B.255/b/48 vol. 2 15 March 1888 (Trade Commissioner Joseph Wrigley to Assistant 
Commissioner)
60 Tough, 57.
61 HBCA B.188/b/10 Vol. 3 pg 17; HBCA B.255/b/48 vol. 2 15 March 1888, Trade Commissioner Joseph 
Wrigley to Assistant Commissioner.
62 HBCA B.255/b/48 vol. 2 15 March 1888, Trade Commissioner Joseph Wrigley to Assistant 
Commissioner; BCA, A.C. Murray Fonds, E/E/M963, “Murray, Alexander Campbell, 1858-1931- 
Reminiscences 1980? Typescript,” pg 7.
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animals were reported throughout the Central Interior and North-West coast.63 It is thus 
possible that the goods were seized out of immediate need or possibly to be locally resold 
for financial gain. However, the strongest evidence suggests that the theft was a response 
to a breach of etiquette regarding hiring practices. Indigenous protests in response to 
changes in employment and company trading practices were not uncommon; in 1885, 
transport workers at Moose Factory successfully went on strike, demanding the same 
wages being offered to transport workers in the interior.64 Additionally, as Galois shows, 
the upper Skeena region has a strong history of indigenous protest in response to 
unauthorized land and resource use.65 Correspondence between Indian Agent R.E. Loring 
and anthropologist Marius Barbeau describes some of the reactions among the indigenous 
communities to the use of outside labour when transporting in the Central Interior: “[T]he 
Babine Indians, when formerly doing the packing for the Hudson’s Bay Company to Fort 
Babine and inland, upon the arrival of forty-five pack mules (from the 150-mile house, 
Cariboo wagon road) they were going to way-lay and shoot all the mules on their way 
thither. I headed it off as everything else I could . . .  .[sic].”66 Considered in the context of 
such aggressive acts of protest, the sabotage of a shipment of goods appears a plausible 
expression of dissatisfaction.
Deviating from expected patterns of employment may not have been the only 
breach of etiquette committed by the HBC in the attempt to implement steam freighting. 
Although regional trade was significantly disadvantaged by the lack of freight, the abuse
63 LAC RG10 (DIA) Vol. 3803, File 53556, R. MacFarlane to EB Davie, 12 November 1888.HBCA
B.188/b/10 Vol. 1 pg. 77, 79.
64 Ray, “The Decline of Paternalism in the Hudson’s Bay Company Fur Trade,” 195.
65 Galois, “The History of the Upper Skeena Region,” 116.
66 Canadian Museum of Civilization (CMC), B-F-202.2, R.E. Loring to Barbeau, January 1934. See also 
BCA GR-0429, Attorney General Correspondence, Assistant Commissioner to John Robson, 27th April 
1888.
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of traditional territorial boundaries of the Gitxsan along the Skeena must also be 
considered as a motivation for theft. The Gitxsan considered portages and land alongside 
the Skeena as private property that required special family permission to use, and 
challenged any unauthorized access.67 Although each community operated under distinct 
rules, villages were exacting tolls for waterway access and protesting the unauthorized 
use of traditional territory for profit by settlers and other indigenous groups even after 
Canadian law enforcement entered the area in 1889 and into the early twentieth century.68 
The HBC’s documents do not indicate that the new freighters had the permission of the 
Gitxsan to travel through the region. As Gitxsan law places precedent on individual and 
community relationships as negotiated through the wilp system of territorial and 
hereditary rights, it is unlikely that the Gitxsan would continue to recognize the prior 
freighting arrangement once new employees were hired.69 This is supported by Galois, 
who asserts that “[w]hite visitors were expected to conform to established practices 
governing trading journeys,” and argues that the exchange of gifts at Kitsegugla by early 
prospectors was evidence of the necessity of a “request and payment for permission to 
proceed” through village territory.70 The HBC, unevenly established in this region, were 
also held to these expectations.
In light of the freighting failure, MacFarlane’s plans for the transportation of 
supply and trade goods to Stuart Lake via steamship were deemed too expensive and 
impractical for continued use by HBC superiors in Victoria. As MacFarlane failed to
67 Jeremy Williams, “A History o f Gitxsan Relations with Colonial and Canadian Law, 1858-1909,” (MA 
Thesis: University of Northern British Columbia), 9, 32. Galois, “The History o f the Upper Skeena 
Region,” 123.
68 Galois, “The History of the Upper Skeena Region,” 153.
69 Williams, “A History of Gitxsan Relations,” 13, 16.
70 Galois, “The History of the Upper Skeena Region,” 120.
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submit final accounts for the year of 1888, it is impossible to determine the total cost of 
the theft and the failed shipping endeavor.71 A rail and wagon route through Quesnel via 
Ashcroft and the Cariboo wagon road, as suggested by HBC Trade Commissioner Joseph 
Wrigley, was eventually adopted as the main system of transportation and freight in the 
region.72 A successful steam freighting system was not introduced into the region until 
1891, which “quickly replaced the Indian freighter canoes and ended the last. . .  trade 
monopolies.”73 However, unlike MacFarlane’s plan, this route did not extend directly to 
Fort Babine or Stuart Lake, further reinforcing the shift in indigenous trading patterns 
that occurred following the 1887-1888 measles epidemic.74
Company correspondence identifies the lack of access to adequate provisions as a 
primary factor in the disruption of indigenous seasonal activity around Fort Babine and 
other regional posts.75 Although providing food for immediate consumption during the 
epidemic and subsequent months was among the company’s primary concerns, the fur 
economy was financed by the promise of a reciprocal, working relationship. Due in part 
to the disruption to the food supply, the HBC was unable to supply trappers with the 
yearly outfits necessary for travel and trapping, a variable that significantly exacerbated 
the disruption of seasonal and economic activity.76 While the outfits provided by the 
HBC did not contain the whole of the food needed to support a family through a winter, 
an increased reliance on dry foodstuffs such as tea, preserved meat, and flour made it
71 HBCA B.226/b/50 vol 6 10, August 1886.
12 HBCA B.226/b/48 vol.2 pg 227.
73 James A. MacDonald and Jennifer Joseph, “Key Events in the Gitksan Encounter with the Colonial 
World,” 205.
74 HBCA B.74 2 2 f. 13; HBCA B.226/b/48 vol. 2.
75 LAC RG10 (DIA) Vol. 3808, File 53556, Murray to R. MacFarlane, 1 April.
76 HBCA B. 188/b/10 Vol. 1 pg. 34; HBCA B.188/b/10 Vol. 1 pg. 77; HBCA B.188/b/10 vol. 3 pg. 17.
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increasingly difficult to trap for an entire season without substantial supplementation.77 
What canned food was available at posts was expensive and too heavy to be practical for 
continued transport through the snow. Additionally, seasonal outfits often contained more 
than food, also consisting of gear necessary for trapping, including twine, shotgun shells, 
and sometimes tools such as axes and knives. Achieving a profitable trapping season 
without these supplies was very difficult.
Cyclic scarcity—the periodic decline in the populations of small, fur-bearing 
animals—also challenged subsistence patterns and further decreased the ability of the 
HBC to provide aid to the indigenous people of the Central Interior. A major component 
of North American game patterns, cyclic scarcity was first observed and documented by 
the HBC in the early 18th century.78 Although the company recorded fluctuations in the 
populations of many fur-bearing animals, the most dramatic connection observed was the 
periodic and corresponding scarcity of snowshoe hare and lynx. The connection between 
hare and lynx was observed in the documentation of individual posts, as well as district 
reports that totaled the types and numbers of furs traded regionally. Although the HBC 
did not explore the cause of the cycle, its records provided an unparalleled source of data 
for scientists in the twentieth century. Using the HBC data, biologists determined that 
when hares are numerous, lynx populations will expand, and when the hare population 
declines, the lynx population is forced to hunt smaller and less nutritiously rewarding 
animals, causing populations decline after a short delay.79 Although the decline in the 
population of lynx is the most dramatic result, the decline in the population of hares
77 Tough, As Our Natural Resources Fail, 17; Ray, “The Decline o f Paternalism in the Hudson’s Bay 
Company,” 189.
78 Charles Elton and Mary Nicholson, “The Ten-Year Cycle in Numbers of the Lynx in Canada,” Journal 
o f  Animal Ecology 11.2 (1942): 215.
79 Kreb et al., “What Drives the 10-year Cycle o f the Snowshoe Hares?,” Bioscience 51.1 (2001): 25.
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triggers a type of secondary scarcity throughout the whole predator chain, as snowshoe 
hares are an important source of food for many other small predators, including foxes, 
martins, and wolverines.80 However, as the majority of small predators do not rely solely 
on hares, the decline in these populations is not as dramatic as the decline of lynx 
populations, but still significant enough to be visible in fur returns. This cycle occurs over 
eight to eleven years, with ten being the average length.81
Unfortunately, the scarcity of small animals also coincided with low runs of 
sockeye salmon in the Fraser River. In that river, sockeye salmon have a four-year cycle. 
After leaving the Fraser basin, each fish will return “home” to their natal stream to 
reproduce once at the end of a four year period, and then die. No older or younger fish 
balance out these runs. Because of this, populations are staggered with one high-density 
year, one middling year and two low years.82 Thus, the larger stock will spawn another 
large stock that will return in four years, but it is estimated that low runs could contain as 
few as one percent of a high year.83 The years 1887 and 1888 were at the lowest point of 
the four-year Fraser salmon cycle.84 The fact that the epidemic occurred during a low- 
retum salmon year as well as a low period in the small animal cycle contributed greatly to 
the hardship of the indigenous peoples of the Central Interior.
MacFarlane wrote to British Columbia Premier and Attorney General E.B. Davie
80 Kreb et al., “What Drives the 10-year Cycle of the Snowshoe Hares?,” 29; S Boutin et al., “Population 
Changes o f the Vertebrate Community during a Snowshoe Hare Cycle in Canada’s Boreal forest,” Oikos 74 
(1995):69-80.
81 Kreb et al., “What Drives the 10-Year Cycle of the Snowshoe Hares?,” 34.
82 Robert L. Burgner, “Life History o f Sockeye Salmon,” in Pacific Salmon Life Histories, ed. C.Groot and 
L. Margolis (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1991), 95-96, as cited in Blake Bouchard, “The Resilience of the 
Babine: the Economic and Social Relations of the Babine to 1830,” (MA Thesis, University o f  Northern 
British Columbia, 2012), 94.
83 William E. Ricker, “Cycles of Abundance among Fraser River Sockeye Salmon (Oncorhynchus nerka)," 
Canadian Journal o f  Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 54.4 (1997): 963.
84 John F. Roos, Restoring Fraser River Salmon: A History o f  the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries 
Commission, 1937-1985 (Vancouver: Pacific Salmon Commission, 1991), 10.
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at least three times in the spring and summer of 1888 recommending that the DIA 
provide aid to the New Caledonia district before receiving a short and negative 
response.85 MacFarlane’s following letter to Premier and Attorney General E.B. Davie, 
written on 12 November 1888, underlined the gravity of the ensuing conditions and 
finally sparked a chain of correspondence:
... [T]he fact that the total failure of last autumn’s salmon fisheries of Fraser and 
Stuart lakes, which largely diminished results at Fort George, Babine, and 
Connoly, is, in the existing absence of rabbits, and the scarcity of lynx and other 
food animals, presently certain to cause great privation, not only to the poor, aged, 
and infirm, but also among many of the abled bodied nations as their families, in 
the course of the present winter; and unless relief is judiciously given in each 
case, from time to time, when absolutely required, I greatly fear it is possible, nay, 
too probable, that some may soon perish of starvation.86 
MacFarlane continued by stating that the HBC would take “due precaution” to assure that 
further starvation or hardship would not occur with the understanding that all expenses 
would be reimbursed by either the provincial government or the DIA.
MacFarlane had once before made an appeal to the Canadian government to 
intervene and provide aid to an indigenous community during a period of famine, and this 
incident undoubtedly influenced MacFarlane’s perception of events in 1888. In 1880, 
writing from Fort Chipewyan, MacFarlane warned Lt. Governor David Liard that “... 
owing to the scarcity of food animals, and the comparative failure of the fisheries, 
numbers of Indians will doubtless suffer many privations betwixt [now] and Spring. We
85 Referenced in LAC RG10 Vol. 3803, File 53556, MacFarlane to Alex E. Davie, 12 November 1888.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
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have already expended a lot of fish and potatoes on them; in short, but for the assistance 
thus annually rendered to starving Indians, throughout the North, many of them would 
assuredly perish . . .  [i]t strikes me very forcibly that something must be done and that 
speedily to help these poor people.” 88 However, the amount of aid the HBC was willing 
to supply was not sufficient to address the failed fisheries, cyclic scarcity, and 
overhunting that many regions in the north faced. Moreover, MacFarlane made it clear 
that he did not believe that the HBC was being fairly treated by the Dominion 
Government, nor that the shifts in company policy reflected the trading realities of the 
late 1880s:
While the brandy belongs to the Company, and Customs’ cries were unknown . . .  
it was [to] me to see that the Indian fared as well as possible, but now that we are 
as fairly faced as the most favoured citizens of the Dominion, and opposed in as 
trade, it cannot surely be right to burden us with the expense of maintaining 
infirm and starving Indians. Confining my remarks as applicable to the District of 
Peace River, Athabasca, English River, and the Mackenzie, I am really unaware 
of anything that has yet been accomplished by our rulers ... since the territory was 
transferred to Canada.89 
Referring both to the company’s unwillingness to continue to carry the social costs of the 
fur trade, as well as the ensuing conflict of interest between the HBC and the federal 
government, MacFarlane’s correspondence reflects the uncertain position of the HBC at 
the end of the nineteenth century. The HBC could simply not afford to continue the older 
traditions in light of the open market, but were bound by necessity and expectation to
88 LAC, MacFarlane Fonds, MG29, A l 1, vol. 1, pp. 808-809.
89 Ibid.
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provide aid in periods of famine. MacFarlane was not alone in considering the cost a 
burden; similar complaints had been expressed by other factors since the early 1880s.90 
Although the DIA eventually supplied some minor relief to the Athabasca region 
MacFarlane had earlier petitioned for, it was ultimately reluctant to assume expenses in 
an area not yet covered by treaty and was, according to McCormack, unwilling to set 
precedent.91 No official reimbursement agreement for the HBC providing aid outside of 
treaty areas was reached until the mid-1890s.92
Despite MacFarlane’s prior success, both the British Columbia government and 
the DIA ignored MacFarlane’s requests for aid in 1888. MacFarlane’s 12 November 
letter was forwarded by Davie to Edgar Dewdney, Minister of the Interior and 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, who, in response, reminded Davie to be cautious when 
evaluating the statements of the HBC officers, who “resid[ed] way off into the interior, 
and ... have always been accustomed ... in cases of distress like the present, to assist 
Indians themselves.”93 After a brief and apathetic inquiry, in which acting Indian 
Superintendent Captain H. Moffat travelled only as far as 150 Mile House, MacFarlane’s 
request for compensation and further intervention was denied.94 Moffat then claimed that 
MacFarlane admitted he had overestimated the harshness of the coming winter and had 
retracted his request for aid, as there was “no destitution for want of provision.”95 No 
evidence supports Moffat’s claim. In April 1889, MacFarlane wrote again to Dewdney,
90 Ray, “The Decline of Paternalism,” 200. In 1880 Chief Factor and company partner James Fortescue 
campaigned for the Canadian government to provide ongoing aid to indigenous peoples, also claiming it 
was unfair for the company to assume the cost in a competitive market
91 McCormack, Fort Chipewyan and the Shaping o f  Canadian History, 84.
92 Ray, “The Decline of Paternalism,” 200.
93 LAC, RG10 (DIA), Vol.3803, File 53556, E. Dewdney to Alex E. Davie, December 1888.
94 LAC, RG10 (DIA), Vol. 3803, File 53556, H. Moffat to W. Meason, 14 January, 1889.
95 LAC, RG10 (DIA), Vol. 3803, File 53556, W. Meason to EB Davie, 18 April 1889.; LAC, RG10 (DIA), 
Vol. 3803, File 53556, W. Meason to EB Davie, 18 April 1889.
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this time enclosing another account of the harsh winter as well as supporting statements 
from other officers that emphasized the extent of distress. Having been forced to procure 
supplies and food from Quesnel at company cost, MacFarlane billed the provincial 
government and failed to submit the accounts of 1888 to the HBC Western Department.96 
MacFarlane’s claims for reimbursement were once again denied.97
Although the company attempted to rectify its dependence on the unpredictable 
fur economy of the late nineteenth century, the impact of these changes were uneven and 
excluded much of British Columbia from the newly established economic patterns. As a 
result, subsistence cycles based around fur trade and company wage labour suffered. The 
measles epidemic of 1887-1889 and poor environmental conditions further weakened the 
indigenous economies of Stuart Lake and Fort George. Economic activities, including 
trapping and the indigenous production of dried salmon for commercial purposes, sharply 
declined in many areas following the epidemic’s high mortality rate and placed further 
importance on a reciprocal relationship with the HBC at a time when the company was 
limiting trade and wage-labour in less profitable districts.98 The combined force of these 
changes helped create the conditions necessary for the expansion of government authority 
and the further development of reserves in British Columbia’s Central Interior.
96 LAC, RG10 (DIA), Vol. 3803, File 53556, R. MacFarlane to H. Moffat, 2 April 1889; HBCA B.226/b/50 
vol. 6 10 August, 1888.
97 LAC RG10 (DIA), Vol. 3803, File 53556, H. Moffat to R. MacFarlane, 20 May 1889.
98 HBCA B.188/b/10 Vol. 1; Galois, “The History of the Upper Skeena Region,” 122. Galois estimates that 
up to half o f the W e’tsu’eten and Babine populations succumbed to measles and starvation between 1887 
and 1888.
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Chapter 3
“The Measles Passed Over the People”1: Integrating the 1888 Measles Epidemic into
the Skeena River Uprising and Settler Narratives of the Skeena Forks.
The measles epidemic reached the Northwest Coast in the early winter of 1888, 
and had a devastating impact on the First Nations communities of the upper Skeena 
region. While firm evidence shows that the measles outbreak was widespread and 
affected much of British Columbia, it is unclear if the illness reached all of the Gitxsan 
villages in the Skeena Forks area }  Evidence from villages outside of Gitanyow 
(Kitwoncool), Gitsegukla, and Hazelton is sparse, and the rapid spread of disease 
between the geographically close and strongly connected communities obscured 
transmission patterns that might otherwise be apparent. However, despite uncertainty 
regarding the path of contagion, primary sources depict a rapid diffusion of severe 
disease throughout the Skeena Forks region. Primary accounts describe many houses in 
the village of Gitanyow “empty or abandoned,” which suggests that entire families either 
died or were displaced by disease.3 These accounts, supported by evidence from 
Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) journals and correspondence, reflect the uneven age 
distribution typical of measles mortality as well as the continued presence of secondary
1 Marius Barbeau and William Benyon, informants Somodio.ok and Sinclair, “Tsimtyan Beliefs,” 
Northwest Coast Files, (Gitsegukla), Canadian Museum of Civilization, (B-F -201.3) (1924).
2 Jeremy Williams, “A History of Gitxsan Relations with Colonial and Canadian Law, 1858-1909” (MA 
Thesis, University of Northern British Columbia, 2000), 32. The Gitxsan are a Tsimshianic people who live 
between one hundred and four hundred kilometers inland from the mouth of the Skeena River. The Gitxsan 
are politically and socially distinct from both the Nisga’a and Coast Tshimsian but share many cultural and 
legal traditions. As today, Gitxsan in the late nineteenth century were dispersed throughout several villages 
on the river, including Kispiox, Kuldo, Kisgaga’as (Kisgagas), Kistsegyukla (Gitsegukla), Kitwancool 
(Gitanyow), Gitwangak (Kitwanga), and Hazelton (Gitenmax). Although these villages shared a common 
culture and language, most operated as an independent unit with their own territorial, economic, and 
political systems, distinct from other Gitxsan and Tsimshian systems o f organization.
Roxy Tomlinson, interviewed by Imbert Orchard, 25 November 1965, “Mrs. Robert Tomlinson, J r . : 
Christian missionary work in the Skeena Region : part 2,” Imbert Orchard Fonds, British Columbia 
Archives (BCA), Victoria, BC.
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complications to which the young and elderly are particularly vulnerable.4 Roderick 
MacFarlane, Chief Factor of the regional headquarters of Stuart Lake, estimated that as 
many as 24 children succumbed to measles and complications in the nearby Babine 
villages.5 When compared against other primary source evidence, the HBC’s estimates 
appear conservative. Provincial correspondence and reports from the Department of 
Indian Affairs (DIA) claimed that at least 240 indigenous people died of measles in the 
Gitxsan villages on the Upper Skeena alone.6 These figures reflect the reports of 
unusually fatal cases of measles in other indigenous communities in the winter and spring 
of 1888.
As Robin Fisher’s seminal Contact and Conflict argues, the North Coast and 
Skeena watershed experienced a dramatic increase in traffic in the second half of the 
nineteenth century as prospectors, miners, and other settlers flowed into British Columbia 
from all comers of the Empire (and beyond) seeking to “strike it rich.”7 The expansion of 
surveyors into the Central Interior led to the survey and construction of the Telegraph 
Creek trail, and several mineral-related booms followed in the far north during the mid- 
1860s, as well as the establishment of Fort Hazelton, a small HBC post and settler 
community.8 Although the gold rush in the Omineca region did not reach the magnitude
4 See Chapter One for a further discussion of this topic.
5 Hudson’s Bay Company Archives (HBCA) B. 188/b/10 vol. 2 Fort St. James (Stuart’s Lake) Outward 
Correspondence “Memorandum for Quesnel” pg 81.
6 Library and Archives Canada (LAC) RglO, Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) Vol. 1355, Premier Alex 
Davie to Edgar Dewdney, 30 November 1888, Vol. 1355, Department of Indian Affairs, RG10.
7 Robin Fisher, Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), 97.
8 Mica Amy Royer Jorgenson, ‘“ It happened to me in Barkerville,’: Aboriginal Identity, Economy, and 
Law in the Cariboo Gold Rush, 1862-1900” (MA Thesis, University of Northern British Columbia, 2012), 
4.
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of the earlier discoveries in other areas of the province,9 the influx of newcomers seeking 
gold and the many related economic opportunities was significant in a region that had 
previously seen little settlement and exploration.10 Government presence in the Skeena 
region prior to the 1880s was minimal, primarily limited to inconsistent surveying and 
mineral prospecting, and indigenous trade networks continued to operate independently 
of white traders until the mid-1860s.11 The growing white population, although far from 
large, encouraged regional integration into the expanding provincial economy, and the 
increasing influence of missionaries and government officials in the Skeena watershed 
challenged indigenous law and traditional perceptions of justice and recompense. The 
expansion of the Canadian government into the Skeena Region was complex, uneven, 
and far from complete by 1888, and the Gitxsan and other indigenous peoples of the 
Northwest Coast continued to define economic and legal relations with both the HBC and 
the provincial government both during and immediately following the uprising and 
epidemic period.
Although the exact patterns of contagion within the Skeena region remain unclear, 
both the timing of the epidemic and range of diffusion can be linked to economic and 
cultural changes occurring in First Nations communities throughout the north coast and 
Central Interior. The strongest evidence suggests that measles entered the Skeena region 
through a costal route via freight portage, or more likely, with canoes of workers
9 Ronald Genini, “The Fraser-Cariboo Gold Rushes: Comparisons and Contrasts with the California Gold 
R u s h Journal o f  the West 11.3 (1972): 471; Barry Gough, ‘“ Turbulent Frontiers’ and British Expansion: 
Governor James Douglas, and the British Columbia Gold Rushes,” Pacific Historical Review 41 (1972):
17; Ralph Hall, Pioneer Goldseekers o f  the Omineca (Victoria: Morris Publishing, 1994).
10 Jorgenson, “It Happened to me in Barkerville,” 4; Susan Neylan, The Heavens are Changing: Nineteenth 
Century Protestant Missions and Tsimshian Christianity (McGill-Queen’s University Press: Montreal, 
2003): 8; Gough, “ ’Turbulent Frontiers’ and British Expansion,” 18, 23.
10 Williams, “A History of Gitxsan Relations,” 19.
"W illiams, “A History o f Gitxsan Relations,” 32.
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returning from seasonal labour in the hops fields of the Fraser Valley and Washington 
State.12 However, it is also possible the epidemic spread westward via trade routes 
through the small community of Portage across Stuart Lake, or through the more 
frequently travelled trade routes to the south and east. The short contagion period of 
measles and the continued presence of disease in indigenous communities throughout 
British Columbia make it unlikely that either the coastal or inland trading route was the 
epidemic’s sole point o f entry into the Skeena region. Several posts, including Fort 
George, reported illness as early as 16 January 1888,13 and correspondence from Stuart 
Lake suggests that that the epidemic reached Hazelton by way of Stony Creek by late 
February.14 Epidemic measles lingered in the Gitxsan villages along the Skeena until 
mid-summer, and HBC Chief Factor Roderick MacFarlane described measles “raging” in 
the Babine area as late as May 1888.15
Keeping the unusual severity of disease in mind, this chapter examines the impact 
of the 1888 measles epidemic upon the First Nations communities of the Skeena Region 
and Northwest Coast, including its role in the event popularly known as the “Skeena 
River Uprising,” an incident in the spring of 1888 that began with a violent conflict and 
the murder of two Gitxsan men and resulted in the dispatch of a gunboat and seventy 
Canadian soldiers to the banks of the upper Skeena River. As the details of the Skeena
12 Paige Raibmon, Authentic Indians: Episodes o f  Encounter from  the Late Nineteenth-Century Northwest 
Coast (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 84; Neylan, The Heavens are Changing, 136. A similar 
pattern o f diffusion was seen in the 1862 smallpox epidemic.
' 3 HBCA B.280/a/l 16 January 1888.
14 HBCA B.188/b/10 Vol.l 29 February 1888, Fort St. James’ (Stuart’s Lake) Correspondence Outward, R. 
MacFarlane to Mr. William Sinclair (Fraser Lake).
15 HBCA B.188/b/10 (24 May 1888) R. MacFarlane to Thomas R. Smith Esquire (Victoria BC) 24 May 
1888, pg 25.
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uprising are documented in both academic and popular publications,16 this chapter only 
briefly reprises the uprising, asserting that the events that took place reflected the 
unsettled nature of both the region and British Columbia as a whole. Although this 
chapter primarily focuses on the impact of the measles in the Gitxsan villages along the 
northern Skeena, events and evidence from other Tsimshianic-speaking communities are 
considered to help fully contextualize the impact of epidemic disease in both settler and 
indigenous communities.
With few exceptions, the authority of the HBC and the Gitxsan system of 
retribution and repayment were relied upon to resolve conflicts as serious as murder in 
both the indigenous community and between First Nations and whites as late as the 
1870s.17 Although the prosecution of the murder o f white trader Amos Card Youmans by 
a Gitxsan man in 1884 has also been credited with encouraging the shift to colonial 
authority,18 the events that took place in the spring and early summer of 1888, variously 
known as the Kitwooncool Jim Affair; the Kamalmuk Affair; the Skeena “Rebellion,” 
“Murder,” “Affair,” or “Incident;” were central to the establishment of a permanent and 
authoritative government presence in Gitxsan territory.19 While more recent examinations 
of the Skeena Uprising have taken both indigenous and newcomer affairs into
16 See, for example, Gough, “ ‘Turbulent Frontiers and British Expansion”; Hamar Foster, ‘“ The Queen’s 
Law Is Better Than Yours’: International Homicide In Early British Columbia,” in Essays in the History o f  
Canadian Law, Volume V: Crime and Criminal Justice, ed. Jim Phillips, Tina Loo, and Susan Lewthwaite 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 41 - 111; Robert Galois, “Gitxsan Law and Settler Disorder: 
The Skeena ‘Uprising’ o f 1888,” in New Histories fo r  Old: Changing Perspectives on Canada’s Native 
Pasts, ed. Ted Binnema and Susan Neylan (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 220-248.
17 Foster, “’The Queen’s Law Is Better Than Yours’,”47, 51, 52. Foster argues that the Gitxsan found “The 
Queen’s Law” acceptable as long as it protected traditional property rights, and that conflict occurred only 
when this law contradicted or impeded Gitxsan community decisions or beliefs; Williams, “A History of 
Gitxsan Relations,” 33.
18 Foster, “The Queen’s Law Is Better Than Yours’,” 41,43.
19 Williams, “A History o f  Gitxsan Relations,” 86. However, Williams does acknowledge that the “practical 
realization of Canadian law” in the Upper Skeena Region was an ongoing process.
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consideration,20 there has been little acknowledgement of the influence of epidemic 
disease and the related social and economic tensions in the Gitxsan communities during 
this period.21 Drawing upon a wide range of primary and secondary sources as evidence, 
this chapter places emphasis on the less frequently examined narratives to ascertain a 
fuller picture of the involvement of the epidemic in the Skeena Uprising and the spring 
and summer of 1888. Primary sources include oral histories collected by CBC radio 
journalist Imbert Orchard, HBC journals and correspondence; notes from oral histories 
collected by anthropologist Marius Barbeau and Tsimshian interpreter William Benyon; 
provincial and federal correspondence; and early records from the Babine Lake Indian 
Agency, which was established shortly after the epidemic faded in the spring of 1889. 
Many of these materials, notably the HBC post records and the Orchard interviews, have 
remained almost completely overlooked from a qualitative standpoint in historical 
examinations of the uprising.22 A closer examination of these sources reveals the 
significant impact of the 1888 measles epidemic upon the First Nations communities 
located in the area between the coast and Rocky Mountains. Acknowledging and 
exploring this connection will contribute to existing discussions of the expansion of 
Canadian authority in the Gitxsan territories and the permanent establishment of the DIA 
as an active force in British Columbia’s Central Interior, an expansion which paved the 
way—both literally and figuratively—for the further white settlement of the Skeena 
River basin.23
20 Although William’s thesis is perhaps the most balanced example, Galois’ recent essay, “Gitxsan Law and 
Settler Disorder,” makes a strong effort to incorporate both indigenous and settler narratives.
21 Ibid.
22 Galois does reference these sources, but does not use them to support any kind of broader argument.
23 Neylan, The Heavens are Changing, 64, 117.
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Expressly challenging Fisher’s assertions of total cultural and religious 
transformation, Susan Neylan’s The Heavens are Changing: Nineteenth-Century 
Protestant Missions and Tsimshian Christianity approaches the cultural and economic 
developments of the Skeena Region through the lens of missionary work and the 
“dialogic” relationship established between the Tsimshianic peoples and Protestant 
missionaries in the second half of the nineteenth century.24 Neylan argued that to 
“recognize the subtler forms of colonization, one must appreciate the active and 
frequently willing participation of First Nations” in what were inherently dynamic and 
evolving relationships.25 As a result, a large portion of The Heavens are Changing 
focuses on Tsimshian response to, and involvement in, a conversion process that Neylan 
identifies as part of a larger continuum of cultural change. Although The Heavens are 
Changing acknowledged that Euro-Canadian/indigenous missionary/convert relationships 
were inherently unequal, and founded within an imperialistic framework that positioned 
the indigenous convert as morally and physically inferior, Neylan asserted that the 
Tsimshian exercised agency in their interactions with and interpretations of Christianity. 
This assertion is directly counter to earlier arguments that, unlike the dynamic need-based 
relationships formed between fur traders and First Nations, missionaries arrived in British 
Columbia to “conspicuously and deliberately” transform indigenous cultures.26 While 
Neylan’s arguments are based upon evidence specific to the hegemonic struggles typical 
of missionary work, these relationships influenced many areas of nineteenth century
24 Neylan, The Heavens are Changing, 5.
25 Neylan, The Heavens are Changing, 5.
26 Neylan, The Heavens are Changing, 11; Robin Fisher, Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations
in British Columbia, 1774-1890 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1977), 198.
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Indigenous/Newcomer interactions on the Northwest Coast and were closely involved 
with the development of the late-nineteenth century Gitxsan worldview.27
The overlap between euro-Canadian spirituality and indigenous perceptions of 
disease is a central aspect of The Heavens are Changing. Christian missions were 
intended to reform and reshape indigenous bodies and souls, a concept that found 
resonance with pre-existing Tsimshianic beliefs that positioned disease as both “an 
indicator and cause of spiritual imbalance in the world.”28 This worldview was rooted in 
the concept of a highly physical yet non-temporal existence that linked medicine and 
healing to the spiritual realm and sick bodies with a type of personal and community 
disorder Neylan termed “moral disruption.”29 Moral disruption could be caused by ill- 
doing, witchcraft, or a failure to adhere to social norms and traditions, and was 
considered symptomatic of larger universal imbalances. Neylan argued that these 
associations not only eased the introduction of the Judeo-Christian system of morality but 
also fundamentally altered indigenous perceptions of disease, a transformation that 
resulted in the 1888 measles epidemic being considered by missionaries and Tsimshian 
converts as both a divine punishment and a potential “means to salvation” for the
unconverted.30 Although the thoroughness of this ideological transformation among
1 1
British Columbia’s indigenous peoples is debated by Neylan and other scholars, an 
awareness of this association is essential to a full understanding of the significance of the
27 Neylan, The Heavens are Changing, 11.
28 Neylan, The Heavens are Changing, 215.
29 Ibid.
30 Neylan, The Heavens are Changing, 135, 136.
31 Neylan, The Heavens are Changing, 16, 17; Mary-Ellen Kelm, Colonizing Bodies: Aboriginal Health 
and Healing in British Columbia, 1900-50 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998), xix; Mary-Ellen Kelm, “Wilp 
Wa’ums: Colonial Encounter, Decolonization and Medical Care among the Nisga’a,” Social Science and 
Medicine 59 (2004): 338. In both publications, Kelm argued that First Nations communities turned 
missionary medical efforts to their own advantage, incorporating aspects of either treatment or ritual into 
traditional belief structures, thereby diminishing threats o f cultural change and coercion.
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histories collected by Orchard and Barbeau. These histories, although broad in scope and 
content, strongly reflect this assumption, as well as contemporary ideologies of morality 
and race that influenced the collection of indigenous oral histories well into the twentieth 
century.32
While the uprising itself receives very little attention in The Heavens are 
Changing, Neylan suggested that an ongoing rivalry between Anglican and Methodist 
factions played a substantial role in the tensions following the death of Gitxsan shaman 
Neatsque, a detail that emphasizes the impact that missionary activities had upon 
indigenous communities in the Skeena region during the spring of 1888. However, the 
majority of historical studies that discuss the Skeena Uprising adopt a predominantly 
legal and law-orientated perspective of cultural change. Those that vary from this 
approach, notably Galois’ lengthy article “Gitxsan Law and Settler Disorder: the Skeena 
“Uprising” of 1888,” focus almost exclusively on settler-Gitxsan interactions in the 
months following Kamalmuk’s murder, minimizing the substantial social conflict and the 
altercation that led to the first murder, Kamalmuk’s stabbing of Neatsque.34 While 
Jeremy Williams and Barry Gough rightly link the shooting of Kamalmuk and aggressive 
provincial response at the end of a substantial series of Tsimshian-settler conflicts, this 
interpretation appears to have encouraged scholars to overlook the significance of the
32 See Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, ed. “Critical Developments: Introduction,” in The Oral History 
Reader: Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 1998) for an overview o f how ideology shapes oral 
histories.
33 Neylan, The Heavens are Changing, 51,220. Neylan suggests that the accusations of witchcraft early in 
the Skeena Uprising are reflective o f social discord resulting from a variety of factors, including disease 
and religious rivalry. Although tensions between the Anglican and Methodist missionaries in the Skeena 
region had perhaps reached a climax with William Duncan’s departure and founding of New Metlakatla in 
1887, the indigenous communities themselves remained divided, and the two missionary groups continued 
to be in competition well into the twentieth century.
34 Robert Galois, “Gitxsan Law and Settler Disorder,” 233.
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epidemic in the Skeena Uprising.35 Perhaps most significantly, it appears to have limited 
the investigation of other events in the winter and spring of 1888 and the impact that the 
period of disease had upon the Gitxsan and other indigenous peoples of the Northwest 
Coast.
Extending to a later date than many of the other studies examined, Williams’ 
thesis “A History of Gitxsan Relations with Colonial and Canadian Law, 1858-1909” 
examined the changing relationship between Gitxsan legal traditions through the lens of 
English, colonial and Canadian law. Relying primarily on material from anthropologist 
Marius Barbeau and provincial and federal correspondence, Williams argued that 
disputes during the colonial period, including the shooting of Kamalmuk in 1888, were 
“fundamentally shaped by customary expectations of what constituted justifiable killing 
and recompense.”36 These expectations were not static, but rather evolved with the 
changing relationship between the Gitxsan people and the colonial and provincial 
governments, which in turn was influenced by both internal Gitxsan politics and the 
increasing frequency of extended economic interaction and conflict with white settlers.37 
Although Williams does not discuss the 1888 measles epidemic other than to provide 
very brief background to the initial conflict, he does refer to a “general state of unrest” 
preceding the uprising that included disease and starvation. Unfortunately, Williams 
did not elaborate on the influence that these factors may have had on the Gitxsan 
response to either the uprising or the period of increased provincial administration that 
followed.
35 See Williams, “A History o f Gitxsan Relations”; Barry M. Gough, Gunboat Frontier: British Maritime 
Authority and Northwest Coast Indians, 1846-90 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1984).
36 Williams, “A History of Gitxsan Relations,” 19.
37 Williams, “A History of Gitxsan Relations,” 4.
38 Williams, “A History of Gitxsan Relations,” 52.
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Robert Galois’ “Gitxsan Law and Settler Disorder” remains one of the most 
detailed historical examinations of the Skeena region during the tumultuous spring of 
1888. Although Galois touched upon themes of social disruption, the article’s main thesis 
is that the conflict between the white residents of Hazelton and the neighboring Gitxsan 
population was the result of lingering tension from earlier disputes over resources and a 
reaction to overly aggressive military responses to prior conflict.39 Galois positioned 
these developments at the center of a broader narrative of imperial expansion, arguing 
that the increased commoditization of the region’s resources helped validate an 
administrative presence and further legitimized settler claims in the already densely 
populated Tsimshianic territories.40 This reading is apt, but almost fully dependent upon 
the existence of a culturally and economically destabilizing outside influence, a 
conclusion that is not supported by the majority of contemporary accounts and the more 
detailed studies of North Coast indigenous-newcomer relations, several of which 
emphasize the high degree of agency that the Gitxsan and other Tsimshianic peoples 
were able to maintain during the late nineteenth century.41 Moreover, although Galois’s 
reconstruction of the Skeena Uprising is far more inclusive of a First Nations experience 
than many of the other narratives, the complicating presence of the measles epidemic in 
the events of 1888 is neglected.
While the events of 1888 were not isolated occurrences, the Skeena Uprising can 
be perhaps be better linked to the growing and province-wide tensions surrounding 
definitions of race, settler identity, and geographic boundaries than issues of immediate
39 Galois, “Gitxsan Law and Settler Disorder,” 222.
40 Galois, “Gitxsan Law and Settler Disorder,” 222.
41 See Neylan, The Heavens are Changing and Williams, “A History of Gitxsan Relations.”
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conflict or shifts in resource use.42 Expanding this focus does not discount previous 
arguments about the encroachment of provincial authority or, as is asserted by Galois, the 
broader impact of the small white community’s search for legitimization.43 This wider- 
lens approach is supported by sociologist Renesia Mawani, who argued that government 
policy imported from elsewhere in the British Empire allowed settlers to create 
intentionally “racialized” spaces, and that the creation of geographically isolated reserves 
along the Northwest Coast was the direct result of a dichotomized settler/Indian/“other” 
identity, an ideology that also defined how white settlements were conceptualized and 
governed by the rapidly expanding provincial administration.44 Although British 
Columbia had experienced increasingly diverse immigration since the Fraser Canyon 
Gold Rush, Mawani asserted this later period of settlement and immigration was essential 
to the development of Indian policy in British Columbia and the designation of British 
Columbia as a “white settler society;” a transformation in part linked to the growth of the 
CPR and the largely Chinese workforce that followed construction projects and cannery 
work to the North Coast.45 When considered in tandem with the new and potentially 
threatening other of Asian immigration, the more familiar and increasingly legislated 
First Nations body began to hold a new significance in British Columbia’s social, legal, 
and political systems of order. Although further work on the impact of this transformation 
on the Northwest Coast and Central Interior is needed, an awareness of this ideological 
shift is essential to understanding the provincial government’s response, and lack of
42 Cole Harris, Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002), 178,180.
43 Galois, “Gitxsan Law and Settler Disorder,” 32.
44 Renisa Mawani, Colonial Proximities: Cross-racial Encounters and Judicial Truths in British Columbia, 
1871-1921 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 8, 15.
45 Mawani, Colonial Proximities, 19; Renisa Mawani, “The ‘Savage Indian’ and the ‘Foreign Plague’: 
Mapping Racial Categories and Legal Geographies o f Race in British Columbia, 1871-1925” (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2001), 2, 59.
95
response, to epidemic disease among indigenous populations in the late nineteenth 
century.
The second half of the nineteenth century introduced significant changes to the 
economic patterns of Northwest coast First Nations. Fort Hazelton, the first non-native 
settlement in Gitxsan territory, was established in 1866 with the intent of supplying goods 
and services to builders of the Collins overland telegraph, miners, and other travelers, 
many of whom entered the interior via the Skeena. This new market of prospectors 
considerably expanded the pre-existing economy and encouraged further independent 
economic incursions into indigenous territory, most significantly the influx of the 
travelling “free traders” that formed the main basis of the HBC’s competition in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Both the Stuart Lake and Fort George post journals 
suggest that these men, who provided illicit alcohol and cheaper goods than the HBC, 
were viewed as serious threats to the economic stability of the company.46 However, the 
influence of outsiders was not always limited to economic endeavors. B.W. Washburn, an 
independent trader living in Hazleton, played a pivotal role in the uprising by attempting 
to assert the authority of the province in the absence of colonial officials. Although 
Washburn was married to a Gitxsan woman and thus presumably aware of local legal 
traditions, he encouraged the indigenous community to report the murder to the white 
authorities and seek further legal punishment for Neatsque’s death. When the Gitxsan 
refused to cooperate, Washburn travelled to Victoria to report the incident himself47
46 Arthur J. Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1990), 26; HBCA B. 1888/b/10 Correspondence Outward “Memorandum for Quesnelle,” pg. 77.
47 Marius Barbeau and William Benyon, informants Isaac Tens and Benyon, Marius Barbeau Collection, 
“Gitksan Narratives (Hazleton, 1920, etc),” CMC, Northwest Coast Files (Gitsegukla) (B.F.89.8) (1924).
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Other economic developments had a lasting impact on both local and distant 
indigenous trade economies. The establishment of commercial fisheries in Port 
Essington, located approximately 180 miles downstream from Hazleton, coincided with a 
sharp decline in the importance of fur in the local economy.48 Employment in canneries 
provided an alternative to the income that the declining fur trade could no longer provide, 
but such opportunities were not a complete substitution for what had been a relatively 
steady income until the mid-nineteenth century. Although the Tsimshian, Gitxsan, and 
other costal peoples were already active participants in British Columbia’s wage labour 
economy, the establishment of local commercial fisheries and the declining availability of 
freighting and other company employment was a notable factor in the changing 
environment of the Northwest Coast. Cannery work often conflicted with other spring 
and summer subsistence patterns, and like trapping, could be disrupted by environmental 
fluctuation. Additionally, as Mawani demonstrates, although social relationships among 
indigenous and Asian employees were not always discouraged, the canning and fishing 
industry was much less hospitable to “half-breeds” than the seasonal employment HBC 
offered through freighting and trapping.49 The cannery’s reservations were exacerbated 
by the reluctance of government officials and missionaries to support wage employment, 
as many believed that the environment of the canneries was detrimental to the broader 
mission of civilization occurring in the planned villages and reserves further north along 
the coast.50 Not specific to the Skeena region, these ideas influenced the development of
48 James A. MacDonald and Jennifer Joseph, “Key Events in the Gitxsan Encounter With the Colonial 
World,” in Potlatch at Gitsegukla: William Benyon’s 1945 Notebooks (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2000), 194.
49 Mawani, Colonial Proximities, 46; Renisa Mawani, “The ‘Savage Indian’ and the ‘Foreign Plague’,”
216, 230.
50 Mawani, Colonial Proximities, 567, 70.
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settler/First Nations relationships on the Northwest Coast during the period of reserve 
creation in the late 1870s and early 1880s, and reflected much of the ideology 
surrounding race, industry, and settlement relied upon by the department of Indian affairs 
well into the twenty century.51
The position of the HBC in the Skeena region was tenuous and highly dependent 
upon outside influence. Even at its most profitable, the HBC did not dominate trade to the 
exclusion of indigenous networks. This was especially true in the Upper Skeena region. 
The inland Gitxsan had long-standing trade relationships with coastal Tsimshian and 
Nisga’a well before HBC presence was solidified in the mid-1860s, and these hereditary 
community-based relationships continued to take precedence over company trade.52 The 
primary function of the HBC’s Fort Hazelton and the seasonal satellite posts was to 
prevent further incursion from outside influences that would hamper trade or reduce 
profit, and ensure strong economic presence at the mouth of the Skeena, a location that 
affected trade in the Nass Valley, Haida Gwaii, and southeastern Alaska. After it became 
clear that Hazelton and the satellite posts would not be as profitable as those inland, the 
company began to focus on the posts where company trade dominated. This shift appears 
to have been a factor in the development of economic and administrative tensions at Fort 
Hazelton. The earliest reports of the uprising claimed that not only was Hazelton under 
siege, and the white residents held captive, but also that the itinerant postmaster Charles 
Clifford had also been seriously harmed or murdered.53
Although it is unclear to what extent Clifford was actually involved in the 
uprising, the larger involvement of the HBC in the Skeena Uprising should not be
51 Daniel Clayton, “Geographies of the Lower Skeena;” BC Studies 94 (1992): 52.
52 MacDonald and Joseph, “Key Events in the Gitxsan Encounter With the Colonial World,” 196.
53 HBCA B.226/b/48 vol. 2 18 July 1888.
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neglected. If Fort Hazelton was the geographic center of the uprising, it soon became the 
ideological one as well. The Skeena Uprising occurred at a time when conflicts over 
identity, land, and resources were being glorified as Indian Wars on the western frontiers 
of the United States, and the aftermath of the Northwest Rebellion was fresh in the minds 
of both officials and settlers as expectations surrounding government responsibility 
evolved in response to fears of future unrest and broader questions of national identity 
and government policy. Public response to the reports of violence in the Skeena region 
was swift and exaggerated, with reports of the incident being published in newspapers as 
distant as the Toronto Globe and the New York Times. Written to have the mass appeal of 
a frontier adventure, these sensationalist accounts described the uprising as a violent and 
potentially bloody hostage-type situation, and emphasized the “murderous” nature of the 
Gitxsan and the fear felt by the white population during the week-long incident.54 
Notably, none of the newspapers mention the epidemic in their reporting. One of the most 
detailed accounts, dispatched to New York from Winnipeg, warned that the actions of the 
“redskins . . .  on the warpath” would result in “rebellion much more serious than that of a 
couple years ago” and a “bitter Indian war.”55 As the article mentions both the relatively 
recent disturbance at the old village of Metlakatha, where Gitxsan had constructed a 
blockade on the Skeena River to seek compensation for the accidental burning of 
Gitsegukla [Kitsegukla],56 and the Ninetieth Battalion, the unit that responded to the 
North-West Rebellion, it is unclear exactly which “disturbance” the author of the article
54 “The Murderous Skeena Indians,” The Globe, 17 July 1888; “The Skeena River Expedition,” The Globe, 
19 July 1888; “The Skeena Indians,” The Globe, 31 July 1888.
55 “The Skeena River Revolt,” The New York Times, 22 July, 1888.
56 See Robert Galois, “The Burning of Kitsegukla, 1872” BC Studies 94 (1992): 59-81.
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was referring to, or if the newspaper considered both incidents as equally serious threats 
to the Canadian settlers.
Notably distinct from the dominant discourse surrounding the fur trade, the 
accounts of the uprising in the weeks and months following the spring of 1888 
emphasized the positive role that the HBC had played in the troubled period prior to the 
murder of Kamalmuk, as well as the authoritative position that the company assumed in 
maintaining order prior to the arrival of the 5th Artillery Regiment.57 Although the press 
and certain factions of the provincial government viewed the HBC as antiquated and even 
a potential barrier to achieving economic maturity,58 the accounts published in the 
Victoria Daily Colonist celebrated the position of the company. Two differing but closely 
related discourses developed: the first sought to highlight the difference between the 
controlled environment of Victoria and the distant “frontier” of Hazelton,59 while the 
second emphasized the ongoing danger of the province’s unpredictable Indian 
populations and the perceived need for increased government administration.60 In many 
areas of the province, colonial authorities were often days away and vastly outnumbered. 
As Galois argued of the Skeena region in “The Burning of Kitsegukla, 1872,” “the writ of 
the state ran weakly, and perhaps more significantly, it ran slowly,”61 and as Williams 
highlights, there “were few, if any” government officials established on Gitxsan territory 
prior to 1888,62 much to the ongoing concern of the settler community.63
57 For example, see “H.B. Co’s Agents View,” The Victoria Daily Colonist, 31 July, 1888.
58 Arthur J. Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade, 3,48.
55 “The Kitwoncool Jim Tragedy,” The Victoria Daily Colonist 31 July, 1888; “Trouble in the North,” The 
Victoria Daily Colonist 12 July, 1888.
60 “H.B.C Co’s Agents View,” The Victoria Daily Colonist 31 July, 1888; etc.
61 Galois, “The Burning of Kitsegukla,” : 88.
62 Williams, “A History of Gitxsan Relations,” 32.
63 Concern about adequate police presence in Hazelton continued to be a topic o f discussion in urban 
British Columbia well into the twentieth century. See “Ask for Mounted Police at Hazelton: Indians Laugh
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The question of settler identity in the Skeena region continued to be an issue of 
concern well into the nineteenth century. One of the most powerful sources concerning 
the measles epidemic in the Skeena region is a series of oral histories conducted by radio 
journalist Imbert Orchard between 1959 and 1960. Originally intended to be research for 
a biography of long-time Hazelton resident Constance Cox, Orchard instead divided the 
interviews to form the basis of the Canadian Broadcasting Radio (CBC) 1961 program 
“Living Memory.” 64 The first in a series of three radio programs, “Living Memory” was 
designed by Orchard to record and present the stories of British Columbia’s ‘old-timers’ 
before they either died or became too infirm to fully recollect their experiences. While 
Orchard’s two successive programs, “From the Mountains to the Sea,” and “People and 
Landscape,” included stories and interviews from other parts of the province, “Living 
Memory’s” episodes largely focused on the Skeena Region and the characters 
surrounding Cox.
Containing material from over 900 distinct interviews, approximately 200 unique 
programs were produced for radio broadcast between 1961 and 1966. Keenly aware of 
the historical potential of even the earliest interviews, Orchard recorded far more material 
than necessary for the CBC contracts, eventually amassing “one of the largest oral history 
collections in North America.”65 Orchard strongly believed that the stories he was 
collecting were both essential to a full understanding of British Columbia’s history and 
that they were in grave danger of being lost due to the passing of time, modernization,
at Local Authority,” The Daily Province 29 September 1906 or “More Constables for Hazleton,” Victoria 
Daily Colonist 12 November 1909.
64 The materials from these interviews form a substantial portion of the Imbert Orchard collection and are 
currently housed at the British Columbia Archives in Victoria.
65 Robert Budd, ‘“ The Story of the Country’: Imbert Orchard’s Quest for Frontier Folk in BC, 1870- 1914.” 
(M.A. Thesis, University of Victoria, 2005).
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and the increasing industrialization of Canada’s west.66 This approach can be loosely 
linked to the “salvage paradigm” that was popular at the time in both historical and 
anthropological discourse, and as such, the interviews must not be accepted at face value, 
but must be understood as the consciously manufactured product of a broader influence. 
As Robert Budd argued, although Orchard had studied history and literature, he had no 
formal training as a historian, and conducted oral history as a radio journalist,68 often 
entering the interviews looking for, and sometimes already having, a particular story.69 
Additionally, although historians and researchers now have access to many of the uncut 
interviews and Orchard’s personal notes, the finalized (and heavily edited) broadcast 
versions of the interviews reflect an important aspect of Orchard’s, and the CBC’s, 
agenda.70 Although indigenous traditions and spirituality are mentioned quite frequently 
in much of the northern content, Orchard largely limited the active participation of First 
Nations individuals to “reminiscent” discussion matter rather than main speakers or even 
potential candidates for interview, an exclusion that Budd attributes to the need for a 
clear, strong radio voice.71 In using such carefully selected stories to unite a diverse 
geographical landscape, this narrative obscures a significant portion of the “pioneer” past
66 Budd, “The Story of the Country,” 10.
67 Budd, “The Story of the Country,” 10,11. Budd suggests that Orchard may have been influenced by 
Barbeau’s work with the Tsimshian, but provides little actual evidence to back this claim.
68 Budd, “The Story of the Country,” 28.
69 Imbert Orchard, interviewed by Derek Lawrence Reimer, 1978, Vancouver, “Aural History in British 
Columbia” Provincial Archives of British Columbia Interview Collection, 1974-1987, British Columbia 
Archives, Victoria, BC. This attitude is perhaps most visible in Orchard’s later acknowledgement that 
Constance Cox was not well regarded as a reliable informant, but was a “very good story teller.”
70 Imbert Orchard, interviewed by Derek Lawrence Reimer, 1978, Vancouver, “Introduction to Aural 
History” Provincial Archives o f British Columbia Interview Collection, 1974-1987, British Columbia 
Archives, Victoria, BC; Teresa lacobelli, “ ’A Participant’s History?’: The Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation and the Manipulation o f Oral History,” The Oral History Review 38 (2011): 313 -348.
71 Budd, “The Story of the Country,” 7. A notable exception to this is Constance Cox, the primary subject 
of “Living Memory,” who was of at least partial Tlingit descent. However, Cox did not identify as such, 
taking pride in being the first “white child” bom in Hazelton.
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that Orchard was attempting to chronicle. Through this exclusion, Orchard effectively 
suppressed the indigenous and mixed-blood experience in his reimagined rural history.72
Despite these notable exclusions, the Orchard interviews that mention the measles 
epidemic and the Skeena Uprising help to fill an important gap in the history of the 
Skeena region between 1886 and 1888. Although these interviews provide little direct 
insight into the epidemic experiences of the Gitxsan, they do provide some evidence 
relating to the spread of measles through the Skeena region. Perhaps most importantly, 
they are a window into the dynamics of settler-newcomer interactions in the western 
interior region during the late nineteenth century, and provide new insight into one of the 
last examples of direct military conflict with British Columbia’s First Nations people. 
Particularly relevant are the interviews of Methodist missionary Robert Tomlinson 
Junior; his wife, Roxy Tomlinson; and long-time Hazleton resident Constance Cox. Each 
of their interviews deals with events that occurred in Hazelton and the Upper Skeena 
region during the spring of 1888.
Robert Tomlinson Jr. was bom in 1870 in Kincolith, a Nisga’a village in the Nass 
River valley, to parents who had also been missionaries along the Northwest Coast. 
Tomlinson’s father, Robert Tomlinson Senior, was a prominent Irish Anglican 
missionary who immigrated to British Columbia in 1867. In 1879, the Tomlinsons moved 
to the Kispiox region, north of Hazelton, with the intent of establishing a missionary 
community similar to William Duncan’s Metlakatla. Although this effort was soon 
abandoned, the Tomlinson family continued to serve as medical missionaries in the 
Hazelton region well into the twentieth century. Assuming both medical and missionary 
functions was a common way to make inroads into indigenous communities and, as
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Neylan argued, missionaries received considerable attention and achieved success 
through the use of their skills.73
Despite the fact that Roxy Tomlinson recounted providing medicine and other aid 
to the Gitxsan community as one of the family’s main functions during the winter of 
1888,74 Robert Tomlinson Jr. placed very little emphasis on the details of the measles 
epidemic, instead emphasizing the complexity of the inter-personal conflicts that led to 
both murders. In contrast, Roxy Tomlinson’s account is far more conversational and 
focuses on the difficulties of treating disease in an isolated indigenous community. 
Although it is likely that Roxy Tomlinson had far more hands-on experience with 
medical treatment than her husband,75 the difference in focus can be attributed to the fact 
that that the majority of the Tomlinson Jr. material was the product of informal 
conversations recorded by Roxy and edited for use in “Living Memory,” the result being 
a much more direct, if less informative, narrative.
Tomlinson Jr.’s account begins with the conflict between Kamalmuk’s wife, 
Fanny Johnson (Sigidimnak Ha'naamuux, referred to as Sunbeams by Barbeau in The 
Downfall ofTemleham) and the Shamaan (or “Witch Doctor”) Neatsque (referred to as 
“Neech” or “Nits” in Barbeau’s field notes).76 Johnson, who Tomlinson describes as a 
“chiefess in her own right,” had placed her son in her ceremonial seat at a Potlatch, when 
Neatsque was said to have pushed the boy to the ground and claimed the seat as his own. 
Tomlinson explained that both Johnson and the Gitxsan community viewed the
73 Neylan, The Heavens are Changing, 215.
74 Roxy Tomlinson, “Mrs. Robert Tomlinson Jr., part 2.”
75 Roxy Tomlinson, “Mrs. Robert Tomlinson Jr., part 1;” Roxy Tomlinson (nee Lydia Roxy Irene 
Drysdale) had a similar background, having served as a Salvation Army officer in Sik i dak, a small 
Gitxsan community now generally known as Glen Vowell. She had not yet married Tomlinson at the time 
of the epidemic.
76 Tomlinson Jr. does not name Johnson in this account, but the Barbeau collection refers to her both as 
“Sunbeams” and Fanny Johnson.
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displacement of the heir and the resulting community disruption as a critical event in both 
the course of the epidemic as well as the Skeena Uprising.:
[A]nd so the old lady went back and ... got Neech [Neatsque] right out of his seat 
right now, and the rest of the chiefs that were sitting there, they knew he had no 
claim to the seat, not like the lady has—and so she pushed Neech out—and put 
back her little boy to hold on her seat until she was ready to sit on it. But as Neech 
was sneaking out the house, he said, well, that won’t avail you very much, 
because he’s only got a short time to live anyway. ... And it was only a few days 
after that the little boy had measles and died. Then they moved to Kispiox down 
to their own town . . .  Gitsegukla and were given a potlatch there, and it was only 
a few days after that before the second boy took sick, and then from there they 
moved to Kitwoncool... and they were only a day or two there when the little 
boy died.77
Johnson, Tomlinson claimed, was “heartbroken” after losing two of her children in such a 
short time, and angry that Neatsque’s threats had gone unchallenged by both Kamalmuk 
and the Gitxsan community: “ ... [Johnson] turned down to Jim and upbraided him and 
called him an old woman, and said th a t... he knew who was killing his children and yet 
did nothing. And she lit into Jim so hot and strong that Jim went over and took his gun 
o f f ... and out he w ent... because he knew Nitch was coming up to join the potlatch at 
Kitwoncool [Gitanyow], and he was watching for him.”78 Tomlinson continued by 
describing the events leading up to and following Neatsque’s murder, placing emphasis 
on the involvement of the Gitxsan community in resisting Kamalmuk’s capture. It is
77 Robert Tomlinson Jr., interviewed by Roxy Tomlinson, 1950s, Ketchikan Alaska, “Robert Tomlinson: 
Christian Missionary Work on the Nass and Skeena Rivers,” Imbert Orchard Fonds, BCA, Victoria, BC.
78 Robert Tomlinson Jr., “Christian Missionary Work.”
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unclear whether the epidemic was a direct cause of conflict, or if it only exacerbated pre­
existing social tensions with the Gitxsan community. In the end, Tomlinson Jr. claimed 
that many in Kitwoncool [Gitanyow] were relieved that Neatsque, and his violent 
tendencies, were finally “out of the way.”79
The much briefer interview with Roxy Tomlinson places considerably greater 
emphasis on the Tomlinson’s experiences as medical missionaries. After providing some 
details on the history of the Tomlinson family and her own experience as a medical 
missionary, Roxy describes her family’s role in treating the epidemic:
Grandmother busied herself making soup and taking it to the people that were 
sick. Grandfather [Tomlinson Sr.] worked early and late with the sick people. The 
small children that were in their cradles survived the measles, but the youngsters 
that were running around half-dressed succumbed to it, and there were funerals 
every day. Robert... went out early in the morning with an Indian and they 
chopped their own wood and brought it in and distributed it among the people that 
were sick to keep them warm ... [he] always felt that it was overruled that they go 
back there, or else he felt that the village would have been wiped out with the 
measles. Because grandfather had enough of the know-how to tell the Indians 
how to take care of themselves, quite few of them did survive ... .80 
Roxy clearly found the severity of disease and number of deaths disturbing, and viewed 
her domestic position, as well as the medical services provided by the missionaries as 
essential to the continued survival of the community. In notable contrast to the
79 Robert Tomlinson Jr., “Christian Missionary Work.”
80 Roxy Tomlinson, “Mrs. Robert Tomlinson Jr., part 2.”
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observations made by the HBC officers, Roxy did state that the illness was especially 
virulent, but attributed the harsh mortality to inadequate Gitxsan response to the disease: 
[T]here were lots of funerals. And the potlatching went on. ... there were 
hundreds that died. I don't know how many, but I know there were whole families 
wiped right out in the measles epidemic—especially the young people. It caught 
so many of the young people; they wouldn't take care of themselves. The babies 
that were in their cradles were ... quite a few of them escaped. They were kept 
warm by being wrapped up in their cradles and kept covered up; therefore they 
escaped. But the other children that were older, that could get exposed to draughts 
and so forth, the poor little things, they all passed on—many of the young people, 
young men and young women. The older people, it didn't hit them too hard, 
though there were lots of them that passed on too.81
Symptomatic of severe measles, unusually high numbers of fatalities among 
children and young adults were also observed elsewhere in the province. Like Roxy, 
medical professionals and Indian agents tended to view this discrepancy as the result of 
poor parenting or the failure of traditional medical knowledge, although evidence 
suggests that a number of environmental factors, including nutritional status, play a large 
part in determining the likelihood of survival from measles and other air-borne viral
09
diseases.
The events of the spring and summer of 1888 were also documented by French- 
Canadian anthropologist Marius Barbeau, artist W. Langdon Kih, and Tsimshian 
interpreter William Benyon. Barbeau, primarily interested in ethnology and folklore,
81 Roxy Tomlinson, “Mrs. Robert Tomlinson Jr., part 2.”
82 See Chapter One.
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visited the Northwest Coast in 1923 to collect information on the language, culture, and 
art of the Tsimshian, Nisga’a and Gitxsan peoples. Although Barbeau and Benyon 
produced several important anthropological works on British Columbia’s Northwest 
Coast First Nations peoples,83 one of the best sources of information on the Gitxsan 
communities produced during this period is the incredibly detailed field notes collected as 
research for the semi-fictional narrative account, The Downfall ofTemlaham.u  Although 
heavily influenced by outdated anthropological theory, Barbeau’s research lends insight 
into how the epidemic period was interpreted by the Gitxsan, and it highlights the lack of 
communication between the Department of Indian Affairs and the indigenous 
communities of the upper Skeena.
The information Barbeau collected is not easily reconciled with “settler” 
constructions of the Skeena Uprising which tend to emphasize the colonial response, 
rather than the origins or long-term social consequences of the conflict. While the 
epidemic is not always elaborated upon, it is mentioned at the beginning of the majority 
of accounts in a way that suggests that the interview participants consider it to have been 
intricately involved with other aspects of the uprising. Although differences exist in the 
details of the interviews and stories, particularly in the chronology of Kamalmuk’s death, 
the discussions of both disease and murder are anchored in traditional expectations 
surrounding the role of outsiders and social responsibility. Multiple accounts suggest that 
the displacement of Kamalmuk and Johnson’s son is significant not only because 
Neatsque’s actions violated Gitxsan perceptions of social order, but because this trespass
83 Most notable of these are Barbeau’s collections o f indigenous mythologies, including Marius Barbeau, 
Tsimsyan Myths, Anthropological Series 51, National Museum o f Canada Bulletin 174 (Ottawa:
Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1961).
84 Marius Barbeau, The Downfall ofTemlaham  (Toronto: Macmillan, 1928).
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happened at a feast that was being held during a time of illness and community crisis.
The gravity of this situation is the focus of an account collected from an informant named 
Isaac Tens, who directly addressed the association between malevolence and the 
epidemic. Tens claimed that prior to this period, although disease was feared, “it was a 
belief that such a scourge carried once in so many years apart but [we] did not attribute it 
to witchcraft or anything.”85 However, these accusations appeared to have become 
common as settler-contact increased; Tens prefaces his account of Kamalmuk’s death and 
the 1888 measles epidemic by explaining how deaths from a later measles epidemic were 
linked to a “magic lantern show” organized by missionaries for residents of outlying 
villages.86
Interviewed by both Barbeau and Orchard, community member Constance Cox 
recounted several ways that the epidemic affected the broader functioning of both the 
indigenous and white communities at Hazelton. The daughter of local trader Thomas 
Hankin, and the part-Tlingit Margaret Hankin, Cox was only seven or eight years old 
when the epidemic occurred; Cox recounts her mother encouraging her to pretend to be 
ill with her sibling so that the Gitxsan community would not be suspicious of their 
immunity.87 While suspicion of the white community is apparent in many of the Barbeau 
interviews, Cox’s accounts are the only that mention the possibility that the measles was 
purposely introduced from an outside (settler) source. Cox claims that several prominent 
leaders in the First Nations community thought that the disease was introduced by the
85 Marius Barbeau and William Benyon, informant Isaac Tens, “Gitksan Narratives (Hazelton, 1920 etc) 
CMC, Northwest Coast Files (Hazelton) (B-F-89.7) (1924).
86 Isaac Tens, “Gitksan Narratives.”
87 Constance Cox, interviewed by Imbert Orchard, 1959, Hazelton “Constance Cox: Recollections: part 1,” 
Imbert Orchard Fonds, British Columbia Archives, Victoria, BC.
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unpopular HBC Clerk, Charles Clifford, through the distribution of “poisoned” sugar.88 
While it is entirely possible that those delivering the freight may have been actively 
contagious, it is far more likely that these accusations originated from the fact that sugar 
was the only part of the HBC freight to reach the interior. The majority of the yearly 
shipment, including flour and foodstuffs, had been seized by an unidentified group of
89Indians on the lower Fraser reportedly protesting their displacement as portage workers.
A small, isolated post such as Hazelton would find the loss of such a large amount 
of provisions a hardship at the best of times, but the unusually inclement weather and the 
occurrence of severe cyclic scarcity during the winter and spring of 1888 meant that 
disruptions to the supply chain were felt particularly hard. The resulting shortage of dried 
goods had a ripple impact on the economy and subsistence patterns of the surrounding 
indigenous communities. The disruption to the cycle of credit had a lasting impact on the 
communities of the Upper Skeena. Most indigenous trappers purchased outfits on at least 
partial credit, with the expectation that the season’s profits would offset some or most of 
the debt incurred throughout the winter.90 The inability to make payments made prior 
debt unmanageable and the provision of further company credit on an individual basis 
unlikely, although postmaster William Sinclair did continue to dispense credit at Fort
88 Constance Cox, “Recollections: part 1 Marius Barbeau and William Benyon, informant Constance Cox, 
“Gitksan Narratives (Hazleton, 1920 etc.),” CMC, Northwest Coast Files (Hazelton)(B-F-89.5).
89 HBCA B.188/b/10 Vol.l Correspondence Outward Letter book pg 34; HBCA B/1888/b/10 Vol. 3 ( 5  
April 1888) to Angus McIntosh (Fort Babine) from R. MacFarlane; HBCA B. 1888 /b/10 Vol.3 (29 April 
1888) to Thomas K Smith Esq, Assistant Commissioner, Victoria from R. MacFarlane; HBCA B.1888/b/10 
Vol.4 (23 July 1888 ) to Mr. Clifford Esq from R. MacFarlane; Constance Cox, “Gitksan Narrative 
(Hazelton, 1920 etc.);” Indian Agent R.E. Loring to Marius Barbeau, Marius Barbeau Collection,
Northwest Coast Files, CMC (5 January 1924) (B-F-204.2). This incident is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Two.
90 Arthur J. Ray, “The Decline o f Paternalism in the Hudson’s Bay Company Fur Trade, 1870-1945,” in 
Merchant Credit and Labor Strategies in Historical Perspective, ed. Rosemary E. Ommer (Fredericton: 
Acadiensis Press, 1990), 189.
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Fraser.91 However, the 1888 Fort Fraser journal suggests that the trading patterns of the 
Skeena region may have been permanently altered by the experience of disease. In a rare 
moment of administrative foresight, Sinclair documented his concerns in the 27 May 
1888 Fort Fraser journal entry: “[f]our Indians from the Forks of the Skeena [Hazelton] 
arrived ... [t]hey traded all the skins they had this afternoon, and intend on leaving 
tomorrow, to return again in the fall. They will probably they say, make this their trading 
post in the future, as they are afraid to return again to the Skeena in account of the 
sickness and mortality among the Indians there last season.”92 Sinclair’s account of 
displacement is supported by MacFarlane, who documented the indigenous peoples who 
passed through Stuart Lake, noting that many individuals who were expected to trade 
there failed to visit during the winter of 1888.93
Although the disruption brought about by the epidemic was temporary, it had a 
larger impact on community structures. As both Williams and Galois argue, in 1889 
Magistrate Captain W. Fitzstubbbs, Indian superintendent I.W. Powell and future Indian 
Agent R.E. Loring would find the Skeena region in a greatly weakened position 
following the uprising, but also following the epidemic period.94 Surveying in the forks, 
which had been challenged by the Gitxsan in 1881, 1884, and 1887, began in the fall of 
1888, only a few short months after the H.M.S Caroline and the last of the regiment 
departed.95 Economically and physically compromised by the extended period of disease 
and cyclic scarcity, the Gitxsan had little power to influence the creation of the Babine
91 HBCA B.74/a/ 2 12 May 1888, f. 11.
92 HBCA B.74 /a/22 1887-1893 27 May 1888, f. 13.
93 HBCA B.188/b/10 vol. 2 “Memorandum for Quesnel,” pg. 77.
94 Williams, “A History of Gitxsan Relations,” 59; Robert Galois, “The History of the Upper Skeena 
Region, 1850-1927,” Native Studies Review 9.2 (1993-1994): 137, 139.
95 Galois, “The History of the Upper Skeena Region,” 137, 139.
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Agency in 1889 and the permanent placement of an Indian Agent in Hazelton. George 
Derrick, one of Barbeau’s informants, claimed that the creation of the reserve and the 
response of the provincial government to Kamalmuk’s death were intrinsically linked: the 
Gitxsan would not accept the reserve until Kamalmuk’s death received suitable 
compensation, but the government would not offer compensation until the people 
accepted the reserve.96 The repeated failure of the provincial government to acknowledge 
Gitxsan traditional values was not the only cause for resentment. The establishment of the 
agency resulted in the administrative amalgamation of the Upper Skeena and Babine 
peoples, a shift that affected Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en relations with neighboring 
indigenous and settler communities well into the twentieth century.97
By 1890, the aggressive military action Gough termed “Gunboat Diplomacy” had 
virtually ceased, making the Skeena Uprising one of the last incidents in British 
Columbia in which an indigenous population was subdued by the threat of overt violence. 
Although both the press and the DIA later admitted that the reports of violence in the 
uprising were greatly exaggerated,98 public and provincial fears of an “Indian Rebellion” 
in the Skeena region transcended local discourse and reflected concerns about the 
vulnerability of all distant settler communities. In 1891, a stockade was erected around 
Fort Hazelton, but the balance of power had already shifted. By 1892, the majority of the 
reserves on the Upper Skeena had been established. While the Gitxsan peoples continued 
to assert themselves in both legal and resource-based conflicts with settler communities 
and the provincial government, an important transfer of authority had occurred in
96 Marius Barbeau and William Benyon, informant George Derrick, “Gitksan Narratives,” CMC, Northwest 
Coast Files (1924)( B- F-89.3).
97 Williams, “A History of Gitxsan Relations,” 63; Galois, “The History of the Upper Skeena Region,” 139, 
140.
98 ARDIA 1889; “Northern Indians” Victoria Daily Colonist 1 May, 1891.
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response to disease and the further encroachment of settlement in the Skeena region. As 
Williams argued, the Gitxsan themselves were an important part of the growth of 
Canadian law after 1888 and an acknowledgement of this transition is necessary to 
understand how the Gitxsan maintained a significant degree of legal autonomy beyond 
the colonial period, a defining factor of contemporary Gitxsan-provincial relations." 
Although no comprehensive approach has been taken to the Skeena River uprising, the 
increased integration of the 1888 measles epidemic into the broader historical narrative of 
the Skeena Forks region has revealed the complexity of Gitxsan-settler relations during a 
period of great economic and cultural challenge. The epidemic must be recognized as a 
central facet of this narrative, as it was a key part of the settler uprising, and a strong 
influence in the creation of settler identity in the Skeena Region.
99 Williams, “A History of Gitxsan Relations,” 5, 8, 85. Williams points to the Delgamuukw trials, but a 
more recent example can be found in Gitxsan resistance to the construction of the Enbridge pipeline.
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Conclusion
“Patterns of Diffusion” is the first step in the inclusion of the 1886-1888 measles 
epidemic in British Columbia’s historical narrative. The exploration of this epidemic 
contributes to an improved understanding of the expansion of white settlement and 
colonial authority in British Columbia’s Central Interior region, as well as the influence 
of epidemic disease upon indigenous communities at the end of the nineteenth century. 
The inclusion of the epidemic into British Columbia’s historical narrative has important 
implications for historians of both indigenous history and epidemics. “Patterns of 
Diffusion” shows that epidemics and disease continued to be influential factors in 
colonialism long after concepts of contact and “virgin soil” became irrelevant, and that 
these later-period epidemics have complex implications with important ties to the 
changing environment and political landscape. This is particularly true of the period 
examined here. The 1886-88 measles epidemic occurred during a period of great 
economic hardship and resource scarcity, and had a significant impact on the subsistence 
patterns of the indigenous peoples of the Central Interior. Studies of newcomer expansion 
and settlement—particularly in the Skeena Region—are incomplete without the 
acknowledgement of this epidemic and the events that surrounded it. Moreover, “Patterns 
of Diffusion” examines an often ignored period of Hudson’s Bay Company history, 
showing that the 1886-1888 measles epidemic became deeply involved with company 
business in central British Columbia even as modernization and changes in policy shifted 
company priorities away from the fur economy.
Perhaps most importantly, “Patterns of Diffusion” sheds light on British 
Columbia’s often overlooked epidemiological history. Many nineteenth-century
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epidemics are either almost or wholly absent from British Columbia’s broader historical 
narrative. Acknowledging this alone has the potential to expand the historiography 
greatly, but much fiirther study is needed.
Unfortunately, despite the best efforts of this work, much remains unknown about 
the 1886-1888 measles epidemic. The scarcity of evidence and the fragmented nature of 
the historical record have limited a fuller exploration of the scope and impact of the 
epidemic, as have the ever-present constraints of time and space. Many important 
questions remain unanswered. For example, only one settler region is examined in this 
study. How did other settler communities react to the epidemic? Did the epidemic 
permanently disrupt indigenous subsistence patterns, or was the disruption only 
temporary? What was the broader impact on wage labour and seasonal economies? 
Moreover, it is unclear how far the epidemic spread, how many people died or were ill, 
and what many of the longer-term impacts on indigenous health, administration, and 
reserve creation were. It is unlikely that many of these questions will ever be fully 
answered, but asking them reveals the necessity of further epidemiological history in 
British Columbia. “Patterns of Diffusion” provides a starting point for future research by 
showing that the 1886-1888 epidemic was highly significant in both settler and 
Aboriginal communities and was deeply intertwined with both the environmental and 
economic history of the Central Interior.
“Patterns of Diffusion” is the first step of a broader examination of disease and 
settlement in British Columbia’s Central Interior. Nineteenth century epidemics need to 
be considered fully as industrial-era phenomena and as part of British Columbia’s 
historical narrative before a full picture of indigenous-newcomer relationships can
115
develop. The inclusion of these narratives into the broader history of British Columbia 
will substantially expand the way historians think about the relationship between disease, 
colonialism, and indigenous peoples.
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